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Foreword
As a social phenomenon, corruption is as old as  society and it is talked
and written about only when two conditions are met. The first is that there
exists enough freedom in a country that it can be written about at all. The
second is met when corruption becomes massive, when it penetrates all
institutions of society and state and when it distracts the normal function-
ing of the legal and ethical order.
Corruption would not be so old, or so hard to eliminate if it was not so
closely connected to human nature. While not getting into anthropology
and definitions of human nature and the discussion if man is organically
good or bad, I would dare to say that human nature is in one sense suscep-
tible to corruption and weakness in overcoming of egoism. To be selfish
and aggressive it is enough for us to follow our instincts. But, to be good
and moral we need to exert a greater or a lesser effort to overcome our
instincts. By living in a society, a person is exposed to numerous tempta-
tions and there are few who will confess like Oscar Wilde: I can resist
everything, except temptations.
These few sentences are not an attempt to make relative corruption as a
social evil, nor to discourage the struggle against it, but to warn of its
resistance and breadth. We are talking about a struggle against a social evil
which destroys the community, annuls the role of legal and moral norms,
and endangers public goods and the existence of the majority of the peo-
ple. Corruption flourishes when the general or public goods are without
strong protection. State finances, state property are the real targets of
organized corruption and organized crime. Unstable states, societies in
transition are especially exposed to corruption because of the changes of
the legal and moral norms.
In certain countries of the former socialist order corruption had roots in
the previous regimes. The longer the crises of these societies have lasted, the
larger the scope of corruption has become. When corruption reaches enor-
mous dimensions, when it breaches into all services, institutions, and
organizations, when it enters into all pores of a society an increasing overall
decaying takes place. First, the police cooperate with criminals, and them it
organizes them; customs officers cooperate with smugglers, and then they
themselves organize smuggling. The judiciary, medical care, education, and
especially the economy fall under the influence of organized corruption. A
symbiosis is created of normal and pathological phenomenon. There is no
struggle against the combined forces of corruption, and everyone cooper-
ates in the same task. This is a condition that can be conditionally called
cleptocracy. All of the influential factors of a society are united in the theft
of public goods, and make up one thieving oligarchy.
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If the honorable citizens do not wake up, organize and fight back, the
rule of thieves can go on for a long time. And even worse, it makes relative
all and makes senseless both the morality and the legality and the public,
annuls the struggle between good and bad, between normal and patholog-
ical, destroys social dynamics and development and promotes decay and
ruin as a destiny. For this reason the first and most important step of every
democratic reform has to be an uncompromising fight against corruption.
Dragoljub Miæunoviæ
President of the House of Citizens 
Assembly of Yugoslavia 
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I Introduction
Corruption, or the practice of bribery, is as old as the state. Therefore
the struggle for its suppression is also that old. Along with the develop-
ment of economic activity, growing government intervention in business
and the bureaucratization of society, corruption grew in intensity. There-
fore, it became one of significant problems of the contemporary world. It
is known that ancient Athenians faced this social phenomenon. This is
why they had a set of rules for its suppression. The expression corruption
Machiavelli takes from Poliby and is denoted as a quality of spoiling of
power. In England the idea of corruption in the eighteen century, besides
deteriorating of authority, was identified with bribery. As corruption,
today, we most often understand the illegal use of social position and
power for personal gain. Concern that because of excessive power of the
state, elections will be reduced to bribery was shared by David Hume.
Simultaneously, Montesquieu believed that any authority is prone to mis-
use, and therefore has to be limited by another authority. Cited views from
the history of social thought imply that where there is political power and
influence there is, in a greater or lesser extent, corruption. In political the-
ory there existed almost a commonly accepted concept that political
power and influence are not to be sold and bought, as is not to be
bought and sold or be a subject of sale a human life, marriage right, child
birth, freedom of speech and association, love, religious feelings etc. The
object of trade, also, should not be an official position, which derives from
the understanding of politics as a common good and which has been
through time codified in legislation of the civilized world. Between these
generally accepted principles and practice occasionally there is significant
difference, and the misuse of the official and political position is sanc-
tioned by criminal code.
The presented principles, although generally accepted, did not deter
development of corruption, its growth and developing into a widespread
phenomenon in all countries of the world. This fact is supported by
numerous researches on one hand, and almost daily, big or small, corrup-
tion scandals that agitate not only the undeveloped, but also the developed
countries of liberal democracy. 
The goal of this study is to, based on clear theoretical premises and
available and processed empirical material, explain the causes and mecha-
nisms of corruption in Serbia, and to comprehend most significant conse-
quences of corruption. Based on that empirical knowledge, to define an
anti-corruption strategy, which should then be transformed into an action
plan. That long journey is to be made by making the first step, which is
defining of the phenomenon of corruption. 
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DEFINTION OF CORRUPTION
Corruption can be defined in several different ways. The most encom-
passing definition of corruption was offered by Vito Tanzi. According to
him: Corruption is the intentional non-compliance with the arms 
length principle aimed at deriving some advantage for oneself or for relat-
ed individuals from this behavior.
The principle of arms-length demands that, in decision-making, per-
sonal or any other relationships between participants in the exchange do
not have any influence. This principle is part of the functioning of a per-
fect market, which is, by definition, depersonalized. 
Based on Tanzis definition, it can be concluded that there are two nec-
essary conditions so that the violation of the arms length principle can be
defined as corruption. First, it is necessary that an intent exists  acciden-
tal undermining of impartiality because of, for example, imperfect infor-
mation, does not represent corruption. Secondly, it is necessary that as a
result of the named impartiality there is the seizing of a certain benefit, or
an acquirement of personal gain. Undermining of impartiality because of,
for example, the color of the skin of the participant in the transaction rep-
resents racism, not corruption. 
Seizing of a benefit, or an acquirement of personal gain for one who
makes partial biased decisions, can have different forms. It is customary to
imply corruption as accepting money (this form of corruption is most
often called bribery), but similar gain can imply expensive gifts as a fee or
counter services. Expensive jewelry for the wife of the person who was
biased or a well-paid job (with little work) for his son surely constitutes
corruption. 
Seizing a benefit, or acquiring of personal gain, can be carried out
simultaneously with the making of a biased decision, but those two acts
can be carried out at different times. Namely, biased decision making by
the one who is corrupted makes an informal, but very solid obligation to
return the favor, or to repay the favor and that obligation does not grow
obsolete, so that seizing of personal benefit can be moved into the future.
If the counter service is a well paid job for the son, and the son has just
started college, it is obvious that there is a time lapse between two acts.
Furthermore, in making an agreement on corruption, the counter service
is often not specified, but only an obligation is established for the corrup-
tor to provide personal gain in the future for the corrupted. 
Colemans theory of social capital of the individual is useful, where that
capital represents the sum of claims of an individual based on services
already rendered. For example, a government employee in a department
for import licensing, by issuing licenses in a biased manner, does not have
to ask for a counter service right away from those he issued licenses in a
biased manner to, but such a counter service is assumed in the future.
Every biased license that is issued represents an investment in the social
capital of the government official, i.e. the increase of his claim from other
individuals. The greater the social capital of an individual, the larger is its
expected utility in the future. 
Additionally, one must distinguish between gross and net social capital
of an individual. Net social capital of an individual represents a sum of
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counter services which that individual expects, decreased by the sum of
counter services which the individual is to provide in the future. One
should remember the relationships established in undertakings of the
Corleone family (novel and film The Godfather I). It is clear that Don
Vito Corleone is an individual with greatest net social capital in his envi-
ronment. In such circumstances, net social capital is inherited, and his
son, when he becomes the new Don, successfully uses that capital in estab-
lishing his position on the relevant market. 
In the majority of cases, the temporal delimitation between the biased
decision by the corrupted and the counter service by the corrupter is such
that the counter service is subsequent. This could be called delayed pay-
ment in cases of corruption. However, in certain cases there is pre pay-
ment. For example, in some Asian countries members of parliament or
government officials receive envelopes with money in advance, at the time
of moving into office, without specification of what needs to be done, i.e.
which biased decisions are expected from them. Only subsequently will a
demand for a service or biased decision be forwarded. 
The above definition of corruption represents a solid analytical frame-
work for investigating this phenomenon. However, the use of this very
definition as a criterion in judging of the observed activity, i.e. judging if
corruption is present or not, is linked with certain problems.
Particularly, it is rather difficult to operationally define bias in decision-
making, that is the breaking of the principle of impartiality. It is easiest to
determine if a formal rule is broken. However, in many cases, formal rules
do not exist and decision-making is a discretionary right of a government
official. If the government official issuing import licenses has a discre-
tionary right to choose to whom he will issue the license, having in mind
the interest for the national economy in general, or preservation of the
public interest, it is very difficult to determine if the rule is broken, and
especially if it is broken on purpose, since there is no strict or formal rule.
Additionally, temporal delimitation between the providing of services
by the corrupted party and the counter service by the corrupter, establish-
es analytical problems in the determination of a personal gain by the one
corrupted. If the counter service is not specified (what is the counter serv-
ice to be provided), i.e. if the corrupted party is investing in its social cap-
ital, it is very difficult to identify the second necessary condition for cor-
ruption, which is the acquisition of a personal gain. We are faced with a
problem in defining personal gain. In most cases an individual or his fam-
ily is involved. However, in certain cases counter services are provided to
an organization of which the corrupted party is a member, for example a
political party. In such a way the number of players in the chain is
increased, additionally making it harder to identify personal gain. 
In addition to the definition by Tanzi, recently an operational defini-
tion by the World Bank is often used, stating that corruption represents
a misuse of public authority for the acquisition of a private gain. This
definition considers the cause of corruption in public authority, and
necessarily links corruption to the state, its activities, state intervention
on the market and the existence of the public sector. In other words, the
use of this definition excludes the possibility of corruption in the private
sector, and it focuses exclusively on corruption in the public sector. This
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definition is consistent with the beliefs of American Nobel prize laureate
Becker that if we abolish the state, there will be no corruption. 
In principle, Tanzis definition of corruption is superior. First, the
World Bank definition lacks certain analytical elements (criteria) making
it difficult to analyze the mechanism of corruption. Second, Tanzis defi-
nition should be given advantage, since it makes possible the examination
of corruption in the private sector, while the World Bank definition deals
exclusively with the state, or the public sector. Mechanisms of these two
kinds of corruptions are somewhat different, and we will consider them
later at length. Although Tanzis definition is superior, the World Bank
definition makes it possible to focus on corruption in the public sector,
which is, in its dimensions and consequences, a significantly more impor-
tant phenomenon. The majority of contemporary corruption research
deals with corruption in the public sector, or with corruption under the
auspices of the state. Therefore research that follows deals with corruption
in the public sector, which due to its spread and consequences is a far
more significant phenomenon, in Serbia. An additional reason for this
choice is a very widespread public sector in Serbia. It includes not only the
public administration in the wider sense, but also public companies, or the
so called socially-owned companies, which still make up the dominant
part of the Serbian economy. Accordingly, in further text, only corruption
in the public sector will be examined.
A few words on the ethical aspects in defining corruption. For a large
number of people corruption represents something morally unacceptable,
or an evil to be fought because it is against basic moral principles. Still,
there are cases when it is difficult to morally judge one who used corrup-
tion. Let us examine this point in a hypothetical, but still plausible exam-
ple. During summer of 2000 in a small town in Serbia, the police arrested
a young activist of the Otpor movement. The grandfather of the activist
knew that chances were high that his grandson would be heavily beaten by
the police. For this reason he visits the home of his neighbor, a local
policeman whom he has known for 30years. He gives him 100 German
marks with a request that no harm comes to his grandchild. The police-
man accepts the money. The next day, the grandson is released by the
police without bruises. Therefore, there is no doubt corruption is at hand.
On the moral ground can this activity be criticized? For the inquiry that
follows this issue is simply not relevant. The analysis of corruption that
will follow is morally neutral. In that sense the listed definition of corrup-
tion is morally neutral. 
The goal of the analysis of corruption in Serbia that follows is to discov-
er the level, causes, and mechanisms of corruption, the consequences, or
effects on the well being of the society and on the distribution of that well
being, a not to deal with the moral condemnation of those corrupted and
corruptors. The moral position of the author of this project is that corrup-
tion, in principle, is evil and this position does not need to be contested.
Additionally, we will easily agree that the best option is that police should
not arrest and beat young people for protesting against the regime  any
regime, and not only the former Serbian regime. Then there will be no
need for corruption of this sort, be it, in the noted hypothetical case, moral
or not. 
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BASIC CAUSES OF CORRUPTION
In the economic world, the basic interest of all business subjects, i.e. all
people who enter into economic relationships, are identical  maximizing
of personal welfare. So, selfish interest is the basic motive of people who
enter into mutual economic relationships. The founder of contemporary
economic science Adam Smith clearly presented this concept more then
two centuries ago. The baker does not supply us with bread he makes
because of his altruism, or for worry that we should not go hungry, but
because of the profit he makes by selling bread. 
Each one of us is ready to invest something, or any resource one has
(property, money, work time, work effort, etc.), only in the case when
from that investment one receives greater value than the one that was
invested. And each of us attempts to maximize the difference between the
value of the investment and the yield from that investment. No one can
pay me as little as I can work represents a specific, although socially
destructive, form of such a maximization. In other words, people in all
conditions behave economically rationally.
A special form of such maximizing is rent seeking behavior. Rent rep-
resents the overall income that is larger than the opportunity costs linked
to that income. Economists would say that rent is the yield that is above
the opportunity costs of investment of a certain resource (Marxist orient-
ed economists would call the rent, extra profit). Each one of us wants to
capture or maximize rent. To do so, we are ready to invest our resources,
so that we can influence those decisions that will make it possible to cap-
ture rent.
Some forms of rent seeking behavior surely do not represent corrup-
tion. Although, there are certain cases of corruption that are present in sit-
uations where no rent exists, the most significant, most common and
regarding their consequences most dangerous forms of corruption are
linked to situations where rent is generated. Corruption then represents
means for the generation or the capturing of rent. 
Let us consider the relationship of corruption and rent in one hypothet-
ical example of state intervention. The state, regardless of motives, decid-
ed to limit the import of bananas to 100 t per year. Such limitation is car-
ried by issuing import licenses, which can be received only by ten compa-
nies and each company for import of 10 t of bananas. Let us assume that
all bananas are acquired at the same purchase price and that all companies
are equally efficient, i.e. have identical costs of import per unit (transport
costs, distribution costs, costs of capital, etc.). For simplicitys sake, let us
assume that average costs equal marginal costs and that there are no real
costs of corruption. If we assume that the function of the demand for
bananas to equal:
price (p) = 6500  30 quantity (q)
and that average, or marginal costs are constant
average costs = marginal costs = 2.000 DEM per ton, 
we can examine effects of such a state intervention on generating of rent
and on originating corruption (Picture 1.1). 
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If there was no limitation in the import of bananas, or if there was no
state intervention, the equilibrium price would be less than the price
formed by limiting import via import licenses (p0 < p’), and the equilibri-
um quantity would be greater (Q0 > Q). Decreasing of the supply and the
increase of the equilibrium price leads to the generation of rent (area
p0ACp’). Therefore, in this case, rent was generated by state intervention,
and with the existence of rent, there is a possibility of corruption as a
means for capturing rent. Namely, there is an incentive to corrupt state
employees who issue import licenses for bananas and to capture at least
one part of the rent generated by this type of state intervention. The values
of relevant parameters for our hypothetical example are listed in Table 1.1.
Picture 1.1.
Import licenses for bananas  market equilibrium 
p
p’
p0
0
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Table 1.1. 
Import licenses for bananas: effects on resource allocation and distribution of well
being
Q0Q’
BA
C
Q
No state State State 
intervention intervention with intervention
no corruption with corruption
Equilibrium price 2.000 3.500 3.500
Equilibrium quantity 150 100 100
Total costs 300.000 200.000 200.000
Social welfare 337.500 300.000 300.000
Rent 0 150.000 150.000
Level of corruption 0 0 1-149.999
D
It is very important to notice that in this case the overall amount of wel-
fare is decreased due to state intervention, independent of the existence of
corruption. So, state intervention in this case is multifold counter produc-
tive. First, it decreases the overall social welfare (area p0ACD is smaller
than the area p0BD). Second, it forms space for corruption, by generation
of rent through state intervention and an incentive to by the corrupting of
state employees, capture one part of the generated rent. At that, the total
level of corruption expressed in monetary terms is limited by the value of
the rent. Corruption will always be a bit smaller than the total amount of
the rent. Also, it is very important to notice that the change of the amount
of corruption in this case does not lead to a change in allocation of
resources, so that there is no change in the amount of total social welfare,
but only its redistribution. It is certain that, in this case, the best solution is
the elimination of state intervention, i.e. deregulation. By doing so, on one
hand, social welfare would be increased, and on the other, rent would be
eliminated removing the possibility of corruption. Therefore, in this case,
there is no dilemma about the best anti -corruption strategy. 
However, in certain cases rent is not generated because of state inter-
vention, but because of a specific structure of the market. A typical exam-
ple is a natural monopoly, where it is socially justified that certain manu-
facturing on a given market production is carried out by only one manu-
facturer. Therefore, introduction of competition in cases of natural
monopoly is not socially desirable. The problem is, if there is no state
intervention, i.e. economic regulation of a natural monopoly, there is
monopolistic behavior that leads to a decrease of supply, increase of
prices, and the formation of rent (monopoly profit). Perfect state inter-
vention (economic regulation) can, at least in principle, lead to an equilib-
rium which would maximize the social welfare and abolish the existence of
rent. However, the monopolist has an incentive to corrupt the regulator
and to, in that manner, provide room for his own economic profit, or
rent. Let us examine this mechanism of rent formation and corruption
generation on a hypothetical example of water supply, as a typical example
of a natural monopoly. Like in the last hypothetical example, for the sake
of simplicity let us assume that average and marginal costs are equal.
Additionally, if we assume that the function of the demand for water is:
price (p) = 702  7 quantity (q)
and that average or marginal costs are constant:
average costs = marginal costs = 2 DEM per m3 of water, 
we can examine effects of such state intervention on forming of rent and
on generating corruption in a case of a natural monopoly (Picture 1.2). 
If there is no state intervention the monopolist will, by decreasing of the
level of supply (Q’ < Q0), maximize the rent (economic profit) which he
seizes, which (in conditions of a monopoly) necessary leads to the increase
of the equilibrium price (p’ > p0). This leads to the lowering of the overall
level of social welfare (p0ACD < p0BD) and to the formation of rent
(p0ACp’). In contrast, perfect state intervention (for simplicity, while sac-
rificing the truth, perfect state intervention will be identified with state
intervention without corruption) eliminates the rent, equalizes the price
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with marginal costs and maximizes social welfare. Accordingly, the
monopolist has an incentive to corrupt the regulator (state employees in
charge od economic regulation) and to maximize the amount of captured
rent. In contrast to the previous hypothetical case, in this case the change
in the level of corruption necessarily leads to the change in the allocation
of resources and to the change in overall social welfare. The greater the
level of corruption, the lesser will be the overall welfare in society. 
In this hypothetical case, deregulation cannot be the basic anti-corrup-
tion strategy. Namely, this would equate interests of the corruptor with
interests of the anti corruption strategy, or the total abolition of regulation
is exactly what is in the interest of the corruptor. This would lead to alloca-
tive loss of welfare (deadweight loss), or to the minimizing of welfare in
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Table 1.2. 
Regulation of a natural monopoly in waterworks: allocation of resources and
distribution of welfare
Picture 1.2.
Regulation of natural monopoly in waterworks 
p
p’
p0
0 Q0Q’
BA
C
Q
D
No state State intervention State 
intervention without intervention
corruption with corruption
Equilibrium price 352 2 2-352
Equilibrium quantity 50 100 50-100
Total costs 100 200 100-200
Social welfare 26.250 35.000 26.250-35.000
Rent 17.500 0 1-17.500
Level of corruption 0 0 1-17.500
given circumstances, instead of its maximizing. Therefore, in this case,
deregulation is not a good solution. 
The previous discussion has demonstrated that, in majority of cases,
rent seeking, or the desire for its usurping represents a precondition for
corruption. In other words, the basic economic precondition for corrup-
tion is rational behavior of economic subjects. However, this is only a nec-
essary, but not a sufficient condition. For corruption to occur in reality,
other preconditions should be met.
The basic precondition for corruption is state intervention (either justi-
fied or not). Contemporary states frequently intervene in business. While
not questioning the motives, at this juncture, or justification of state inter-
vention, the very existence of such an intervention forms fertile grounds
for corruption to flourish. 
BASIC MECHANISMS OF CORRUPTION
Types of corruption 
In examining mechanisms of corruption, the analysis of a few possible
basic assumptions is needed. The first theoretical assumption is that every
state intervention in business is well meaning, i.e. that we are dealing with
a benevolent state, whose only goal is to maximize the welfare of its sub-
jects. It is clear, as noted previously, that such a state can exist only in text-
books  it is yet to be found in reality. 
If a state is benevolent, the basic question is: how is the practice of cor-
ruption possible? Theoretically, the answer can be sought in the principal-
agent theory. Namely one can assume, the existence of asymmetry of
information between the principal (the state, or the legislative authority),
who defines the rules of conduct, and the agent (state employees), who
enforces those rules. The agents, or civil servants, do not have the same
goals as the benevolent state. The basic goal of the agent is to maximize his
personal welfare. For the state to control the work of the agent it has to be
perfectly informed about his job. In reality, however, there exists a natural
and very significant asymmetry of information. Agents know much more
about their activities, then the state, embodied in the legislative authori-
ties. The essence of the agency theory is that, under conditions of asym-
metrical information, state employees act in such a way that their person-
al goals (maximizing of personal well being) are realized independently
from the task bestowed on them by the principal (legislative state authori-
ty). Therefore, in the framework of this theory, we are dealing with a
benevolent state and wicked state employees. As defined by Leninists, we
are dealing with scoundrels within our own ranks. In other words, cor-
ruption is consequence of asymmetric information between a benevolent
state and evil state employees. 
However, the question of persuasiveness of such a theoretical construc-
tion arises, at least for certain societies, namely the persuasiveness of the
assumption of the benevolent state. For this reason an alternative theoret-
ical approach was constructed, which starts from an assumption about an
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evil state. It is assumed that the only goal of the state is to maximize its
income, that is that the only goal of the state leadership to maximize their
personal welfare. In this case we are dealing with a so-called predator state,
or at it is called lately, a cleptocratic state. Very often a cleptocratic state is
identified with dictatorship, or an undemocratic regime, while the benev-
olent state is identified with democracy. Regardless of the fact that such a
proposition the represents a very harsh simplification, a cleptocratic dicta-
torship represents an acceptable framework for the explanation of the
mechanism of corruption in many countries. 
Inside the given conceptual framework, the dictator is really only a rob-
ber and he understands the dictatorship as means for maximizing of his
personal welfare, that is, for maximizing his income and wealth. Corrup-
tion in this case represents only a mechanism for increasing the income of
the dictator. The necessary condition for maximizing of income is that the
existing dictator remains a dictator for as long as possible, so that he can
succeed in plundering as much as possible. As there are candidates for tak-
ing over power, since they would want to become dictators instead of the
Dictator, in order to improve their welfare. The dictator must carefully
share the spoils among all members of the ruling elite, so as to curtail their
incentive to realize their ambition. In other words, there exists a division
of spoils. In that context, the corruption of state employees does not rep-
resent a random phenomenon, but only a well- elaborated role inside
institutionalized plunder. 
There is a very significant difference between centralized and decentral-
ized corruption. The previous model of corruption (Picture 1 and table 1)
was based on an assumption that for the import of bananas only one license
was needed, which was issued, practically, by only one state employee, so
that there is a monopoly on the market for corruption. If, technically, the
mentioned import license is issued by several employees, it is assumed that
they are in collusion, and form a perfect (full) cartel. According to the find-
ings of microeconomic theory, i.e. the theory of industrial organizations,
there is no difference between monopoly equilibrium and the equilibrium
in the case of a perfect cartel. Such market structure, i.e. the industrialized
organization of corruption, is called centralized corruption. 
In contrast, it can be assumed that for import of bananas several licenses
are needed, where every individual license represents a needed, but not
adequate condition for the import of the named commodity (besides the
basic import license, for example, licenses issued by the sanitary inspection,
Health Protection Administration, Central Bank, etc). Only if all licenses
are acquired, the given commodity can be imported. Every individual
license is issued by a different, mutually not connected department of the
state administration, or different civil servants who are not in collusion.
This structure of the corruption market is called decentralized corruption.
The key question concerning industrial organizing is what are the con-
ditions that support the forming of centralized, or decentralized corrup-
tion. To answer this question the cartel theory can be used. All of the fac-
tors that influence the formation and survival, or implementation of car-
tels, influence the formation and survival of centralized corruption. This
pertains above all to the possibility of the breaking of a cartel and imple-
mentation of credible punishment. For this reason centralized corruption
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was dominant in communist Russia The basic institution for implement-
ing of the cartel of centralized corruption was the KGB, which had means
for detection of the breaking of centralized corruption and refined meth-
ods for punishing violators, which were implemented with haste. In that
sense, the same findings hold for centralized corruption under the aus-
pices of New Yorks Genovese family. The lack of such, or similar institu-
tions causes the formation of decentralized corruption. 
Therefore, a strong and unbound state (by democratic institutions, for
example) enables the existence of centralized corruption. A weak state,
regardless if it is bound or not, represents a necessary condition for decen-
tralized corruption. Numerous examples of African countries confirm
this. Weak African states create a room for dispersed corruption, which
includes a great part of the state apparatus, or state employees. The basic
reason for the flourishing of corruption in post-communist Russia is the
weakening of the power of the state, which still kept a high level of inter-
vention in the economy, leading to the transformation of centralized into
decentralized corruption. Therefore, there is no paradox in the flourishing
of corruption in Russia  the reason for this is to be sought in the change
of its industrial organization. 
It is certain that the probability is higher in case of a benevolent, or
democratic state, for decentralized, and in the case of a cleptocratic state,
for centralized corruption. However, this principal does not have to hold
true in all cases. The key factor of industrial organization of corruption is
the power of the state, or its capability to enforce rule it prescribes, regard-
less of character of those rules (see Box 1 for a reminder of corruption in
nazi Germany).
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Box1
Corruption in Nazi Germany:
Living Space of Space for Plunder 
Was there corruption in Hitler’s Germany? Sometimes one can hear statements that
this was a state where corruption was eliminated. As proof, it is stated as a fact that
not one concentration camp prisoner was able to bribe camp guards so they would
set him free. While not contesting the above, it should be said that it is not proof of
elimination of corruption in that country. According to credible evidence (Albert
Speer, Hitler’s arnamement minister), the most corrupt man of nazi Germany was
Hermann Goering, the number two man of that regime (in internal-political issues
largely the first man). Since Goering had exceptionally great authority in allocation of
resources at less then market prices, it is certain that many German corporations had
an incentive to bribe him, so to receive appropriate resources (slave labor, for exam-
ple), or to be granted large contracts as part of public procurement, especially for the
armed forces. Indirect proof of Goering’s corruption is the difference between his
wealth at the time when he and his comrades took power and the time when they
were removed from power. "You think that I do not know that Goering is corrupt?
His example made corruption possible in our state!" confided Hitler to Speer, while
Russian tanks entered suburbs of Berlin, seeking the shortest route to the bunker
(Speer, 1965). Therefore, corruption in Nazi Germany was very centralized. It was
not available to the concentration camp guards (punishment for such corruption was
extreme, with chances that it would be implemented, a consequence of a strong, and
in this case unscrupulous state), but it was available to the Nazi leadership. It can be
concluded  a strong state means centralized corruption.
With all dangers of crude generalization, the following table can be used
as a guide through different types of corruption. 
Forms of corruption 
According to the mechanism of corruption, or its economic conse-
quences, it is possible to identify several kinds (aspects) of corruption:
a) corruption which makes possible the implementing of rules (laws);
b) corruption which makes possible circumnavigating, or breaking of
rules (laws) 
c) corruption, which leads to the change or the formulation of new,
rules (laws).
The previous hypothetic case, the example of licenses for the import of
bananas, can be used for explicating the listed kinds of corruption, or the
differences in motives and consequences for different types of corruption.
It is assumed that the state policy of limiting of banana import is based on
licenses for their import. If it is assumed that import licenses are issued to
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Table 1.3.
Different types of corruption
Type of rule Democracy Dictatorship
Character of the state Benevolent Cleptocracy
Source of corruption Agency problem Character of the state
Intensity of corruption Uncertain Great
Character of corruption Decentralized Centralized
Frame 2
State intervention dominated by private interests:
Peanuts, seeds, other pastimes....
A typical example of state intervention dominated by private interest, is peanut pro-
duction in the US. Regulation of this field is based on strong administrative barriers
for entry, very complicated import of this commodity, and quotas for maximum
production of producers already in the field. It is assumed (Rucker and Thurman,
1990) that effects of such regulation on social well being in the period 1982-1987
were very unfavorable. Deadweight loss was around US$ 34 million, and from con-
sumers to manufacturers welfare was redistributed to the amount of around US$
255 million. Why does such counterproductive state intervention remain? The num-
ber of peanut producers in the US is relatively small (only 23.046, based on 1982
data), and economic profit (transfer of well being) that is the result of named regu-
lation on the average equals US$ 11.100 per producer. Therefore, peanut producers
have a very strong incentive for interest-based organizing and in establishing, or
maintaining the existing regulatory policy. On the other hand, peanut consumers in
the US are extremely numerous (practically the complete population), which means
that costs to organize this interest group are extremely large. An average loss of con-
sumer’s surplus because of this regulatory program equals only US$ 1,23, meaning
that the transfer of well being of each group member caused by the banning of such
state intervention, or deregulation, would be negligible. There is no interest for con-
sumers to organize themselves and break, from the social standpoint,  counter-pro-
ductive state intervention. And the common interest? No one cares about it anyway. 
all interested companies that meet certain conditions, a corruption model
can be formulated that makes possible the implementation of law. Name-
ly, state employees do their job inefficiently, and issuing of licenses is
delayed, which endangers business activity of those companies that seek
the named import licenses. Accordingly, a rational behavior of those com-
panies consists in their readiness to pay a certain amount of money to be
issued import licenses, to speed up their issuing. In other words, they are
ready to pay for the issuing of a free license for which, according to rules,
they have the full right. 
There are two possible reasons for the named behavior of state employees.
First, there is no incentive to work efficiently. Regardless of the speed, or the
efficiency of their work, their salary remains the same, and therefore the opti-
mizing behavior of state employees is based on the minimization of effort
(costs) for a given income. Secondly, since thy are aware that companies are
ready to pay a bribe for speeding up the issuing of licenses, state employees
are acting in such a way as to increase the probability to be offered a bribe for
expediting the process of license issuing. The more they stall with issuing of
licenses, the greater the probability companies will offer a bribe. 
Even greater room for corruption of this kind is formed if the state
decides to limit the number of import licenses by issuing them in the order
that applications arrive (first come  first served). Then every import compa-
ny will have an incentive to, by corrupting the state employee issuing licens-
es, to get on the list of importers, or to skip the line that is being formed.
The next type of corruption is one that leads to circumnavigating, or
breaking of rules. Namely, every company that is importing bananas has
an interest in increasing the quantity of bananas which it is importing (for
every additionally imported banana, the profit is increased, as is the rent it
is seizing. This means they have an incentive to, by corrupting state
employees, to increase the quantity of the allowed import of bananas for
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Frame 3
State intervention and oblivion:
Sheep are for the taking 
In late 1940s the Korean war begun. Soon the American boys in uniform discovered
that Korea was a mountanous country, with a very harsh climate. Their uniforms
were not up to the job. The Chiefs of Staff decided to replace all uniforms with new
wool uniforms. Therefore, legislation was passed on the subvention of the produc-
tion of wool, and American farmers, drawn in by such a subventions began massive-
ly growing sheep and supplying wool. Years passed, the Korean war ended, the US
Army got new uniforms made of artificial fabrics, and the war moved to Vietnam,
where the cold did not represent a major problem. The only thing no one remem-
bered was to lift the rule not needed by anyone. Except, of course, by farmers who
continued to receive subventions for manufacturing of wool which was not needed
by anyone. Time passed, US Army waged war in Iraq and Kuwait, in very high tem-
peratures, while farmers continued to produce wool and receive subventions from
the federal budget. Only with the Clinton administration, as part of the process of
reform of the public administration, someone noticed that the subject subventions
were still paid. Of course, subventions were banned right away, and no one noticed
any consequences. Except, of course, the farmers who lost the subventions. Question
remains, who did those farmers vote for in the last US elections?
their company. In this way they increase the overall allowed import quan-
tity of bananas for the economy in general. Additionally, companies not
on the list for receiving licenses, have an economic interest for import of
bananas to be put on the list. In other words, there is a demand for addi-
tional import licenses, or supply for corruption making possible the
import of an additional quantity of bananas. If new, illegal licenses are
issued, rules are broken and the state is not in a position to effectively
implement the rules, or laws, aimed, at least in principle, towards maxi-
mizing social welfare. In other words, this kind of corruption increases the
quantity of imported bananas, or the real quantity is greater than the one
determined by the state. 
The two previous types of corruption are part of so called administra-
tive corruption or corruption that is based on biased decisions by state
employees making impossible the full and impartial implementation of
state rules. However, in its consequences, the worst type of corruption is
the so- called political corruption. This is the type of corruption that leads
to the change of rules, or laws in line with partial (private) interests of cor-
ruptors. In our hypothetical case of banana import, the rational interest of
importers is to limit the import even more, or to establish a new market
equilibrium securing the maximizing of the overall rent, of course under
the condition that they continue to have import licenses for bananas. This
means that companies will have an incentive to (by joint action) influence
the elected representatives of the people, i.e. the legislative branch, and to
(by changing the legislation), limit the import of bananas even more. In
this a way, corruption makes it possible that partial interest of a group, or
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Frame 4
State intervention in cases of natural monopoly:
Was Milton right?
The Chicago Nobel prize laureate Milton Friedman back in 1962 clearly stated that
regulating of natural monopolies is counterproductive and that it should be left to
the market. The basic position is that social costs of such regulation are greater then
the benefits. Elaborating, Friedman used two arguments. First, natural monopolies
are technologically conditioned, and every technology is prone to change, so that
natural monopolies are temporary phenomena - they will disappear with the change
of technology. Second, when they disappear, or when competition is established, a
regulatory agency will remain, and it will then regulate that which is not to be regu-
lated - a competitive market. Was Milton right? As far as the first argument stands,
we are still waiting for promises to be met. In certain fields (telecommunication, for
example), technological progress will lead to the dissapearance of natural monopo-
lies in many segments of the field. For example, wireless communication practically
broke the monopoly of classic land telephony in the so-called local networks. How-
ever, it is uncertain how will technological progress lead to pipeless water transport.
Only then will we be able to say that Milton was right. As for the second argument -
he was not right. Introducing competition or deregulation but of the change in
demand), lead to the abolishing of the regulatory agency. Also, changes in the field
of telecommunications lead to abolishing of economic regulation in many segments
of that field. Therefore, we should not fear that once established institutions could-
n’t be reformed. At least not in the US. 
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individuals be imposed as general social interest, or to even to make it offi-
cial by the passing of totally biased rules. 
In general terms, a certain level of corruption is unavoidable in every
society. It cannot be fully eliminated, nor is it possible to construct a sys-
tem fully resistant to corruption. But, it is possible to mortify it and
degrade the level of corruption from high towards low. The key difference
between societies with a high and low level of corruption is the issue of
social priorities. In societies with low corruption the priority is forming of
new value, or the increase of well being of the society. In societies with
high corruption the priority is redistribution of existing values, or the
redistribution of welfare, and not the creation of new value and the
increasing of the social welfare. Such societies wallow in corruption and
have no perspective. 

II Corruption and Bribery
in the Serbian Popular Tradition
DEFINITION OF BRIBE AND ITS SYNONYMS 
Bribe in the Serbian language signifies money or another valuable item
as a gift, compensation by which someone (usually one in power, who has
influence) is won over to meet the wish of the giver (most often in an unfair,
illegal way), according to the Matica Srpska Dictionary. An older word
exists discretion, which signifies a bribe, bribery. The word corruption
entered into use relatively late. 
Older sources mention bribes and bribery. In records of Bishop Mojsije
Petroviæ from the XVIII century, where financial costs are denoted, one of
large columns which denoted expenditures of bishops court were pres-
ents or discretions. The Bishop, during an official visit to Vienna in 1731,
writes that everyone expected either a present or a discretion and notes
they were made at Caesars Gate, office of the Vice-President, room
of the gracious, and for a done discretion of certain official named
Rehckron it is noted his new summer will not die. Jakov Ignjatoviæ in his
novel Patnica (1888) notes the following: Do you see this livestock. One
head is slaughtered and two are brought in. You know, farmers are still
good, they bring their judge discretion. Also Dositej Obradoviæ had to
give bribes: He wondered the offices of high administrators present at the
Court, seeking to influence them by discretions which jangle and tickle the
palate. Vuk Stefanoviæ Karadiæ inscribed in his Dictionary a verse: For
the peasants did wrong deeds / and cursed be one who taketh the bribe.
This verse clearly explains the goal of those people who wish to attain a
certain high position.
RELATIONSHIP OF POPULAR TRADITION TOWARDS CORRUPTION 
The Serbian popular tradition has a rather flexible position regarding
bribes and bribery, but it is fully aware of its existence, as of the fact that
this phenomena can hardly be exterminated.
According to popular belief, not every reward is a bribe and for this rea-
son in everyday life a clearly defined differentiation exists between a treat,
a gift, giving a gift, taking someone for a treat, and a bribe.
Habitual moral norms define ceremony and rituals and prescribe when
it is mandatory to bring a gift to someone. Those customs are usually
linked with the life cycle (birth, christening, wedding, newlywed celebra-
tion), and with certain great and important events for an individual or his
family, which demand great financial expenditures (building of a house,
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or, the so called moving in celebration).Giving gifts in these circum-
stances in any form is not considered a bribe.
Bribe is also not considered a situation where someone assisted you to fin-
ish a certain job, and you later treat him to lunch or a small present or money.
That is considered a treat or appreciation. According to the habitual norm, a
person is even under obligation to express his appreciation in a material way.
If not, the community will think of him as of an ungrateful person.
However, if you offer someone before the service is rendered a treat in
the form of a meal, gift, or money, and he accepts, and then does what you
asked for, that is considered a bribe.
The popular tradition has a negative opinion about the person receiving
a bribe. Condemnation by popular opinion is much harsher towards one
taking a bribe, then towards the one giving the bribe. The conviction exists
that the one receiving a bribe does so out of clear greed, and not out of any
existential need, and therefore the condemnation is greater. It is also
believed that he is using his position, authority, and power to acquire for
himself that which does not belong to him, or what he does not need. The
condemnation is especially great when the mentioned person arrived at
the given position by unhonorable means. It is believed that the position
itself of the bribe taker secures enough privileges and a good material exis-
tence, and that he does not have to take bribes. The expression to oil a
greasy goose pertains to such cases. Receiving a bribe according to popu-
lar tradition is a every serious offense, which debases not only his own rep-
utation, but also the reputation of his family. Accidents or sickness which
can happen to anyone, if they strike one who is believed to be taking bribes
are explained as Gods punishment for a bad deed. He is pursued by nega-
tive views even after his death, which is illustrated by the following story: A
peasant was on his death bed, and peasants gathered around him, when he
begun to pass away, someone lights a candle and places it in peasants
hands.  Thank you for the threat!, said the peasant not opening the eyes.
Sentiments are divided about the one who is giving a bribe, and are
formed on a case by case basis. If for the bribe giver this is the only way to
resolve a legitimate request, then the position of the traditional communi-
ty is non-condemning. Popular tradition tacitly approves and has great
understanding for an individual who by bribery expedites or receives cer-
tain decisions or settlement, because it knows that the state administration
or authorities, or state employees who are representatives of the authori-
ties, can always find an excuse for not issuing a ruling. If one insists on the
obligation of authorities to promptly and without any compensation carry
out its duty, the authority or the state employee can become agitated and
seek revenge at another time. The proverb: the poor cannot be measured
with the devilish one depicts powerlessness of an individual and the all-
powerful state or government.
Besides the force of the authorities there is also the economic motive.
Since the appellant is usually from the country, and officials are in cities, it
is cheaper and simpler for the appellant to bribe a clerk, then to travel to
the city several times for the same reason.
This sort of giving and taking of bribes has been present on this territo-
ry for centuries and it is hard to exterminate, because it has practically
become part of the folklore, an every day occurrence. The fact that author-
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ities will not exemplarily punish one who is receiving a bribe, and there is
always a possibility  often seen in practice  that the bribe giver will be
punished much more severely, causes in the popular tradition a certain
kind of apathy and loss of will to change the reality, and with the well
known statement or justification: Everyone does it! For those who still
have a feeling of remorse.
Regardless of how this kind of bribery seems naive and harmless, it is by
forming of general acceptance and lack of condemnation or simply by mak-
ing peace with destiny, in its essence dangerous for forming of a climate that
certain forms of bribery are less dangerous from others. In this manner a
habit is formed that every task is easier completed if the thing is oiled.
By accepting the concept that all will be easier if someone is bribed, we
arrive at a paradox where the meaning of the habitual norms is changed.
Often one can hear today: do this for me, and I will give you a treat.
Word treat, used in this context, represents and euphemism for bribery
and has a completely different meaning from the original. The word treat,
which always demarked a virtue and was a synonym for honesty, are now
becoming a label for a criminal activity. In time, if this misuse continues, a
situation will arise when offsprings will be speaking the language of their
ancestors, but the meaning of their words will be the opposite. The word
bribe will be lost, as was lost the word discretion, but corruption will
remain. Anyway, regardless of the above story about the peasant and the
candle it was shown that this process lasts longer then one might think.
On the territory of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
during times of the breakup and war there was a wide spread occurrence
of liberating people from occupied cities and their transfer to free, or
safe territories. This was called: extraction, buying out, saving, but it was
in reality classic bribery.
Bribed were those who at a given time had military or political power,
and givers of bribes were closest family members or friends of the person
who was in the occupied settlement. In the majority of cases there were
third parties present, who mediated between interested parties. Introduc-
tion of the third side, the mediator, is known in organized cases of bribery.
The bribe in these cases was money, usually hard currency, or sales con-
tracts, by which the one who is giving the bribe sold his property to the
one receiving the bribe (infrequently).
In the Serbian national territory this form of bribery was known previous-
ly and it is to be found during all wars and occupations.(The folk verse: Takes
Marko three loads of treasures, And he frees Moslem women and she cap-
tives, And pays Marko three loads of treasures, And leads free the poor folk).
The popular tradition fully supports giving and taking of bribes in such
cases. Luckily, this sort of bribery is present only in war conditions. When
the war ends, circumstances disappear that cause these type of bribes.
The tradition most strongly condemns, even places curses, for giving
moneys or other sort of compensation to a person in power and influence to
grant the giver profit, and to cause another person loss. 
These cases can often be found in folk tradition and usually relate to giv-
ing false testimony against an innocent person for reasons of personal gain.
The case would usually be initiated by a person in power, who, by bribery
or blackmail of an individual, demands from that individual initiating of
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litigation, false testimony, or giving of false evidence, to achieve passing of
a severe sentence against a person whose property he is after. It is a bit
unusual that a powerful person bribes one with no power, but numerous
cases that occurred immediately after 1945, which even today are talked
about with fear, give evidence to the existence of this type of bribery.
CAUSES AND CONDITIONS WHICH FAVOR CORRUPTION
The cause of corruption, according to tradition, on the side of the bribe
taker is always greed. Greed is an individual character trait known to all
human communities, regardless of race and religion. Bribes and bribery
always exist, but there are conditions which favor the development of
bribery and conditions which dont.
On the general level the basic precondition for development of bribes
and bribery is included in one word: lawlessness. At the very time when the
state and its institutions begin to weaken or collapse, and power of an indi-
vidual begins to ascend over them, corruption enters the picture at the
speed of light. Those who hold a certain state function are in a position to
be the first to notice weaknesses of state institutions, and to determine if
there is a will and a way to resolve those shortcomings. If their assessment is
that it cannot be done or that there is no will to do so, discipline breaks
down, fear of consequences decreases or disappears, which causes character
changes in the individual. The saying Dont tempt me describes the state
of an individual who has the possibility to take the forbidden fruit. In such
conditions one carefully follows activities of the supervisor and colleagues
and tries to find out their reactions and actions. Relationships in the system
begin to function according with the principle of linked vessels, and at that
in the negative sense. The weaknesses of the administration are discovered
and misused. The rest is a question of technique, or as is often said in Ser-
bia  robbery begins. This is clearly defined in the popular tradition, and
expressed by simple words in popular proverbs: not until night falls for
one, can it dawn for another ; for one war  for another a brother!.
In the local environment or community few behavioral models can be
differentiated:
 community with patriarchal mentality, in which are honored accepted
rules of conduct or common law norms.
 community without patriarchal mentality, which does not honor
rules of traditional behavior,
 community in transition, or interim between two systems or two
authorities. 
In the first case there is the smallest amount conditions for the develop-
ment of corruption. The main characteristic of the patriarchal morality is
respect for work and values created by work (moral: there is no bread with-
out a hoe); for the spoken and given word (moral: a man is bound by his
word, while an ox by his horns). An obligation of a patriarchal figure is
also the care for the family, and for this reason he will avoid any risk-tak-
ing activity, so as not to hurt himself and his family by his actions. Since
bribes and bribery are, among other things, activities which include risk,
they are in collision with the concept of patriarchal morality. The reaction
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of the local community is harsh and causes general condemnation and loss
of reputation of the one who would break common law rules of behavior
and, ultimately, make impossible his existence in the community.
In communities where patriarchal morality is brought to a minimum, or
there is none, other value systems rule. The cult of work and of the given
word are not key elements of this system, but are considered, a shortcoming.
Hypocrisy, by which in a manner of ease and without much effort material
goods are gained, is a characteristic of this type of community. The duality
of morals is clearly expressed in relationship towards state and private prop-
erty. Private property has an owner and it is respected. The state property is
considered property without a real owner and is acted upon accordingly. If
representatives of state property are real people, it is believed that they can
be persuaded to close an eye to certain activities. Common practices in such
persuasion are: the state will not fail because of our small deal, it will be
good for you, and good for me. Since there is no condemnation in the local
community, nor serious reactions from those in charge of protecting the
state and its property, persuasion is easy. Proverb: money drills where no
drill can, one hand will wash the other hand, crow will not poke anoth-
er crows eyes out are popular illustrations of corruption.
Transition, as a time of the change of a system, or the time between two
authorities, among people always called lawlessness, is a period which
greatly supports corruption. With the collapse of authorities and the sys-
tem, their symbols also collapse. The state, its values, and property are left
with no one who wants to protect them. There are not even symbolic dan-
gers of carrying out certain activities which used to be dangerous. The state
becomes a free for all and many see a chance to gain profit for themselves.
There are no more scruples. Moral and common norms of behavior
become old fashioned and obsolete and those who follow them are
called incapable. Bribes and bribery become public, and value symbols of
the old society are ridiculed. Luckily, the popular tradition has experience
with these periods and describes it by following proverbs: no one had the
candle burn for him till the morning, all that is corroded will pass.
TWO POPULAR TALES ON CORRUPTION 
1. Does the Vezir (Turkish lord) eat? is a very common story placed in dif-
ferent periods in time and in different local communities. The common
theme is the change of the principal in a given environment. Before the
departure of the old, the new principal is preceded by horror stories causing
great fear among his subjects. A meeting is then organized by heads of fam-
ilies, where the wisest one poses a question: does the newly appointed one
eat? When those present answer positively, the one who posed the question
answers: well, then there will be no problems, we will feed him well!
2. A certain man called Desimir, born near Pranjane appears before
Archangel Michael. During worldly life Desimir has liked to look at other
mens women, drink too much, play an accordion, and could not resist the
cards. Bit by bit and sins piled up. For truths sake, he did good deeds: went
to church on Good Friday, regularly honored St. John, and once, after a card
wining, even gave money to the church. But when all was placed on the set
29Corruption and Bribery in the Serbian Popular Tradition
of scales, sins prevail. St. Michael looks at him, looks at the scales and offers
Desimir a hair to cross. Then Desimir pleads with Michael and said: I beg
you with God and St. John, look a bit better at the scales!. St. Michael paus-
es, comes to him and says that they should look together. Desimir agrees,
which was what he wanted, and while the archangel tiredly placed sins and
good deeds again on the scales, he saw his chance and stealthily placed a few
gold coins on the side where good deeds stood. Michael begins to measure,
and now the good deeds prevailed. He was surprised, took a closer look and
saw what was at hand. He was swayed a bit, but pretended he saw nothing,
murmured to his beard, that he was probably wrong because he was tired,
and took the gold coins, and then gave Desimir a log and he crossed to heav-
en. Later God learned about it and dismissed Michael from the duty and
named Gabriel to weigh souls, and among people, besides the story,
remained the belief that with money a soul can be bought and lost.
* * *
Corruption, or bribery is a universal category present in all contempo-
rary, civilized societies and nations. There is no civilized nation which
does not know of this phenomenon. Serbs are no exception. The listed
examples from daily life, and their relationship with this phenomenon,
clearly indicates the long presence of bribes and bribery in this region.
A variety of habitual norms which regulate the relationships of participants,
as the rapport of the local and the wider community when dealing with bribes
and bribery denote the complexity of this phenomena. Yet, regardless of the
delicacy of corruption itself, it is perceived in the popular tradition as a
unhonorable and criminal phenomenon. No one will talk positively about it
in public and all will see it as a great evil which should be exterminated, but
will immediately express a doubt that this is possible. Century long experi-
ence, embodied in the system of customs, ceremonies, ritual acts and popular
creation, denotes that the popular tradition clearly perceived and differentiat-
ed between different types of bribes, bribery, and corruption. It is fully aware
of dangers these phenomena carry and of their strength which is so high that
it can lead to destruction of all values on which a community or society is
based. Through proverbs, morals, and even humor it marked the phenome-
non of corruption and those who take part in it. However, the common peo-
ple are also careful. They have erred numerous times it their history and expe-
rience has thought them that from every evil there is a greater one and that
driving out justice can eventually hurt the one who is doing so. This is the rea-
son why the common people dont believe everything they see and hear. It is
easy to make a unison condemnation of corruption, but one has to go on with
his life and he might knock on the very door against which the condemnation
was directed. Here lies the reason for the lack of a strong and direct position
regarding bribes, bribery, and corruption in the popular tradition; the public
opinion is formed on a case by case basis.
The popular tradition has inscribed and in the collective popular mem-
ory saved century long experience of life with corruption and struggle with
it. No one is happy over the existence of corruption. Everyone would like
if there was none, but it still exists. The common people are aware of this,
as are aware of the struggle against it.
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III Results of Surveys on Corruption
NOTION AND EXPERIENCES OF CORRUPTION:
PUBLIC OPINION OF SERBIA ABOUT THE PHENOMENON AND
PRACTICE OF CORRUPTION
Introduction
Although it is believed that corruption is an all present phenomenon
of contemporary era, its widespread and great deep-rootedness in a cer-
tain society are linked, by the nature of things, with the state of the over-
all moral (value) climate in it. The societies which are in a process of sys-
temic transformation (like is the case today in all East European coun-
tries, including Yugoslavia) are especially sensitive in this regard. Periods
of great and rapid political and economic changes, are followed by
processes of social disintegration, which means not only the implosion
of institutions and severing of social links, but also crises of the existing
system of values, of the ruling moral norms and standards. Institutional
changes, as a rule, follow or condition the process of disintegration of
the system of values that in the past did make up the bases of social con-
sensus and integration. Since the new value system has not yet been fully
established, the transition from the old into the new political and eco-
nomic order, in reality, is characterized by a harsh conflict of values, that
is a state of social anomy and moral deregulation. Comparative studies
conducted in countries of East and South East Europe in the post-com-
munist period clearly demonstrate that they all share a state of signifi-
cant prevailing anomy, both on the level of social consciousness and on
the individual level. 
Different forms of deviant behavior often develop as a reaction by
people to an anomic social situation, either as means of adaptation or
an attempt to overcome this state (Merton). Some of these reactions
(feeling of helplessness, hopelessness, and disorientation and, in drastic
forms, suicidal tendencies) represent passive forms of adaptation, since
they are in a sense a psychological retreat regarding a given social situa-
tion. A very widespread manner of subjective response to given circum-
stances can be conforming to such a situation in society, getting used to
and accepting of the newly established rules of conduct even if they are
in contrast with ones own moral and value codes. However, a signifi-
cant active reaction to the social situation of anomy can be acceptance
(internalization) of positions and different innovative types of behavior,
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often of a criminal category. Basically deviant types of behavior which
have been socially tolerated in a longer period of time, become stan-
dards of normal or adequate behavior in a given situation. Most
often, these are actions where it is hard to draw a line between socially
acceptable bypassing of the rules, the very ones, which portray the full
relativization of moral and legislative rules and the open practices of
immorality and crime. Many phenomena characteristic for the period
of transition in these societies  gray economy, irregular economic
and business transactions, smuggling, unacceptable money trading,
stealing from ones own company, unauthorized premises development
and, among others, bribery and corruption  for many people do not
represent any more a serious moral (and in view of a lack of serious
laws) or serious legal offences. The outspread practice of the breaking of
moral and legal norms, lose the meaning of being prohibited, but is
accepted as something customary and normal  is a clear sign of the
existence of anomy in a society. This kind of psychological adaptation
by citizens forms a certain moral climate, which then favors the further
deepening of anomicity of the society, social deregulation and social
debacle. Certain analysts of todays post-communist systems therefore
consider  it seems with validity  that probably much more time will
be needed to, in the framework of these societies, strengthen social
norms and establish broken social links, then to advance the economic
situation (Andorka).
The disintegration processes and the state of anomy essentially
marked the Serbian society during the last ten years, although symp-
toms can be pursued further in the past, through the period which pre-
ceded the beginning of the political and economic transformation. Cir-
cumstances which caused and reproduced them are well known: unre-
solved issues of statehood and the constitution, economic depression
(made worse by international economic sanctions), the experience of
hyperinflation, drastic pauperization and differentiation of the popu-
lace, rising rate of unemployment, war psychoses, refugees, internal
political trouble and infighting. Empirical research of notions, posi-
tions, and experiences of citizens regarding the phenomenon and prac-
tice of corruption, the findings of which we are presenting here, is based
within this social and psychological context. Although subjective assess-
ment made by people only partially represents the current reality  they
can, namely, be under the influence of widespread stereotypes, ideolog-
ical and political preconceptions and the like  the subjective con-
struction of reality strongly influences the behavior of people and thus
itself becomes a relevant social fact (Berger and Luckman, 1960). If we
wish to understand the roots of the origin, conditions for spreading,
and the best methods of combating corruption in a society, this fact
must be respected.
The sample 
The public opinion survey on corruption was carried out from January
23 to 31, 2001 on a sample of 1.632 (planned 1.640), on the territory of
Serbia excluding Kosovo and Metohija. The sample was made up of adults
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and was realized on 82 points, or 82 community offices in 60 municipali-
ties. The survey was carried out on a sample of the quota type with respect
to six criteria: sex, age, education, urban-rural status, nationality, and
belonging to wider demographic regions.
The structure of the sample was the following in regards to sex: male
50,2% and female 49,8%. Age structure of those polled: age 18-29 years
24,9%, 30-39 years 20,1%, 40-49 years 19,7%, 50-59 years 15,9% and 60
and older 19,4%.
According to education he structure of the sample was the following:
completed 4 years of elementary school and less 11,7%, eight year primary
school 33,1%, secondary 38,8% and higher school and university 16,1%.
The structure according to profession consisted of: farmer 20,2%, non
qualified/semi-qualified laborer 13,9%, qualified laborer/highly qualified
laborer 19,7%, employees 16,5%, private entrepreneurs 3,9%, experts
12,0% no profession 13,9%. According to work status: employed in
social/state company 32,8%, private company 12,4%, self employed 5,6%,
retired 12,3%, not employed 14,5%, homemaker 13,5%, student 6,9% and
unknown 2,0%.
Perception of the phenomena of corruption 
Corruption as a significant social and/or personal problem 
Citizens of Serbia believe that the phenomenon of corruption is one of
most serious problems facing the Serbian society today. When answers of
those polled are analyzed concerning the issue of most serious social prob-
lem at this time, the problem of corruption (12%) stands out parallel with
such social problems as poverty (26% of answers), political instability
(22%) and crime (15%). Every tenth citizen believes that the issues of cor-
ruption are the priority problem, judging from the level of social danger or
damage (while another 14% places it in second place according to impor-
tance). It should be noted that, at this time, corruption is seen as a serious
social problem even when compared with the poor economic situation,
unemployment, poor health care and education, polluted environ-
ment and poor inter-ethnic relations. 
Although corruption is listed among the most important problems on
the social level, more seldom is it pointed out as the most important indi-
vidual problem (only 7%). In this sense, problems of low living standard,
or of poverty, have a priority for the majority of citizens (48%), and are
followed by phenomena seen as their cause of following effects  poor
economic situation (9%) and unemployment (9%). Judging the harm
of corruption on the individual level, a somewhat larger percentage of cit-
izens (9%) places corruption on the second most important position, but
it is still perceived as a less important problem than poverty, crime, unem-
ployment, and poor health care services. 
When a list of major social problems is prepared, based on overall
answers (sum for first and second place of importance), the findings con-
firm that corruption is on the high, fourth, place  behind poverty, politi-
cal instability, and crime (Table 3.1.).
33Results of Surveys on Corruption
Based on the given table, it is possible to conclude again that corrup-
tion is perceived to a somewhat greater extent as a serious social, then as
a serious personal problem: altogether, 12% of citizens perceive it as one
of the most serious (most harmful) phenomenon for society as a whole
(among the four most important), and 7% of citizens are personally
affected by corruption (seventh according to importance). The order is,
also, changed, because numerous other problems (unemployment, poor
health care protection, political instability) have a greater significance for
an individual. Indirectly, this data can signify the existence of relative
habitation (getting used to it) of the individual to the occurrence of
small corruption in which he himself participates and which brings
him certain gain. 
The notion of corruption 
Partial verification of the thesis of existence of certain habitation of
citizens to certain manifestations of corruption in our society is seen by
data on what citizens, in general, understand under the concept of corrup-
tion. Corruption is considered a harmful social phenomena by somewhat
more then 60% of those polled; a significant percent (28%) believe that it
is a common phenomena (something that has always and in every socie-
ty existed and it will always exist); 7% believe that corruption is a neces-
sary evil, or something not proper, but can be useful; and 2% more see in
corruption a means for a faster and a more successful solution to certain
problems in society. In conclusion, the majority of citizens consider cor-
ruption a social problem which should be fought by all means.
34 Corruption in Serbia
Phenomena Social problem Personal problem
Political instability 16 8
Poor inter-ethnic relations 6 3
Corruption 12 7
Poor economic situation 10 9
Crime 17 10
Unemployment 7 12
Polluted environment 2 3
Poor health care 3 9
Problems in education 1 3
Poverty, low living standard 24 33
Something else 1 1
Dont know / No answer 1 2
Total 100 100
Table 3.1. 
Major problems for the society and the individual (sum for first and second place
of importance) in %
Which actions make up corruption?
The absence of a clear condemnation of corruption can be, in part, due
to a lack of clear understanding by citizens of this phenomenon, or the rel-
ative confusion in what can be considered or included in the phenomenon
of corruption. Although there is a well-established understanding that
corruption is basically something that is socially unwanted and con-
demned  there is no consensus regarding which actions make up this
phenomenon. Confusion regarding moral condemnation of certain types
of corruption exists, most often, when dealing with the following prac-
tices: giving pre election donations to political parties, personally con-
tacting a municipal representative in an attempt to acquire a development
permit, giving a gift to a doctor and additional compensation to a
lawyer for aiding the accused before a court. In all of the above more then
one third of those polled believe that we are not talking about real cor-
ruption. A significant number, also, does not believe corruption is offer-
ing a counter service aimed at acquiring a leave of absence from work
(28%),intervention with a high official to obtain employment for a fami-
ly member (27%), or use of a personal connection to free someone from
military duty (19%). 
Obviously, the activity which assumes reciprocity in granting certain
services, giving concessions, make privileges possible among close
acquaintances  i.e. what is customary considered as using contacts and
relationships, which makes up a part of traditional morals  are exempt
from the phenomena of corruption. In contrast, citizens are prone to call
corruption all forms of acquiring privileges linked with giving and receiv-
ing of cash. Implicitly, the concept of corruption is linked with in the con-
sciousness of citizens, primarily, with giving of cash or the realization of a
financial gain (for example: giving money to a state employee for decreas-
ing taxes, offering money to a traffic policeman so he would not take
away your driving license). Such perception of corruption is linked, on
one hand, with still prevailing forms of traditional morality; and on the
other hand, it represents a kind of vindication of ones own participation
in the widespread practice of using relationships and contacts as a way to
acquire a privileged position in effectuating civic rights and obligations. 
Basic causes of corruption 
Citizens believe that the overall crises of morality of the society, overall
growing poverty of the society, and the lack of the rule of law, are the basic
(and almost equally important) causes of corruption in our circum-
stances. The following table illustrates the distribution of the overall num-
ber of answers to the question about basic causes of widespread corrup-
tion in the society (three answers were offered, Table 3.2).
If we, (conditionally and for the purpose of this analyses), divide corrup-
tion causes into systemic, objective, and subjective factors, we can conclude
that, in the perception of citizens the formation of corruption is mostly
influenced by the weakness of the system (no rule of law, inefficiency of the
judiciary system, bad legislation, the nature of the political and economic
system, etc.), and that the responsibility is less often bestowed to objective
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circumstances (war, sanctions, overall poverty) and to subjective character-
istics of the society itself and of the people as individuals. 
Only 1% of those polled believe that corruption is contributed to by
government intervention in the market, which demonstrates that the Ser-
bian public opinion does not have a clear apprehension of the conse-
quences of state intervention. In contrast, in the first position as a cause of
corruption, the moral crises of the society is perceived, which directly
illustrates that our public still believes in morals as a mechanism for the
establishing of order in a society, or an obstacle to the formation and
expansion of corruption. 
The most important cause of corruption
The opinion of citizens about the most important cause of widespread
corruption in our society, confirm the above conclusions and, also, addi-
tionally sheds light on the reasons why corruption is not in public, in the
moral sense, a univocally condemned phenomenon. A belief prevails in
the public that corruption is, yet, a derived phenomena, and that the
basic problem lies in the nonexistence of the system of the rule of law 
meaning, mostly, in lawlessness, or not respecting laws (23%), and
then, in bad legislation in this field (6%), an inefficient judiciary system
(6%), and lack of clear administrative control (2%). The reasons for gen-
eration of corruption which citizens point out can be ranked above all, in
the field of (more general) systemic causes (for example: inheritance of
the previous communist system, political system, economic system,
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Table 3.2. 
Basic causes of corruption (cumulative)
Causes % rank
Overall poverty 15 2-3
Immorality and lack of fairness in the society,
crises of morality 17 1
Inefficiency of the judiciary system 8 4
Inheritance of the previous communist system 5 7-8-9
Bad legislation in this field 6 5-6
War and international sanctions 5 7-8-9
Political system 4 10-11
Economic system 3 12-13
Lack of clear administrative control 4 10-11
Low salaries of state employees 6 5-6
Lawlessness, no rule of law 15 2-3
Government intervention in the market 1 14
Human nature, people are like that everywhere 5 7-8-9
Something else 0 15
Dont know / No answer 3 12-13
government intervention in the market). As in the previous case, eval-
uating in general, the essence of the causes is in most part seen in weak-
nesses inherent to the system itself (almost one half of answers). Exter-
nally, objectively unfavorable circumstances (overall poverty  17%, was
and sanctions  6% and small salaries of employees  4%) are basic rea-
sons for the widespread corruption in out society are listed by somewhat
more then one quarter of citizens. Bestowing of the responsibility to the
society itself (immorality and dishonesty in the society, morality
crises  20% and human nature, people are like that everywhere  5%)
is characteristic, also, for somewhat less then one quarter of those polled.
Although they admit that an important cause for spreading of corrup-
tion can be found it the overall state of morality in the society  in the
overall moral crises  the society (citizens), obviously, aspire, in the final
consequence, to reject the burden of their own moral responsibility by trans-
ferring it to the system (systemic weaknesses) and to objective circum-
stances (overall poverty).
Perception of the phenomena of corruption in our society
Appraisal of the widespread of corruption
Citizens believe that corruption is, both in the most recent past and in
the present, an extremely widespread phenomenon in society (the mark
very high and high are given by almost 80%). The perception of the
scope of the widespread ness of corruption in Serbian society, at that, are
obviously influenced by general, positive, expectations of the population
regarding the performance of the new authorities, which were noted in
other surveys (Table 3.3).
A general conclusion based on acquired data can be made that there are
no significant differences in the perception of the widespread ness of cor-
ruption in the past (five years ago) and today, when one observes the aver-
age perception of the widespread ness of corruption which those polled gave
for these two periods (on a scale 1 to 5, from very low to very high).
The present (4,14) is, in this sense, only a bit more positive from the past
(4,16). However, there are rather widespread expectations that the scope of
corruption will significantly be decreased in the future (and those positive
expectations are linked with the change of power in Serbia). Generally, a
positive attitude towards new authorities influences the assessment and
anticipation of the widespread ness of negative phenomena in society.
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Table 3.3. 
General widespread of corruption (in %)
Period very low moderate high very dont average
low high know
Five years ago 2 2 15 37 40 4 4.16
Today 1 3 15 40 36 5 4,14
In five years 6 15 24 10 6 39 2,93
Fields in which corruption is most widespread
Perception of the widespread of corruption in general, as in individual
fields of social life, as part of certain social institutions cannot be consid-
ered as a reliable indicator of reality. To a great extent they depend on per-
sonal experiences of individuals, as from exposure of certain segments
of the population to important sources of information and susceptibility
regarding relevant messages. Such assessments, also, depend on the gener-
al attitude towards the political system and/or regime, which is attributed
with the responsibility for the state of the society in general. Our survey of
the attitude of citizens towards corruption was carried out at the very time
of the change of authorities in Serbia and Yugoslavia, which made it
impossible to form with certainty a referent framework which influ-
enced the perception and subjective judgment of citizens. Researchers
assume that this factor of the undefined referent framework had a lesser
influence on the appraisal of corruption in certain fields, since perceptions
were already formed in a longer period of time, and a somewhat greater
problem exists with appraisal of institutions. Our belief is, still however,
that since the institutions of the President and of the Government (of
Yugoslavia and Serbia) in the consciousness of citizens appear as personal-
ized notions, their appraisals pertain, mostly, to current holders of these
posts. Still, in the interpretation of findings one should be reserved.
Having in mind the previously stated reservations, we can conclude
that, according to the citizens, corruption represents an extremely wide-
spread phenomenon in all fields of our society: between 50% and 85% of
those polled assess that corruption is represented much and very
much in all listed fields (excluding somewhat education, for which one
third of those polled state the same). Based on the average marks by citi-
zens, it can be concluded that this phenomena is present to a greatest
extent in the customs administration (4,47), judiciary (4,18) and police
(4,16) (Table 3.4.).
Average index of evaluated widespread of corruption (by which are
summarized assessments of the widespread of this phenomenon in all of
the listed fields together)  equals: W = 7,1)1. For comparison, this index
in similar surveys in Bulgaria had a value of 5,9.2 When assessment of the
widespread of corruption was carried out on the basis of an extended list
of institutions, a very similar ranking of answers was arrived at (Table A1.
in the annex).
Judging by average findings of the widespread of corruption given by citi-
zens, fields or institutions with which this phenomenon is most often linked in
this country are the customs administration (4,35),the tax administration
(4,12), the judiciary (4,11) and police (4,06). The presidency of Yugoslavia
(2,42), statistical bureau (2,58), and the Army (2,73) are institutions in
which, according to assessment of citizens, corruption is found to be the least.
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1 Index W is calculated as a sum of individual indexes or scores for every field individual-
ly = Q, divided by the number of individual indexes or scores = n  meaning: W=Q / n
and  it is projected in span from 1 to 10, where 1 represents the smallest, and 10 the
greatest intensity of the phenomenon.
2 According to: Coalition 2000; Corruption Indexes
If we exclude the statistical bureau as an institution the citizens are not
well informed about, the findings where corruption is most rarely linked
with the Army and the current President of the federal state, indirectly
support the thesis (and confirm findings of certain previous surveys) that
those institutions have the greatest trust of citizens and greatest legitimacy.
Part of the perception of the current Yugoslav president (including the
Presidents men) kept an aura of honesty, with which Vojislav Kotuni-
ca won the elections.
Average index of the evaluated widespread of corruption for all fields
(calculated as in previous case) amounts to: W = 6,0.
A similar structure is arrived at when one analyzes the perception of cit-
izens in which of these fields corruption is the most, or the least wide-
spread. Also this time, more then one half of citizens point to the customs
administration (1/3 of answers), police and judiciary  as the basic cen-
ters of corruption; the FRY presidency (30%), Army (21%) and statistical
bureau are, on the other hand, seen as institutions where corruption is
present the least. 
Professions (groups) seen as bearers of corruption
Citizens think that the majority of public servants, both on the local and
republican level of the executive branch of government, participate in cor-
ruption. Similarly as with the assessing of widespread of corruption in cer-
tain fields and institutions, it is believed that more then three fourths of all
state employees participate in corruption.
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Table 3.4.
Fields of society in which corruption is widespread the most (in % )
Field Average Very Little Medium Much Very Dont
little much know
Health care 3,96 2 4 18 43 30 2
Education 3,20 15 17 35 26 10 6
Municipal administration 3,78 1 5 28 36 22 6
Customs 4,47 1 1 7 29 55 7
Courts 4,18 1 4 13 35 40 7
Police 4,16 2 4 13 34 42 5
Social (state) 3,96 1 4 21 35 30 8companies
Private companies 3,69 4 10 23 28 25 11
Public companies 3,77 2 7 25 27 25 13
Republican (Serbian)
administration 3,84 1 5 23 32 24 14
Local administration 3,83 1 6 24 32 25 11
Political parties 3,78 2 7 24 28 24 16
State leadership 3,79 5 11 14 21 33 16
At that, there is no difference in assessing the widespread of corruption
on the republican (average 2,98), or local (2,90) level. Corruption is per-
ceived not only as widespread, but also as common phenomena.
Specification of professions and social groups that are perceived as basic
participants in the practice of corruption demonstrate that the customs
service is again in first place. More then two thirds of citizens think that
all or the majority of customs officials participate in corruption (aver-
age 3,17). According to the level of assessed corruption they are followed
by general managers of state companies (average 3,11), but all other listed
professions are also to a great extent stigmatized as prone to corruption
(Table A2 in annex). The average index of the rating of the widespread of
corruption for all professions together (scale 1 to 10) is: W = 5,5. 
The extremely high criticism by citizens in this sense is, essentially, non-
discriminating; and we can, therefore, with a high level of probability
assign it to the general tendency of radicalism which overtook the society
which is in a state of political changes and upheaval.
Corruption in public procurement
It is a general belief of people that corruption is an unavoidable side
effect of public (state) procurement. This specially pertains to certain
fields, like public works for the reconstruction of the country (average for
outspread of corruption 4,14), education (4,11) and police (4,04). Pertain-
ing to health care one can notice that the average for outspread of corrup-
tion for tenders is seen higher then, a high average for this field in general
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Picture 3.1. Professions according to the level of participation in corruption 
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Leaders of political parties
Party officials, local activists
Employees in municipal companies 
Journalists
(4,11: 3,96), which means that the citizens believe that this is the epicen-
ter of corruption in this field. (Table 3.5.)
The least corruption in public procurement, according to those
polled, is to be found in the army (3,20) although it is significant. In gen-
eral, the average findings show that the public generally believes that
corruption during public procurement is exceptionally extensive. The
average index of existence of corruption in public procurement, in all
listed fields, is W = 9,2
Most frequent forms of corruption and their social consequences
According to the views of the majority of citizens (46%) corruption in
our society is most often used in circumnavigating legal obligations and
norms; then, in an attempt to change the existing legal norms for some-
ones gain and interest (24%); and only then in an attempt of the people
to realize certain rights, which are guaranteed by existing legal norms
(20%). Such answers could be explained in light of previously listed
results that the basic causes of corruption, according to the citizens, are
inherent to the system. Corruption is, therefore, perceived as the ade-
quate response by individuals to the faults of that system  a way and
an attempt to bypass or change norms that do not enable the appropriate
protection and realization of rights. However, this explanation has dis-
crepancies in findings in the attitude of citizens regarding the dangers that
certain mentioned types of corruption might have for the entire society.
As the socially most dangerous type of corruption, according to citizens
of Serbia, is the one used with a goal to change existing laws for personal
interests and benefit (44%), and then corruption in the circumnavigating
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Table 3.5. 
Assessment of outspread of corruption in public (state) procurement3
3 Note: The average was calculated vice versa  from 1 (least corrupted) to 5 (most cor-
rupted); meaning, the higher the average higher the perceived corruption.
Field Average Very Somewhat Medium Some None Dont 
know
Health care 4,11 35 36 15 3 1 9
Education 3,26 10 27 32 18 2 11
Public companies 3,81 21 33 28 4 0,5 13
State
administration 3,86 25 30 26 4 1 13
Police 4,04 34 33 13 7 1 2
Army 3,20 14 23 19 2 17 15
Public works
(reconstruction 4,16 38 24 12 5 1 19
of the country)
of laws (31%). Corruption used to effectuate guaranteed rights of citizens
is rarely seen as a significant social danger (only 9%), and one part of
those questioned (7%) believe that this type of corruption can even be
beneficial for society (Table 3.6.).
Although corruption is generally condemned, one part of citizens has a
tendency to justify its use, under certain circumstances: when it contributes
to the realization of rights guaranteed by law, and which in a way pre-
scribed by the law cannot be realized. This confirms Mertons belief that
different types of socially deviant behavior  among others corruption 
often originate as a reaction to an anomic social situation: i.e. a situation
in which a significant discrepancy exists between accepted social goals and
means an individual has at his disposal to realize them.
Bases of the given assessment of the extent of corruption
As mentioned, the assessment of citizens about the extent of corruption
in a society, are but subjective reflections of the reality. Their authenticity
can, however, at least partially be verified if one knows the experiential
bases on which they were formed: are they based on personal experience,
positions based on beliefs and information of referent groups, or the influ-
ence of mass media. Knowledge of the basis for perception of the attitude
on corruption is also necessary as a precondition for planning measures of
immunization of the populace against this sort of deviant behavior.
More then 50% of citizens base their judgment on direct experience,
or the experience of their environment a close circle of people. From
that number one fifth of those polled states that they have participated in
the practice of corruption, which adds validity to given subjective assess-
ment by citizens about the widespread ness of corruption. At the same
time, however, these statements can be used as an approximate measure
of the real extent of susceptibility of citizens of Serbia to in participation
and in the practice of corruption, which is, as it can be seen, very great.
The other half of responses pertains to indirect deduction, either based
on information from media, or based on perception of existing differ-
ences between the income and the living standard of public servants
(Picture 3.2.). 
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Table 3.6. 
Outspread, perceived danger, and benefit of certain types of corruption for the
entire society (in %)
Type of corruption Outspread Social danger Social benefit
To attain rights 20 9 7
To circumnavigate laws 46 31 1
To change laws 24 44 1
Not beneficial   75
Dont know 10 17 17
1.5. Attitudes of citizens towards corruption
The principle position of citizens towards corruption is predominantly nega-
tive4. by the majority of the population perceives corruption, as a social evil.
However, survey findings point out that even at the level of principle there
are striking undertones of attitudes, which can justify a conclusion of the
existence of a significant level of anomy and moral crises in society. 
When attitudes of citizens towards corruption are examined directly,
i.e. when based on an individual question, one analyzes the scope and
conditions for the justification of corruption, it is possible to conclude
that in the population in this regards there exists a fair amount of consen-
sus regarding condemnation of corruption in principle: a somewhat less
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Personal experience (personally had
to give money, gifts, services) 21%
Conversation with family and
friends 30%
Information provided by newspa-
pers and other media 22%
The fact that the standard of living
of public servants is much greater
from their salaries 22%
Other 2%
Dont know/no answer 3%
Picture  3.2 
What is the basis for the assessment of the extent of corruption (%)
4 A scale that included ten statements and based on direct questions examined attitudes
of citizens towards corruption.
3%
30%22%
21%
22%
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Is always justified 0%
Is sometimes justified 13%
Undecided 9%
Most often is not justified 30%
Is never justified 45%
Dont know 3%
Picture 3.3.
Position on justifying corruption as means for attaining a goal
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then one half (44%) believe that it is never justified, and another one
third that most often is not justified, as a means for the attainment of a
certain goal or interest. More then one fifth of citizens, however, not even
at the level of principal, do not discard corruption fully as a means for the
attainment of personal goals. One part demonstrates an ambivalent posi-
tion (9%), somewhat above one tenth believes that this practice is justified
under certain conditions (13%), and an insignificant percentage uncondi-
tionally justifies it (under 1%).
When those polled were offered individual descriptive statements based
on which attitudes towards corruption were judged the following distribu-
tion of answers was obtained:
The above distribution of answers shows, also, that at the principal
level, corruption is more often than not, rejected  both as a general phe-
nomenon and as means for resolving personal problems. However, there
is a difference in the scope of acceptance of corruptive practice depending
on the main actors and the one who benefits. Citizens are more prone to
accept, also at the level of principle, such practices if they see themselves
in the role of the person who is solving a problem, then in the case when
they are taking a position regarding the behavior of others (public ser-
vants). In other words, they are more prone towards compromise in situa-
tions in which corruption is used for the accomplishment of their own goals
and interests. 
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Table 3.7. 
Acceptability of corruption in principal (in %)
Positions It is acceptable
that Assembly
representatives
and members of
the Government
accept money,
gifts or services
from different
individuals or
organizations
To solve a prob-
lem successfully
a person should
offer money or
a gift to
clerk/official he
is in contact
with
If a
clerk/offi-
cial asks
for money
to solve
my prob-
lem, I
would pay
him
It is acceptable that
employees of
ministries, munici-
pal and city admin-
istration accept
money,  gifts, or
services from vari-
ous individuals or
organizations
Fully
acceptable 3 4 4 3
Partially
acceptable 5 8 9 4
Undecided 9 13 20 7
Partial
rejection 15 16 17 15
Total
rejection 63 55 41 67
Dont know 4 4 8 5
Average 1,65 1,84 2,09 1,54
When based on these statements from the applied scale the average
index of acceptability od corruption in principal is calculated, it can be
seen it is relatively low and equals W=4,15. Although it is difficult to make
a sound comparison in this sense, it should be mentioned that a similar
index of acceptance of corruption in Bulgaria has a value of W= 1,5.6
The position towards corruption, i.e. the existence or lack of existence
of moral condemnation of this phenomenon was also examined based on
a projected question (projected feelings of a person who is in a position to
corrupt). The question was: How does, most likely, a citizen feel when he
has given money or a gift to a clerk and gotten what he wanted? Answers
follow: 
The most common emotional response of citizens who were forced to
pay a bribe, according to answers of those polled, is anger (28%). The feel-
ing of shame, which would represent an indicator of an interior moral
norm or an internal sanction, is characteristic only for one quarter of
answers. Indifference or even satisfaction connected to this act, is
expressed by one third of those polled, and a significant number of those
who refused to answer this question  are a significant sign that in the
society there is a significant level of getting used to this phenomenon,
that it is becoming something normal, everyday, which does not cause
moral revolt, condemnation or aversion. 
Susceptibility for participating in corruption 
The above listed data signify a general problem of inconsistency
between the principal position of moral intolerance regarding corruption
and the position and behavior in an actual situation, when there is a real
need of satisfying personal interest. Therefore the expressed intolerance of
citizens towards the phenomenon of corruption (i.e. given statements on
the impermissible phenomenon of corrupting) can be accepted only as an
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Picture 3.4 
How does the one who has paid a bribe feel? 
5 Average index of the position towards corruption is calculated based on questions from
the scale of positions of the Likertov type that included 10 statements.
6 According to: Clean Future, Anti-Corruption action plan for Bulgaria, Coalition
2000, p. 68.
Angry 28%
Indifference 8%
Ashamed 25%
Satisfied 22%
Dont know/no answer 16%
8%
16%
25%
28%
22%
approximate measure of its real social acceptance, or of the real suscepti-
bility and readiness of members of a society to participate themselves in
the processes of corruption. The research made an attempt to quantify this
susceptibility, i.e. the predisposition to participate in corruption.
Efficiency of corruption as means to accomplish goals
The readiness of citizens to participate themselves in the practice of cor-
ruption, regardless of moral positions, greatly depends on whether it is
perceived as a mean that can efficiently resolve or ease the solving of prob-
lems of an individual in this society. The appraisal of citizens regarding the
efficiency or instrumentalization of corruption was examined on the basis
of the following, projected question: If they wanted to successfully
resolve a certain problem how probable is it, in your judgment, that those
people in this society would have to do one of following things?.
Corruption is, obviously, perceived as a very efficient mean for attain-
ing individual goals: according to those polled, 75% of people in our soci-
ety would most probably or probably give money, 81%  a gift, and
the same percent a service, in an attempt to successfully resolve their prob-
lem (Table 3. 8.). The average index of perceived efficiency (instrumental-
ity) of corruption (in all three forms) is: W = 7,3.
Personal readiness to participate in corruption
Corruption is an exchange process and it includes both the giving,
and the taking of a bribe. The examination of personal readiness of citi-
zens to participate in corruption includes both sides. Would citizens pay
a bribe is asked? Findings show that the majority of citizens (even those
who have a principle position that corruption is unjustified) are prone
under pressure of circumstances and in a situation where they have no
other method to solve their problem  to take part in corruption by pay-
ing a bribe. Only 1/5 would never pay a bribe; more from one half would
not pay a bribe only if there is another way to solve their problem; 1/5
would pay if they had money and 3% would pay in any case. This means,
that more them ¾ of those polled are ready to take part in corruption,
i.e. that they demonstrate readiness for compromise and deviation from
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Very Probably Fairly Not probably Dont
probably improbably at all know
Offer cash
to a clerk 28 47 14 4 7
Give a present
to a clerk 36 45 9 3 6
Do a favor
for a clerk 37 44 9 2 7
Table 3. 8. 
How probably would people do one of the following things (in  %) 
their own believes in this regard, under certain conditions and for lack of
an alternative. 
Situations or problems listed by citizens as justification for personal
participation in corruption, most often are linked with the fields of health
care and employment. (Table 3.9.)
The greatest readiness to pay a bribe exists in attempts to acquire better
health care services (51%), or to solve the problem of employment (41%).
It is, also, significant when dealing with customs (35%), public utilities
(27%), and securing building permits. Readiness to corrupt is the smallest
when dealing with problems in the field of education (9%).
Generally speaking, there is a high level of readiness for corruption. The
average index of readiness to participate in the practice of corrupting (in
all listed forms), on a 1 to 10 scale, is: W = 6,9.
1.6.3. Readiness to accept a bribe
The second aspect of the readiness of citizens to participate in corrup-
tion is the attitude towards the acceptance of a bribe. It is, also, signifi-
cantly widespread. Citizens demonstrate a similar inconsistency (devia-
tion from the principal condemnation of this phenomenon) in this case
too. Almost one half is ready to, in a hypothetical situation7, take an
offered bribe, out of which 8% unconditionally. The fear from sanctions
would, eventually, deter one third of people from this practice, and 44%
unconditionally condemn and reject such a practice. 
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Service Yes No Dont 
know
Not to pay customs duty on the border 35 48 17
To get a full-time job (or for someone else) 41 42 17
To pay less taxes 18 71 10
So your child would get a better grade in school
(pass an annual exam) 9 83 7
To receive an building permit for a house 27 58 15
To win a certain case before a court 21 63 16
To receive better medical treatment 51 34 15
Not to pay a misdemeanor fine 16 68 16
To acquire a certain public utility service
(telephone, power, water) 29 54 16
Other 2 10 88
Table 3.9. 
In which situations would you pay a bribe? (in %)
7 The question was: When you imagine yourself in a role of a badly paid clerk to whom
someone offers money, a gift, or a counter service to solve him a given problem, what
would you do?
Experiences with corruption
Mutual corruption pressure 
The experience of citizens regarding the practice of corruption includes
a certain pressure from state employees to have bribes offered, or pressure
exerted on state employees to accept a bribe. Findings demonstrate that, in
general, the corruption pressure between citizens and public servants is
moderate and more often implied then direct. 
Judging from answers of those polled only in a small number of cases
public servants overtly sought from them cash, gifts, or favors (17%), but
in a greater number of cases they demonstrated that they expect some-
thing like that (47 %). Only 1/5 of citizens are ready to admit that they
personally have initiated behavior that can be considered corruption, i.e.
that they exerted pressure aimed at corrupting. 
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Picture 3.5. 
Would you take a bribe? 
Always In Only Never Dont
majority exceptionally know
of cases
They directly ask for
money, gift, or a favor 3 14 32 39 13
They do not ask directly but
demonstrate that they expect to 10 37 22 18 12
be given money, gift, or a favor
They do not ask directly nor
demonstrate that they expect 
to be given money, gift, or 5 15 20 45 14
a favor, but you indicate that
such agreement is possible
Table 3.10. 
In the past year when you were in contact with public servants, how often did it
happen that:
I would take it,
everyone does so 8%
I would take it, if it could solve his
problem 7%
I would not take it if I were break-
ing law 32%
I would not take it, I dont
approve such actions 45%
Dont know/no answer 8%
7%
8%
32%
8%
45%
Therefore, the average index of overall corruption pressure is signifi-
cantly lower from the index of susceptibility to corruption  W = 3,3. Cor-
ruption being performed by citizens, therefore, is not so much a result of
overt imposition, but of willing acceptance, motivated by an understand-
ing that this is the most efficient way for accomplishing of their interests
and needs. 
Openness to corruption pressure 
A significantly different picture is arrived at when citizens assess their
own (one way) openness to pressure to pay a bribe, in a concrete situation.
In these cases, among others, auto censorship is significantly lower
depending on social desirability, or undesirability of the answer. The
assessment of being exposed to pressure to give a bribe in different situa-
tions points out that this pressure is most to be found in the field of health
care, or from doctors and other medical staff (26% of citizens says that
they had experiences of this kind lately). Policemen (19%), customs offi-
cers (17%) and sales people (16%), also have a tendency to apply pressure
on citizens in this regard, more often then other professions (Table A3. in
annex and Picture 3.6).
The index of corruption pressure which public servants exert against
citizens (for all professions together) is high and equals W = 7,4 (scale
1 to 10). 
Specific experiences with corruption 
The majority of citizens (65%) do not openly admit that they were in a
position to give a bribe, while approximately 30% admit to doing so. From
that figure 27% said that bribery was successful (they received the service
which they have expected). Around 19% of citizens who were in a position
to give a bribe, gave a bribe only in one place, 5% in two, and 3% in
three and more places. In cases of multiple bribery, according to answers
of those who participated in the practice of corruption, public servants
who they gave bribes to were more often of different rank (7%), then of
the same rank (1%). 
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sure against citizens W=7.4 
Index of mutual corruption
pressure W=3.3
Picture 3.6.
Indexes of corruption pressure
A tariff for determining the amount of the bribe, judging from
given answers, is most often known (21% said that an already estab-
lished norm exists); in 9% of cases the amount was stated on the spot;
5% of citizens asked what the amount is, and 3% found out in another
way. Examining of specific experiences with determining of the amount
of the bribe was used as a test question, which uncovered that one num-
ber of those polled, conceals their real experiences with the practice of
corruption.
Battling corruption
Possibility of suppression of corruption in our society
Citizens beliefs concerning the possibility that society can resolve the
problem of corruption are divided: more then one half believe that cor-
ruption is an ever present phenomenon, or that it can only somewhat be
decreased; somewhat less then one half believe that that the widespread
ness of this phenomenon can be significantly decreased, or that it is possi-
ble to suppress it fully.
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Picture 3.7.
Level of decentralization of corruption
Picture 3.8.
Effectiveness of corruption
Corruption in one place
61%
Corruption in two
places25%
Corruption in three or
more places 14%
Corruption had an effect
90% (service was
received)
Corruption did not have
effect 10% (service was
not received)
61%
14%
25%
10%
90%
Expectations of citizens
A great majority of citizens thinks that the old authorities did not put
in any serious effort to eliminate corruption. On the other hand, expecta-
tions form the new authorities to undertake significant steps in this direc-
tion are great. The average index of assessed unwillingness of former
authorities to fight corruption is high, W = 9,4; while the same index of
unwillingness for the new authorities to fight this phenomenon in the
future is only W = 1,2.
Expectations regarding the activities and efficiency of the new authori-
ties in this field are extremely optimistic not only with the issue of fighting
corruption but also regarding the assessment of their eventual susceptibili-
ty to corruption. Almost 60% of citizens expect that representatives of new
authorities will be significantly less or less susceptible to be corrupted
from their predecessors. Only 2% believe that they will be susceptible to
corruption, and 14% do not expect any significant difference.
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Picture 3.9. 
Can corruption be suppressed?
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6
4
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0
Unwillingness of former
authorities W=9,4
Unwillingness of new
authorities W=1,2
Picture 3.10. 
Unwillingness of authorities to fight against corruption 
Corruption in our society can in
no way be suppressed 9%
There will always be corruption
here, although it can be some-
what decreased 40%
Corruption in our society can be
significantly decreased 40%
Corruption in Serbia can be fully
suppressed 5%
Dont know/no answer 6%
40%
5%
6% 9%
40%
Basic conclusions
The analysis of data from the empirical research on perceptions, atti-
tudes, and experiences of citizens regarding the phenomenon of corrup-
tion lead to certain general conclusions. 
First, the majority of citizens demonstrate that they are aware that cor-
ruption is a reality of this society and that it represents a social problem.
Corruption is seen as one of the four most important social problems. Cit-
izens perceive this deviant phenomenon to a lesser extent as their own
problem (seventh place according to importance), having probably in
mind small corruption in which they participate themselves and which
brings them gain. Namely, their perception of corruption relates to the
large corruption in which they do not participate and about which they
have only indirect knowledge. 
Secondly, there is no unified opinion about corruption as an extremely
harmful social problem which should be fought by all means. Relativiz-
ing the dangers it represents for society in general represents a sign that the
society, at least in part, has grown used to the phenomenon of corruption
and that it is ready, at least in part, to tolerate it. However, still a majority
of those polled have a complete negative value attitude towards corrup-
tion, i.e. sees it as an evil, which should be fought in any way. 
Thirdly, no singular idea of corruption exists in the populace. This phe-
nomenon is linked, above all, to giving cash or realizing a monetary prof-
it, while many activities in granting reciprocal obligation of giving (servic-
es, gifts, concessions), which make up a part of the traditional morality 
are excluded. Identification of a significant part of corruption practice
with obligations, which have roots in norms of the traditional moral, rep-
resents psychological bases not only for tolerating, but also for justifying
this phenomenon.
Fourthly, citizens have a tendency to see the causes of corruption, above
all, in weaknesses of the (legal) system. Placing the focus on systemic weak-
nesses, and partly on objective circumstances, in the final analysis, has a
meaning of rejection of the burden of moral responsibility of the society
itself. Citizens do not see state intervention as a factor of corruption in Serbia. 
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Picture 3.11. 
Expectations from new authorities 
Less susceptible to cor-
ruption 60%
More susceptible to cor-
ruption 2%
Dont expect significant
change 14%
Dont know/other 24% 2%
24%
60%
14%
Fifthly, there exists a general agreement among citizens that corruption
is an extremely outspread phenomenon in the society. At that, corruption
is perceived not only as an outspread, but also as a general phenomenon.
Insufficient differentiation of judgments and perceptions, in this respect,
regarding certain social fields, institutions, and professions, can be
explained as a result of political radicalization and of an extreme increase
of criticism in the society in general towards the former regime, following
the September and October events in Serbia. Simultaneously, there exist
rather widespread expectations that the scope of corruption in the future
will significantly decrease and those positive expectations are linked to
changes of the regime. 
Sixthly, in the framework of the general and insufficiently differentiated
perception of the outspread of corruption in the society, certain fields still
stand out: citizens believe that this phenomenon is most represented in
the customs service, judiciary, and police, and the least in the presidency
of Yugoslavia and the army. When we talk about professions or social
groups which are perceived as basic centers of corruption the first place is
taken by customs services and directors of state companies, but all other
professions and groups are significantly perceived as open to corruption. 
Seventhly, public procurement (tenders) is perceived as the center of
the so-called large corruption. This especially holds true for state procure-
ment in the field of public works in the reconstruction of the country, in
health care and the police. 
Eighthly, the principal position of citizens towards corruption is pre-
dominantly negative and it is perceived by the majority of the populace as
a social evil. Yet, it can be concluded that corruption is not generally and
unconditionally a condemned phenomenon. One part of the citizens
expresses an ambivalent position that represents a reaction to a long-term
anomic social situation, in which corruption has shown itself as efficient
means in solving the most important problems of individuals. Also, this
position is a consequence of (universally perceived) tendency of people to
deviate from their own principles in situations when corruption serves in
the realization of their own goals and interests. 
Ninthly, there exists a high level of readiness of citizens to take part in
corruption, i.e. readiness for compromise and deviation from their own
principles under certain conditions and when without an alternative. Such
readiness is especially present in situations when dealing with key prob-
lems above all, the problem of medical treatment and employment. 
Tenthly, while the views of citizens are divided concerning realistic pos-
sibilities that society can resolve the problem of corruption, their expecta-
tions from the future and new authorities regarding the effort to decrease
this deviant social phenomenon  are extremely optimistic.
EXPERIENCES OF PRIVATE ENTREPRENEURS WITH CORRUPTION 
Introduction
The goal of this survey is, above all, to examine, based on available
empirical data, the state of corruption linked to private entrepreneurs in
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Serbia. And to, based on that knowledge, determine a set of rules for its
repression. Before interpreting the available empirical data it is necessary
to, shortly, note the specific conditions, which are not present in other
countries, and which have encouraged the growth of corruption in Serbia.
They are, above all, certain specific issues not characteristic for other
countries in transition. 
Firstly, the breakup, or disintegration of Yugoslavia caused, besides its
physical disintegration, also the disintegration of the political, legal, and
economic system. Besides the disintegration of the economic space there
was a disintegration, or transformation of the then present system of val-
ues. The breakup of the country caused a war on its territory. And as a
consequence of the breakup of the country and of the war there was a
decrease of economic activity, increasing flows of refugees, and an overall
growth of poverty of the general population.
Secondly, as a consequence of war, Serbia was for a period of full ten
years under political and economic sanctions of the international commu-
nity. In such circumstances, those in power at the time systematically dis-
placed the flow of commodities and capital from the legal into the illegal
market. The accepted political doctrine of the ruling elite was supported
by many individuals, both those close to the authorities, and those not so
close, because one part saw in it the survival of the national economy, and
others saw their own chance for a quick and illegal profit. This decreased
the already small public control, characteristic for communist regimes, on
one hand, and increased the possibility of various speculations, on the
other hand. The semi-legal manner of doing business was not widely con-
demned by the public, but was, most often, graciously accepted, because
this was a way to acquire different, often scarce goods. Sanctions, which
decreased economic activity, caused the loss of employment for many and
caused the decrease of the standard of living for the majority of the popu-
lation. A consequence of this was, additionally, a forced departure of hun-
dreds of thousands of people into gray economy and into small-time
smuggling that made it possible for them literally to survive.
Thirdly, by introducing limited political pluralism and growth of the
private sector, a number of generally accepted social norms ceased to exist.
Business deals between the private and social/state sectors suddenly were
freed from yearlong political and legal limitations. In reality, business
deals were freed from strong party control. Simultaneously, political
authority could not decide between a marker economy and a type of half-
market and half-command economy. For this reason there was no clear
political will to construct a legal framework adjusted to new conditions.
Business activity fell into chaos. A large number of predominantly trading
companies were formed. A desire for quick wealth, following the example
of representatives of the political-economic elite, becomes a widely accept-
ed credo for the majority of businessmen. This made possible the making
of generally shady deals between owners of private companies and com-
munist managers of social/state companies. Because for a long time the
social/state property was perceived as no ones  no one was held respon-
sible for unfavorable contracts of these companies. Political and economic
elites were part of the same nomenclature and for this reason they could
cooperate with no legal consequences. The privatization of the social/state
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property was postponed so it could be quietly transformed into private
property. Actors of this illegal privatization are representatives of the for-
mer (communist) and previous (socialist) political-economic elites. By
delaying, traces of plunder were hidden. It should be born in mind that
many individuals who did not belong to the authorities used the new situ-
ation for illicit activity. The consequence of such a policy can be reflected
in the fact that owners of two thirds of private companies with over 30
employees in Serbia are members of the communist nomenclature or their
children (Vukoviæ).
The listed cases (noted as briefly as possible) were extremely favorable
for the development of corruption. Specially if we have in mind, and we
will examine this at length later, that the legal system of the country was
completely squandered, in which we see one of the key causes of corrup-
tion. In the squandering of the limited legal system the political authority
that held power at that time participated the most. In the name of higher
interests, first they turned a blind eye, and then, representatives of the
authorities went gradually into business. This gave a negative example
to everyone else who participated in business transactions. The described
social changes, also, lead to the conflict of social values and to a crises of
morality, on one hand, and to the increase of poverty of society at large, on
the other hand. Poverty, as a potential cause of corruption was investigat-
ed by Aristotle. In Politics he points out that poor people, who are part of
the system of judicial and executive power, are because of their poverty
corruptible (Aristotle). This position is in full accord with Weber, who
points out that a responsible and professional bureaucracy must be ade-
quately remunerated. Almost in a similar way react the citizens of Serbia.
They see the main causes of corruption in the functioning of the judiciary
system, crises of morality, and overall poverty. 
As far as the judiciary system is concerned, one can start from the clas-
sic position that the dividing line between a legal and police state, or as
in our case, between rule of law and a corrupted state is the point that
law has to be applied to those who hold the executive power in their
hands, and therefore the physical power to use physical coercion (Shevil-
lie). A precondition is the respect for procedure because law-abiding
societies or the rule of law is based on justice, because just procedure in
general assumes equal behavior towards all. In contrast, unjust proce-
dure grants a preference to one of the participants, and not the other
(Perelman). More concisely, rule of law implies a state in which the exec-
utive branch is subject to a set of rules that are imposed in a forced
manner, and simultaneously make up the basis, framework, and borders
of its power (Shevillie). Therefore, rule of law should deter public ser-
vants from acting arbitrarily and should secure equal application of law
in identical or similar situations, regardless of participants. Equal treat-
ment of all participants in legal proceedings, respect for basic individual
rights of citizens, regardless of religion, race, physical characteristics,
wealth, status in society, membership in political organizations, person-
al or family ties with arbitrators of justice, place in the hierarchy of
power etc., are its basic characteristics. To carry out these principles in
practice it is necessary to satisfy another condition for an independent
judiciary: and that is an independent class of juridical honorats
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(Weber). The class of judges must be aware of its social role, whose pro-
fessional honor includes also readiness to carry out the legal craft
which must be the bearer of their own legitimacy of legal form (Rad-
bruh). Finally, and especially important, every state with a rule of law, to
be called that, must secure a wide accord of acceptance of law as a spe-
cial value in all spheres of life (Albrecht), and also widely held beliefs
must exist that power, and therefore its misuse, can and must be limited
exclusively by law. Finally, we can conclude, the more accomplished this,
briefly presented theoretical model is, the less corruption in a given soci-
ety. The greater the deviation from the model, the level of corruption
will be greater.
Sample 
The survey of corruption among private entrepreneurs was carried out
in the first half of February 2001 on a sample of 327 private stores and
companies on the territory of Serbia, excluding Kosovo and Metohija, in
40 municipalities. A combination of a stratified and quota sample was
used. Survey covers 21,1% manufacturing workshops, 42,9% non-manu-
facturing stores, 11,9% manufacturing and 21,1% non-manufacturing
companies. The ownership structure of surveyed companies and stores is
as follows: private, full responsibility, one owner 78,0%; private, partner-
ship 7,3%; company with limited liability, one owner 9,5%; company with
unlimited liability, several owners 4,0%; stock company, private 0,3%;
stock company, mixed ownership 0,6% and unknown 0,3%. The size of
the company according to the number of full time employees was as fol-
lows: less then 5 employees 69,7%, 6 to 20 employees 24,8%, 21 and more
employees 5,2%; while the size of companies according to the total num-
ber of employees (full and part time) was as follows: less then 5 employees
56,3%, 6 to 20 employees 33,9% and 21 and more employees 9,4%.
Unknown in both cases amounts to 0,3%. Interviews were conducted in
73,1% of cases with the owner, in 10,1% with the general manager or pres-
ident of the board, in 4,9% with a partner, 6,1% with a manager, and 3,3%
of cases with other employees of the company or a shop. It is interesting
that 83,3% of the sample have owners as sole shareholders, 13,2% two
shareholders, and only 3,0% three and more shareholders. Additionally,
according to statements of those polled, the majority owner is in 60,6% an
individual, 34,9% a family, and 4,5% others. The majority owner has not
changed from the founding of the business entity in 91,1% of the cases, in
3,7% of cases it was changed , and in 5,2% is unknown. Also, in 96% of
cases companies are private from their founding, the remaining number
are privatized social companies, private branches of social companies, or
privatized mixed social-foreign companies.
Corruption in the judiciary
Having in mind the thesis stated in the introduction, the analysis of
scope and outspread of corruption must start from the analysis of the
legal system. One of the key points of such an analysis is how the citizens
perceive it, and how do business subjects evaluate it. An earlier survey
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(Argument, 1997) gives an unfavorable view of the judiciary by Yugoslav
citizens. Trust in courts as an institution is expressed by less then one
third (30,9%) of citizens. In contrast, almost one half (45,6%) has no
trust in them. The remaining (23,5%) is neutral or cannot make a judg-
ment. In answering a question, from that survey, courts in Yugoslavia
guarantee a fair court process, only less then one quarter (23,6%) of cit-
izens said they agree in full. Disagreement with this statement is above
one half (51,8%), and the rest (24,3%) cannot say. Another survey (Insti-
tute of Social Sciences, 1997) shows that, when we exclude those who did
not give an answer, that only a small part (4,3%) of citizens of Serbia trust
the institution of the court, and less then one quarter (23,0%) has an
average amount of trust. In contrast, almost two fifths (39,6%) of citizens
who expressed their view have no trust in the institution of the court, and
those who have a small amount of trust is one third (33,1%). 
Our most recent survey, results of which are presented in table 3.11,
demonstrate that citizens have an extremely bad perception of the judici-
ary system of the country. 
Only in a little more then one quarter (28,4%) of cases believe that
courts are just and unbiased, and three fifths (60,3%) that this is only
rarely or never true. This means that the citizens of Serbia deny the courts
justice and impartiality, as they, also, deny their fairness (65,8%), speed
and efficiency (74,3%), accessibility (57,5%), and reliability (67,1%) and
ability to carry out their own decisions (58,1%). The listed empirical data,
above all, demonstrates that citizens assess the judiciary, as an arbiter in
any conflict, as not trustworthy. Control by authorities over the courts is
direct and citizens can feel it directly. It can be felt, generally speaking, that
every court decision because it is tangible, can be a cause of manipulation
and of placement of a citizen or an economic subject in an unequal posi-
tion. Additionally, the decisions are felt right away; it is not necessary for
time to pass, as in certain other situations, so that the influence of author-
ities on a certain institution can be felt.
The court, as an unavoidable institution in resolving of eventual busi-
ness disputes, got even worse marks in our survey, carried out among pri-
vate entrepreneurs. We evaluated the court system by a six level scale in
the laid out battery of questions. Table 3.12 includes, in addition to a
concise distribution of answers, the arithmetic mean values, and an
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Table 3.11.
Assessment of the court system; according to the public opinion, courts are: 
Always Mostly Rarely Never Dont know Index (1-5) Place
Just 5,1 23,3 37,9 22,4 11,3 3,59 4
Fair 4,6 18,5 40,0 25,8 11,0 3,72 3
Fast 3,6 11,4 40,1 34,2 10,7 3,96 1
Accessible 7,7 21,6 33,0 24,5 13,2 3,57 5
Reliable 4,0 14,5 40,4 26,6 14,3 3,81 2
Capable 6,9 19,7 39,7 18,4 15,3 3,56 6
index of the assessment of certain characteristics of courts as seen by
private entrepreneurs.
Almost one fifth of those polled said ( always, through, usually, often)
that courts are fast, reliable, just, fair, and capable, and fewer than one
quarter that they are accessible. More concisely, with a three quarter
majority the private entrepreneurs deny courts in Serbia the necessary
speed in decision making, then, its reliability, passing of decisions in an
honest manner, lack corruption, unbiased ness and the ability to imple-
ment their own decisions. Also, with a two-thirds majority they deny that
it is, accessible in an equal manner to all. The stated assessment of courts,
institutions, is almost identical for private entrepreneurs in regard to the
type of company, or shop (e = 0,082 to 0,184). At the same time, owners
of private shops are harsher in assessing the fairness of courts than own-
ers of private companies (e = 0,210). The presented data demonstrates,
also, that the worst marks were given for speediness, or efficiency of
courts, in the resolving of business disputes, then reliability, while condi-
tionally speaking, best marks were given for accessibility. This can mean:
courts are not accessible, and when they are accessible, then they are slow,
unreliable, and unfair. 
Comparative analysis of these two tables tells us that there is almost
no difference between the perception of the judiciary system by citizens
of Serbia and its assessment by private entrepreneurs (the indexes are
also equal). Both point out slowness in first place, then unreliability,
unfairness, and lack of justice. The only, almost insignificant difference,
is that accessibility and capability, according to private entrepreneurs in
comparison with citizens, have switched places. All this means that the
support of courts in securing equal conditions on the market of goods,
labor, and capital is not reliable. It follows that the competition between
different economic actors is also unequal. Violate this equality with the
aid of personal and political party contacts, and others will attempt the
same, when their interests are endangered, to use corruption, which
generates a demand for corruption. Public servants, for their private
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Always Usually Sometimes Never Dont Index Rank
and often and rarely know (1-5)
Just 1,51 8,45 7,81 5,6 6,7 3,60 4
Fair 1,81 2,86 0,91 6,5 8,0 3,79 3
Fast 1,5 6,85 1,63 5,2 4,9 4,10 1
Accessible 5,81 7,15 0,11 7,4 9,5 3,51 6
Reliable 1,51 1,06 1,21 8,0 8,3 3,80 2
Capable 4,01 4,95 6,91 6,8 7,3 3,56 5
Table 3.12.
Assessment of the court system; according to  private entrepreneurs, courts are: 
8 Let us remember that corruption in essence represents violation of the rules of the game
in market transactions. 
interests, are taking bribes and are undermining the mentioned equali-
ty, which generates the supply of corruption.8 As a consequence, partic-
ipants in the market feel insecure. They cannot predict the moves of
their potential competition and cannot plan their own future business
activities.
Private entrepreneurs are consistent in assessing the quality of the
work of courts. Namely, in the same survey, in which the quality of
services provided by public servants was assessed, they have almost
identically answered regarding the quality of work of courts. Almost
three quarters (73,4%) based on their experience have assessed court
authorities and the judiciary as poor (poor to a certain extent, poor, and
very poor) in carrying out services, which they provide (index 3,9). The
bad marks entrepreneurs gave to the institution of courts, which repre-
sents one of the pillars of a democratic systems, i.e. the division of
power, is of key importance for understanding the overall social phe-
nomena in Serbian society, and therefore one of the main keys for
understanding corruption, not only here, but in general. Low marks for
the work of courts at the same time is a sign of a lack of confidence in
the legal order. This means that the division of power among the leg-
islative, executive, and judiciary branch is present in words only. Pri-
vate entrepreneurs in this survey, as do citizens, state clearly: on one
hand the judiciary is under the direct control of the executive branch
or, more precisely, of one political party, and on the other hand, it is
corruptible, and for these reasons we have no confidence in it, because
year long experience teaches us so.
In contrast to this position, the private entrepreneurs expect from the
new, democratic authorities, changes in the judiciary system. Namely,
almost two thirds (65,2%) believes that now (after changes) the legal
system of the country should back them in business disputes. On the
other hand, more then one fifth (22,3%) state that it would not back
them. When dealing with the past times, for example, three years ago,
the situation was diametrically opposite, only15,3% had said that more
or less they had the support of the legal system, and almost three
fourths (73,1%), also, more or less, that they did not have it. The pre-
sented results state that private entrepreneurs have very high confi-
dence in new authorities. They expect the new authorities to resolve the
current problem of the Serbian society: the judiciary system. Thus, the
private entrepreneurs expect that the authorities will free the courts
from the strong hold of the executive branch and establish autonomy of
all members of the repressive apparatus: the police, prosecutors, courts,
and correctional institutions. 
Based on the presented and interpreted empirical data it can be conclud-
ed that without the confidence of citizens in the institution of the courts,
there is no psychological security of individuals in securing his rights before
a court. If there is no such security, an individual, either a businessperson
or a citizen, is forced to use various, most often non-institutionalized chan-
nels for the realization of his rights. One is corruption. A citizen or a private
entrepreneur who lost trust in the institution of the court, when he finds
himself before a court, will more often be interested if his legal representa-
tive has personal contacts with the court, then, for example, what is the
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legal status of his process, how long will it last, or what the professional
capabilities of his legal representative are. A small step remains to formulat-
ing the following questions often posed to the legal representative Do you
have a contact in the court? and How much will it cost me? 
Inefficiency of public services as a precondition of corruption
Before conducting an analysis of magnitude and outspread of corrup-
tion in Serbia it is necessary to analyze obtained empirical data concerning
the assessment of the quality and efficiency of services provided to private
entrepreneurs by public services. One of the key conditions for every busi-
ness activity is the quality and adaptation of legal regulations to market
conditions. In addition to the named regulations, additionally of extreme
importance is the quality of services provided by public services; from the
quality of the road network, telephone and health care services, to services
of the executive branch, or, from municipal to republican and federal
ministries. They form a social climate, or the environment that we most
often assess as mostly favorable or mostly unfavorable to the development
of entrepreneurship. Quality, for many of them, besides efficiency and
promptness, also implies impartiality. Public services seen in this light,
represent logistic support for every business subject. Without this support
it is almost impossible to carry out modern business activity. 
In table 3.13. we have shown the assessment of public services as given
by private entrepreneurs. The distribution of answers  arithmetic mean,
index, and ranking by every service according to assessments of private
entrepreneurs  is given.
The displayed results of the empirical study clearly demonstrate that
private entrepreneurs give very bad marks9 to quality and efficiency of
public services. At the top of the list are road maintenance, courts, parlia-
ment and health care. In contrast, the army, post office, the telecommuni-
cations company, the national bank, heating plants, and the water compa-
ny received somewhat better average marks. We have here three types of
services and we have conditionally named them the state, public and
local spheres. From the three the state sphere; or the state and its insti-
tutions received the worst marks. A more detailed analysis shows that
from all public services from the state sphere, as suggested in previous
pages, the worst marks were given to the court authorities and the judici-
ary, then the parliament, and the customs service. For the public sphere,
worst marks were given to road maintenance, health care, and education.
Since for these three services significant financial means are necessary, the
quality of their services is in direct correlation with the overall financial
situation of society. And since that overall material situation of society is
extremely poor, it is logical that services, provided by these public entities,
are at a low level. The quality of many of these services is also influenced
by factors that they cannot control easily, especially services in the domain
of infrastructure. From the local sphere, the worst marks were given to
services, which are an extension of the executive branch of the republican
government  tax collection, and inspection services.
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9 Value 1 means very good, and value 5 very bad. .
The assessments of private entrepreneurs are in line with facts known
form political philosophy stating that the success or failure of each individ-
ual, in this case entrepreneur, significantly depends from the success or lack
of success of not only the narrow (community) but also od the social com-
munity which they belong to  or the state (Dworkin). When this point is
interpreted a bit more loosely, we can see that its success, and therefore the
quality of services offered by pubic services, depends to a great extent not
only on the municipal and state authorities as such, but also on the general
social and inherited socio-historical conditions. We believe that many of
inherited social-historic conditions can be, by deliberate activities of politi-
cal authorities, changed or corrected, or their influence be somewhat neu-
tralized. All of this, above all, by the construction of an adequate system of
regulation to be carried out by social institutions. 
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Very To a To a Very Dont Index Rank
good certain certain bad know (1-5)
extent extent bad
good and bad
Customs service 1,51 5,92 3,91 4,43 4,3 3,71 5
Federal government
and ministries 0,92 1,43 0,61 1,03 6,1 3,42 11
Federal ministry
for foreign trade 0,61 4,42 6,61 1,64 6,8 3,62 7
Republican 
government 1,22 0,53 5,51 1,03 1,8 3,39 12
National (central) 
bank 4,03 5,52 9,1 9,52 2,0 3,02 17
Local authorities 2,43 8,33 9,51 5,3 4,6 3,26 14
Health care 2,11 9,95 0,42 3,2 4,3 3,7 24
Education 2,13 3,04 2,81 6,2 5,8 3,47 9
Police 3,12 7,04 3,72 1,4 4,6 3,32 13
Army 5,84 8,62 4,4 8,91 3,2 2,72 20
Tax administration 2,12 4,84 0,72 6,9 5,5 3,63 6
Inspection service 2,42 4,83 9,82 7,2 5,8 3,62 8
Post office 2,85 7,82 7,8 6,7 4,9 2,77 19
Telecommunications
company 2,15 3,93 0,2 8,3 5,5 2,85 18
Electric power 
company 1,23 3,94 2,81 9,6 2,4 3,44 10
Water  company 4,35 2,02 6,31 2,8 4,6 3,16 15
Heating plants 2,83 5,52 4,81 1,02 6,0 3,07 16
Road maintenance 0,31 1,73 2,45 2,3 4,3 4,37 1
Judiciary 0,31 4,74 7,12 6,31 1,6 3,90 2
Parliament 0,61 9,02 9,62 2,62 8,1 3,72 3
Table 3.13.
Quality and efficiency of services  provided by public administration
Countries in transition, including Serbia, are faced with numerous prob-
lems, including the diverse problem in the functioning of public services.
They were, above all, conceptualized as a service of the ruling nomencla-
ture. Since it was a one party nomenclature, the key for placement and
advancement of employee cadre was obedience and nepotism, and not
expertise and quality of work. Due to the non-ownership model, social
peace and nepotism, all of these services, without exception, became the
means of taking care of the surplus of the workforce. This process of grant-
ing jobs was carried out most often according to special criteria. Along with
the long expected political changes in Serbia a fear concerning job security
grew among employees This fear was especially induced by recession, due
to which hundreds of thousands of other workers were dismissed or send
on forced leave. Simultaneously, within society a small group grew rich
very quickly. This wealth was attained most often through economic trans-
actions between the newly formed private and social/state sectors The key
actors of these business arrangements were members of the political
nomenclature. The unpunished accumulation of wealth in an illegal man-
ner by people close to authorities applied pressure on the system of moral
attitudes of every individual. This caused the erosion of business ethics and
corrosion of the system of social values. 
On the other hand, with a rapid growth of poverty there was a rapid fall
of salaries of public servants and, as a consequence, the decrease of work
discipline. The decrease of salaries, low job security, implosion of overall
social responsibility, and the real fear that many of them will lose their job
with the change of political authorities, constituted the motivation for the
rapid increase of desire to exploit the time remaining in their positions to
the full extent. In reality, all of this motivated them to cash in on their
services as much as possible; and since this could not be done legally, their
leaning towards corruption increased. Self-justification was easy: if others
can do it, why not me, especially since I am paid so poorly. 
Making professionals out of the public servants is one of the precondi-
tions for the increase of quality and efficiency of services rendered by pub-
lic administration. This means their de-politization, and therefore their
protection from political changes, better remuneration and guaranteed
promotions based on competence and knowledge, and not on basis of obe-
dience. Additionally, it is necessary to establish a system of both internal
and external control against eventual misuse of office. It is also necessary to
codify the work of public servants as much as possible and thus limit their
discretionary right in decision making. At the same time one should limit
the role of the state and the bureaucracy in economic transactions. In other
words, the more of a market in a society and the greater the seriousness of
the state, the possibilities for the development of corruption are more lim-
ited. In other words, less state intervention breeds less corruption. 
Public servants and outspread of corruption 
In the introduction we mentioned that corruption is more or less devel-
oped in almost all societies. The rich and legally regulated countries with a
long democratic tradition are not immune to corruption. Besides, a legal
system and a cultural-historic heritage, state intervention is one of the key
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causes of corruption. As specific causes of corruption, especially the small
scale, since not all countries are exposed to them, we can name poverty.
With its increase the extent of corruption grows. It is known that the
increase of state intervention influences the development of corruption, or
that where economic relations are regulated by a large number of rules,
which are to be interpreted or implemented the possibility for the sale of
those services by public servants is much greater. The illegal sale of these
services leads to the strengthening of the hierarchical structure of power,
because in this way the higher layers keep the lower layers obedient,
regardless of the amount of their salaries, since one part of the earnings are
compensated by the illegal collection for services. The price of the
weight of an individual position in the hierarchy is not measured only
by the salary, but also by the possibility of the illegal collection for servic-
es. This of course increases their attractiveness, on one hand, and discre-
tion, on the other. This is why it is very customary that in almost all trans-
actions where the state is present, from when it is an employer, an
investor, all the way to being a secondary participant in an economic
transaction, corruption is present to a greater or a lesser extent. On the
power of the state the extent of corruption and its very existence depend. 
Simultaneously, with the increase of state economic activity, the proba-
bility that a significant percentage of the funds, which change hands, will
be taken as a bribe increases. Therefore, costs are increased due to bribery
and often the quality of the provided service or transaction is lowered.
Various services can be subject to bribery, starting with investment deals
and public procurement, through granting favorable loans, and of import
quotas for scarce commodities, all the way to the issuing of different
licenses, even the smallest ones. One of the basic principles of every
bureaucracy, on which it bases its social power, is the fabrication of new
rules and duties and the growth of its competence. It becomes an exclusive
interpreter of them. Therefore, its importance is increased and position
made more secure. The additional motive toward administrating, and
thus forming of different barriers for private entrepreneurs, is the possibil-
ity that those services can be, illegally, paid for. The price of a service is
always proportional to the size of the deal. Accordingly, not only is the
demand increased, but also the readiness of the interested parties to pay a
bribe with the increase of the value of the deal.
Investigating the reach of corruption is an unthankful job because of
the lack of valid statistical data regarding its scope. Coercion (seeking) and
offering of bribes is most often done in private  without witnesses;
because it is an illegal activity done between participants in an economic
transaction. For this reason its scope can be investigated only by recon-
structing cases which become public by way of courts or news media, on
one hand, or by systematic surveys, on the other hand.
This methodological procedure has its limitations and is unsound not
only in societies in transition, but also in developed ones, because they
include a high dark figure of crime (and corruption as well). The situa-
tion grows even more complicated in societies experiencing great and
impulsive social-economic changes and societies with no independent
courts and free press. We are left with the second methodological proce-
dure that is surveys, as the only, somewhat sound procedure for identifying
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the scope and outspread of bribes. Its limitation is in the fact that it cannot
reach the highest political authorities and their participation in bribery.
The second problem lies in the fact that surveys do not measure the real
level of corruption in a society, but above all, the perception of citizens
about the scope and outspread of this phenomenon.
Survey results demonstrate that private entrepreneurs, based on their
experience, with an above half majority (52,9%) state that it is customary
that companies and stores, which do this kind of thing, give bribes
(always, in majority of cases, or often) to state employees for completing
certain things. Also, more then one third (36,1%) said that giving bribes
for those things to state employees is somewhat rare. Only 3,1% of cases
never give bribes, and 8,0% dont know. This means that almost nine
tenths (88,9%) of private entrepreneurs, according to their statements,
have had at least at one time, given a bribe to a state employee for a certain
service. The presented data tells us that giving a bribe to state employees is
a necessary condition for the carrying out of economic activity. It is so out-
spread that it has become a common practice. There is no significant dif-
ference in regard to the type of company (Cramers v = 0,142) or its size. 
Experiences from the field shows that if a bribe is not given to a public
servant at the time of registration of a business, you will be visited by sani-
tary or tax inspectors. The same holds true for the customs service and for
departments that issue import and export licenses, or for local administra-
tions that issue work permits or building permits for attractive locations.
One can conclude that corruption is a widely outspread practice among
state employees judging by data that over one half (52,3%) of private entre-
preneurs said that they always know in advance (always, usually, and often)
the amount of additional payment for various services. At the same time,
almost one third (30,9%) knows the amount to be paid for corruption
(bribe) only sometimes and rarely. Only 4,3% of private entrepreneur
know, but not the exact amount and kind of services to be rendered for the
bribe to be paid. It is most probable that they know about this social phe-
nomenon only indirectly  through someone elses experience. 
The key data on corruption in a given country is linked to its industrial
organization, or the market structure  in other words, is corruption
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Picture 3.12.
Frequency of corruption in cases of private entrepreneurs
Alwaus 9%
In most cases 22%
Often 22%
Sometimes 27%
Rarely 9%
Never 3%
Dont know 8%
8%
22%
22%
27%
9%
3%
9%
centralized or decentralized. This can best be seen based on information if
one service performed by a corrupt state employees has to be paid one or
more times. Multiple payments for the same service depicts decentralized
corruption. According to survey results almost every third (31,8%) private
entrepreneur was forced, according to his own statements, to pay for the
same service again (always, usually, and often); and additional one in five
(20,2%) sometimes, and one in seven (13,1%) rarely. This, also, means that
that almost two thirds (65,1%) for the same service, had to pay two or more
times. The distribution of answers regarding the type of the company tells
us that owners of stores more often, but statistically insignificantly
(Cramers v = 0,190), paid two or more times then owners of companies.
A special problem arises if the corruptor, in spite of a paid bribe, does
not receive the agreed service. Then we have inefficient corruption, or cor-
ruption with very high transaction costs, since it is necessary to form an
oversight mechanism for the implementation of corruption. Survey
results show that after the additional payment the agreed on service is
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Picture 3.13.
Do you know in advance the amount of a bribe to be paid?
Alwaus 7%
Usually 29%
Often 17% 
Sometimes 20%
Rarely 11%
Never 4%
Dont know 12%
12%
29%
17%
20%
7%
4%
11%
Picture 3.14 
Frequency of multiple payments for service
Alwaus 3%
Usually 12%
Often 16% 
Sometimes 20%
Rarely 13%
Never 8%
Dont know 28%
28%
12%
20%13%
3%
16%
8%
received: always in 8,3% of cases, usually in 40,1%, often in 15,0%, some-
times in 11,9%, rarely in 3,4% and never in 1,5% of cases. Those who
dont know are 19,9%. The mean arithmetic value is 3. Based on the pre-
sented data it is clear that there is a great possibility that the paid service
will be provided. More precisely, the bribe giver has only relative certainty
that he will receive the paid service. This can mean that certain public
servants, especially of lower rank, occasionally, wishing to acquire addi-
tional income, promise and collect for services outside their influence and
competence. The agreed on service somewhat more often, but not of sta-
tistical significance, is received by owners of stores than by owners of com-
panies (Cramers v = 0,203). Storeowners are more often faced with lower
level employees, or employees on lower levels of power, and therefore the
somewhat higher possibility that they will receive the paid service. On the
other hand, company owners deal with higher-level employees, because
competences for sought services are on a higher level, or out of necessity
seek lower level employees, who sometimes cannot carry out undertaken
obligations. This is the reason why the agreed on service is not always
received. This confirms the thesis that lower level employees occasionally
sell a service outside the sphere of their influence.
Private entrepreneurs, based on experience, do not believe they can find
protection from corruption in the framework of the existing bureaucratic
apparatus. To avoid the unavoidable additional payment by seeking
another government employee, or his boss, is absolutely refused by 13,5%
of private entrepreneurs. This activity can save them sometimes or rarely,
said over one half (51,3%). In contrast 7,3% of private entrepreneurs
believe that by going to see the boss or another employee they can always
avoid bribery, and additional 14,4% think this mostly or often. In
general, entrepreneurs state they do not have significant protection from
corrupt public servants in going to their superiors, or in escaping to
another employee. Obviously, there is collusion in the state service, some-
times overt, sometimes covert, or passive. 
This confirms another reference found in the survey. Namely, above
one half (52,2%) states that for the provided favor (from always to in
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Picture 3.15.
If a state employee is corrupted, is the service really received? 
Alwaus 8%
Usually 41%
Often 15% 
Sometimes 12%
Rarely 3%
Never 1%
Dont know 20%
20%
1%
3%
15%
8%
41%
12%
individual cases) they were directly asked for money, gifts, or a counter
favor (for example, a paid winter vacation). Those who do not ask directly,
then expect to receive just compensation for provided services. Private
entrepreneurs in more then two fifths (43,4%) of cases said that public ser-
vants clearly demonstrated that they expect money, gifts, or a counter serv-
ice. At the same time, more then one third (37,6%) demonstrates readiness
to take a bribe in individual cases, and only 11% ever expects so. Therefore,
bribery has become not only an outspread phenomenon but also almost a
public occurrence. Such public display was influenced by the lack of fear
from eventual sanctions, on one hand, and from moral condemnation of
the wider social community, on the other. The lack of fear from sanctions
derives from the fact that deeply corrupted are not only public servants but
also political authorities. For personal protection from eventual sanctions,
political authorities have corroded the legal order of the country, a fact now
exploited by the lower structures. Wide moral condemnation from the
social community is nonexistent, because numerous individuals, even if
they do not agree, relativise condemnation, because in most cases for some
it is the only way to survive, and for others a way to get certain things
done. At the same time, corruption becomes a widely prevailing rule of
conduct, especially between the state and its citizens. 
Finally we arrive at the key question: how much do private entrepre-
neurs, from their annual income, pay for bribes to public servants?
Through this question we received the most reliable data regarding how
many of them have to pay for various additional services. Simply put, one
quarter (24,8%) does not pay bribes. Above one half (57,8%) does so and
states how much in regard to their income, while a significant part (17,4%)
cannot say. The most frequent rate of taxation of private entrepreneurs
from public servants is between 1 and 10%. There is no significant differ-
ence between private companies and stores. Since the local private entre-
preneurs reluctantly talk about their income, their answers regarding the
participation of paid bribes in the overall income should be taken with sig-
nificant reservations. What is partially known is that the amount for the
bribe depends on the type of activity, or its attractiveness and the scope of
business being under consideration. Experiences of surveyors in the field
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Picture 3.16.
Percentage of the overall income which is used for bribery
0%  26%
Less than 1%  15%
1-2%  8%
2-10%  20%
10-25%  10%
Over 25%  4%
Dont know  17%
17%
4%
10%
8%
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state that most often money changes hands for locations permits for shops
and restaurants and for various building permits in attractive large city
zones. In the same rank are, of course, import licenses and customs clear-
ances, especially for commodities on a limited regime of import. Things
that a survey cannot reach are organized crime, or the import of oil, oil
derivatives, cigarettes, and alcoholic beverages.
Unavoidably a question is posed of how much of their work time, and
thus work energy, or resources, private entrepreneurs lose in bribing differ-
ent state or para-state employees. One third (33,9%) said they do not lose
time or, as one person said: You take out your wallet, hand it over and it
ends there. At the same time, one fifth (20,8%) states that it is less then 1%
of their time. However, almost one quarter (23,8%) state that on the average,
for bribing of public servants, or managers of public/state companies they
lose between 1 and 25% of their time, and additional 4,3% that the percent-
age is higher. One part (17,1%) cannot evaluate. A question is unavoidably
put forward: why some private entrepreneurs lose so much time to carry out
their obligations towards public servants? Time is lost, because they are
attempting to, by using various resources as they say themselves, avoid the
additional payment, or, they pay only when they have no other choice. 
Based on the presented survey results we can see that corruption is
widely present and that it has became almost a public affair. This means
that money or favors are sought or expected with no shame and fear. The
next question according to importance is the question in which spheres of
social life is corruption present the most. Results of this part of the survey,
for private entrepreneurs, are presented in table 3.14.
One can notice right away that bribery is present the most with adminis-
trations dealing with acquisition of building sites, or, for construction of
temporary buildings. Then import-export licenses and obtaining of govern-
ment contracts, and then for acquisition of telephone and electric power
services. At the bottom of the list are the tax administration, company regis-
tration, and approval of new sales prices. This means that more corrupt are
those services where the possibility of income for the private entrepreneur is
greater. The building permit can have a great market value, because the mar-
ket price of a building in a exclusive city zone can be several times larger then
the price of construction  the same holds true for import-export licenses. 
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Picture 3.17.
Percentage of work time of private entrepreneurs lost on corruption
0%  35%
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The above data tells us that no single authorities are immune to corrup-
tion  regardless of how they present themselves. The level of corruption in
one society does not depend, as we said in the beginning, on the morality of
an individual, but on the potential income from corruption and from the
efficiency of the penal apparatus. This can be confirmed by the fact that
building permits in seventeen largest cities in Serbia were issued by then
opposition parties. Corruption of municipal employees in those cities,
according to the survey, was the same (Cramers v < 0,115), as in those
cities where power was held by the Socialist-JUL coalition. The level or cor-
ruption of municipal administration and services, regardless of what party
was in power, was high; but it should be noted that municipal administra-
tions (elected officials in administration) are somewhat more corrupt
(index 3,78) from municipal services (index 3,51). 
The bottom of the list of corruption of public services is the tax admin-
istration. This is due to several factors, above all the irregularity in the
forming of the tax base. Namely, private companies and entrepreneurs are
successful in minimizing their tax base by using various mechanisms and
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Table 3.14.     
Aptitude towards bribes of public sector employees; bribe for:
Always Mostly Sometimes Never Dont Index Rank
often rarely know (1-5)
Import license 5,5 11,3 9,1 5,5 68,5 3,06 2
Export license 5,5 8,3 7,0 5,8 73,4 3,02 3
Customs documentation 5,8 13,4 8,9 8,0 63,9 2,96 6
Foreign currency
transactions 3,7 12,8 12,0 8,6 63,0 2,67 10
and inspection
Tax administration 4,0 21,4 39,7 17,1 17,7 2,12 17
Financial police 7,0 27,8 34,9 13,8 16,5 2,69 9
Company registration 4,0 19,6 34,3 19,9 12,3 2,30 16
Sanitary inspection 4,9 22,3 37,6 13,1 22,0 2,52 14
Urban planning 
inspection 4,3 22,0 32,8 12,2 28,7 2,59 12
Registration of foreign
trade transactions 2,8 9,8 10,7 7,6 69,1 2,58 13
Building site acquisition 11,3 28,2 21,4 6,7 32,4 3,1 21
Working permit 5,8 25,1 31,5 13,1 24,5 2,66 11
Telephone and power
acquisition 11,9 30,9 26,8 11,0 19,6 2,97 5
Government contract 8,3 11,3 12,3 7,3 60,9 2,98 4
Local government 
contract 6,1 21,8 24,4 9,5 38,2 2,8 18
State company contract 8,6 21,7 26,0 9,5 43,3 2,84 7
Approval to 
change prices 2,4 24,1 14,7 11,9 56,9 2,40 15
there is no need to corrupt the tax administration to achieve minimal
taxes. The second place is taken by the registration of companies and
approval of new sales prices. In the first case the registration of a company
has an insignificant market value on the informal market, because in Ser-
bia there are hundreds of thousands of registered companies that are
frozen  which do not work. In other words, there is no profit in the reg-
istering of a company. Approval of new sales prices, also, has a low price
on the informal market, since private entrepreneurs very seldom do busi-
ness in fields where the state sets the prices. Synthetically presented only
the tax administration and registration of companies make up the relative-
ly low corrupted services (index under 2,5), and highly corrupted services
(index over 3,0) include municipal and city services for issuing of building
permits and the customs service. To them very close in corruption are the
government and their ministries (especially the one in charge of foreign
trade) and public electrical power and telecommunications companies.
All the rest are medium corrupted services. 
Based on the presented survey findings it is more then clear that cor-
ruption in Serbia is present almost in all pores of business. More precisely,
bribery has become a necessary, but not sufficient condition almost in the
smallest business undertaking. From the viewpoint of public servants, as
the most corrupt part of the society, bribery is seen as a normal phenome-
non, or, as the author of this paper was told, as a tax the state did not
and will not be able to collect. The consequence of the unpaid tax is his
small salary for the job he performs. The fact that this tax (various
additional payments) is also paid by those who should not be doing so,
is not his problem, but a problem of the state. Especially since every busi-
ness activity, as seen by one part of public servants, is perceived as a dubi-
ous activity. Corruption has spread so much that it became systemic  it is
built-in into the social-economic and the political system of Serbia. This,
among other things, is demonstrated by survey findings, in this regard
there are no statistically relevant differences regarding the type of private
companies, its activity, and scope of business activity.
Basic types of corruption
Three basic types of corruption characteristic for contemporary soci-
eties are: additional payment to a public servant for realizing of a right
which by law is available to an individual or a business subject, then
bribery for the purpose of acquisition of a right which according to law or
sub-law act one does not have, and finally, bribery for readjusting of a law
of sub-law regulation (different bylaws and regulations) in line with inter-
ests of the corruptor. The extent of these three types of corruption we have
presented in table 3.15.
The presented results demonstrate the following: first, there is a high
percentage of dont know answers and second, the dominant type of
corruption is bribery for the realization of rights. The high level of unde-
cided answers is a consequence of a fact that a private entrepreneur, or a
common citizen, in practice cannot easily differentiate between realizing
of a right or of breaking of a law. The second problem is that they are not
interested in this issue. They are only interested if they have to provide
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additional payment for the service or not. Finally, psychologically it is
somewhat easier to classify your deed as the realization of your rights, then
as breaking the law. 
The first type of corruption, realizing of a right, is a consequence of the
following fact: bureaucratic apparatus of public services prolongs the
realizing of rights or by its additional interpretation deters an individual
or business subject from attaining that right. For this reason the user of
this right is forced to speed up the procedure, which was put in place by
the bureaucratic apparatus as an obstacle, by providing additional pay-
ment. The same holds true for the quality of service. Additional payment
for realizing rights is explained by the public servant with an argument
that it is possible only under a condition that he ignores certain ele-
ments of procedure. The same holds true for the realizing of a right
without waiting. If a bribe is expected or coerced does not change
things. The key characteristic of this bribe is that the public servant is not
breaking the law, but circumnavigating it or misusing his position. By
doing this, his risk is lower. This is one of the reasons why this type of
corruption is most widely present. The outspread of this kind of corrup-
tion is caused by the frequent contacts of private entrepreneurs with pub-
lic servants in an attempt to realize their rights. Corruption for the realiz-
ing of rights, according to statements of private entrepreneurs, most fre-
quently occurs during the acquiring of electricity and telephone services,
working permit, acquiring contacts with the government and local gov-
ernment, acquiring a contract with a state company, acquiring a building
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Table 3.15.     
Types of corruption; bribery for (in %):
Realizing Breaking Changing Dont
rights laws laws know
Import license 24,8 20,2 4,6 50,5
Export license 23,2 20,2 4,0 52,6
Customs documentation 18,0 28,7 4,6 48,6
Foreign currency dealing and inspection 16,5 29,4 6,7 47,4
Tax administration 25,4 42,2 10,4 22,0
Financial police 25,1 45,9 8,6 20,0
Company registration 38,2 22,6 10,7 28,4
Sanitary inspection 29,1 35,8 9,2 26,0
Urban planning inspection 29,7 31,8 9,5 29,1
Registration of foreign trade transactions 21,1 22,0 5,5 51,4
Building location acquisition 36,1 28,4 8,0 27,5
Work permit 46,2 21,7 7,0 25,1
Telephone and power acquisition 52,9 17,7 4,9 24,5
Government contract acquisition 27,2 16,8 7,0 48,9
Local government contract acquisition 39,4 19,0 6,1 35,5
State company contract acquisition 37,3 20,5 5,8 36,4
Approval to change prices 30,9 19,3 8,0 41,9
location, approval of new sales prices, import-export licenses, and com-
pany registration.
The second type of corruption, breaking of rules, is a consequence of the
following chain of events: a public servant, so that he could collect for a
service, tolerates a potential client who is breaking the rules (various misde-
meanor fines, letting the merchandise pass customs, etc.) or breaks the rules
himself (issuing of different permits, fixing tenders, etc.). Since in this case
there is no clear line between corruption and crime, for both sides, the cor-
ruptor and the corrupted, the risk is higher. The amount of risk, in addition
to the value of the deal, influences the price for the service. Since this type
of corruption is linked with more risk it is somewhat less present then the
corruption aimed at the realization of rights. Breaking of rules, as a type of
corruption, is the most common, according to statements of private entre-
preneurs, for acquiring of customs documentation, foreign currency trans-
actions, tax administration, financial police, then sanitary and urban plan-
ning inspections, and mandatory registration of foreign trade deals.
The third type of corruption, influencing the change of laws, in the
West is mostly legalized and called lobbying. Locally it is less developed,
at least in regard to small private entrepreneurs. This is most likely
because their social influence is rather small, and they are not in a posi-
tion to participate in passing of laws, or rules. It is probable that some of
their answers in this regard are overstatements of their real social influ-
ence. On the other hand, large private entrepreneurs, with close ties with
the previous regime, most likely focused the largest part of their corrup-
tion activities towards state employees, or politicians in an attempt to
change laws, or sub law regulations. 
In conclusion, according to statements of private entrepreneurs, the
basic characteristic of corruption in Serbia is the realization of rights of
business subjects. If we compare this position with results of public opin-
ion polls, then it is clear that citizens and business subjects are additional-
ly taxed from state employees. Since the fiscal discipline in the society is
very low, or tax collection is different and varies from one subject to
another, the same holds true for this additional tax. In reality, not every-
one pays it, only those who have to. Its amount depends on the will of the
public servant, the relationship of the entrepreneurs with political author-
ities and his quick-wittedness. This additional tax, or bribe, has become
a necessary way of life and of doing business. Finally, corruption very sel-
dom, almost never ends up in court. From this it follows that moral con-
demnation by the widest social community is very rare, and if this con-
demnation does exist, it is mild.
Development of corruption in Serbia
At the very end we must ask ourselves if corruption in Serbia is increas-
ing or decreasing. It is known that there were no surveys of this kind in the
past so we attempted to find out from private entrepreneurs what is the
situation today compared to three years ago. Such results have limited
value, but there are no other means on our disposal. In table 3.16. we pre-
sented the assessment of private entrepreneurs of the state of corruption
in certain public services now and three years ago.
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Before presenting the survey results, it is necessary to point out that private
entrepreneurs assess corruption in those fields they deal with. For example,
almost 70% of them are not importers, and regarding corruption and foreign
trade they simply answer  dont know. On the other hand, every each one of
them individually, could not have had personal experiences in all the listed
fields. This is the reason for the exceptionally high value of the dont know
column. This tells us that they did not assess fields without personal experi-
ences or where experiences are scarce. This fact confirms our assumption
about the high quality of answers to presented questions.
Simultaneously, the presented data tells us that the assessment of pri-
vate entrepreneurs is that there is a mild decrease of corruption in Serbia.
There are significantly more, from two to four times depending on the
field, of those who believe that the situation regarding corruption is better
now then three years ago. This can mean two things: first, private entre-
preneurs as an interested party expect from the new authorities a decrease
in corruption, and therefore they partly project their answers, and second,
with political changes in 2000, corruption in Serbia may have decreased.
2.8. Business, corruption, and the business environment
The business environment, defined as the sum of all factors that have an
influence on activities of companies, has a very great influence on the
activities of companies, or decisions made by entrepreneurs. 
73Results of Surveys on Corruption
Table 3.16.
Corruption three years ago and now. What is the situation?
Better Same Worse Dont 
know
Export license 8,9 19,0 3,1 69,1
Import license 10,7 20,5 3,4 65,4
Customs documentation 9,8 23,2 4,0 63,0
Foreign currency transactions and inspection 8,9 25,7 4,0 61,5
Tax administration 15,0 57,0 7,3 19,9
Financial police 15,9 55,0 7,3 21,7
Company registration 16,8 49,2 4,0 30,0
Sanitary inspection 12,8 58,1 3,4 25,7
Urban planning inspection 11,6 52,9 3,4 32,1
Registering foreign trade deals 10,4 23,2 1,8 64,5
Acquiring building location 14,1 45,0 5,5 35,5
Work permit 17,1 45,0 5,2 32,7
Acquiring of telephone and power services 11,9 53,5 10,7 23,9
Acquiring a government contract 9,8 29,7 2,4 58,1
Acquiring a local government contract 17,1 40,7 4,9 37,3
Acquiring a state company contract 11,3 45,6 7,3 35,8
Approvement of sales prices 13,1 41,3 4,6 41,0
In table 3.17. we presented the assessment of private entrepreneurs how
individual factors, beginning with the economic policy, through the qual-
ity of the infrastructure, influence their business practices, or the quality of
those business practices. 
Survey results clearly demonstrate that private entrepreneurs see as a
barrier to the development of business activity, first the amount of taxes
and dues, then the key elements of economic policy, ever present corrup-
tion, and lack of financing. In contrast, the smallest problem, but still with
a very high index, is seen in the unstable exchange rate of the local curren-
cy, functioning of the courts and infrastructure (telephone, power, roads).
At the same time we should note that indexes, for all examined factors
of business activity, have very high values. Yet, we should examine the
most important ones. First, it is known that the tax rate for private entre-
preneurs (especially shops) is not significant, but other dues and other
indirect giving, which are occasionally hard to figure out, are very high
and uneven. Taxes and other dues taken together, which is basically the
only thing that interests the entrepreneur, for salaries of employees are
over 120%. Due to this, they are forced to pay one part of these salaries
illegally  in cash. Previously we saw that private entrepreneurs have stat-
ed that the corruption of the tax administration was smallest, and now we
see that the tax policy is in the first place (because of inconsistency and
great interest rates on unpaid taxes) as a factor limiting the development
of entrepreneurship. 
Economic policy, as the second example, demonstrates that views of
entrepreneurs are greatly indicative. It is known that political authorities
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Table 3.17.
Factors of a successful business activity:
No Small Moderate Big Dont Index Rank
problem problem problem problem know (1-5)
Financing 5,2 13,5 30,3 47,1 3,9 4,05 4
Phone, power, roads 17,1 32,1 30,9 18,3 1,5 3,14 13
Taxes and dues 3,7 10,1 28,4 56,0 1,8 4,31 1
Economic policy 2,4 11,6 25,4 52,3 8,3 4,24 2
Inflation 15,3 15,0 19,3 48,0 2,4 3,78 7
Exchange rate 22,3 16,5 20,8 37,3 3,1 3,44 11
Functioning of courts 15,3 22,3 22,6 27,2 12,5 3,38 12
Corruption 4,3 12,2 22,6 53,5 7,3 4,19 3
Street crime and riots 16,8 16,8 17,1 39,1 10,1 3,59 10
Organized crime 
and mafia 15,3 12,8 17,1 40,7 14,1 3,71 9
Monetary activities
of state companies 9,5 11,6 25,7 43,4 9,8 3,93 5
Monetary activities
of private companies 10,4 15,6 23,5 39,8 10,7 3,80 6
Various inspection 
services 10,4 19,6 27,2 40,1 2,8 3,75 8
for more then ten years wavered between a market economy and a mar-
ket/planned economy. Because of this fluctuation, which is not the object
of this analysis, we have great state intervention, which continues, in spite
of declarative support for the market economy. Because of this private
entrepreneurs assess the economic policy as a highly restrictive factor of
business activity. In other words, a very wide and extensive state interven-
tion represents a limiting factor for the growth of private entrepreneurship. 
Thirdly, the state of the infrastructure is extremely bad: the road net-
work is damaged, constant restrictions of electric power in the winter
period has become customary, regular telephone service is overloaded,
mobile telephony is overloaded, unsure, and too expensive for the level of
services it provides. In spite of the facts stated above concerning the inad-
equacy of infrastructure services (table 3) entrepreneurs believe it repre-
sents the least, but still an important factor in the limiting of business
activity, and therefore of social development. Comparison of the signifi-
cance of this factor and its influence on business activity with the impor-
tance of tax policy or globally economic policy or the possibility of
financing (expanding of activities or quality) entrepreneurs clearly
judges. By doing so they want to say: a quality infrastructure, court sys-
tem, and stable money is important, but for economic progress the prior-
ities are a moderate fiscal policy, a clear market orientation in regards to
economic policy with all of its associated elements, a honest public
administration without corruption and the lifting of monopolies held by
state/social and private companies. 
Conclusion
Corruption is almost as old as human society. It has grown parallel with
the increase of social and political power, growth of bureaucracy and the
meddling of the state in market transactions. The key causes of corruption
in the Serbian society are the lack of the rule of law, disarray of social val-
ues, all-present state intervention, and insufficient income of state
employees. The absence of the rule of law has an older origin, while the
disarray of social values, or moral crises and poverty are more recent phe-
nomenon. When we say lack of rule of law, we mean the lack of control of
the executive branch, non-functioning of the institutions of the system,
and a low level of overall social control.
One of conditions for development of corruption is both the quality
and the efficiency of activities provided by public services. Survey results
demonstrate that the qualities of work of these services are unsatisfactory
for the needs of private entrepreneurs. They assess this work in majority of
cases negatively, or rather poor, poor, and very poor.
The most outspread kind of corruption, according to the experience of
private entrepreneurs, is in the acquisition of a building location, then
during acquisition of import-export licenses, acquiring of government
contracts, and acquisition of telephone and electric power services. In
contrast, bribery is present the least in the fields of tax administration,
company registration, and approval of new sales prices.
From the three types of corruption, or, the realization of rights, break-
ing of rules or sub laws, and influencing changes of laws and sub law acts,
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in Serbia the most outspread corruption concerns the realization of rights.
At the same time, influence on changing of laws and sub law acts has a very
low value on the informal market of services, since small businessmen in
Serbia have no access to the legislative branch of government. 
The subordination of the judiciary branch to the executive branch
influenced the fact that various types of bribery and corruption remained
unpunished. For this reason corruption expanded and became an integral
part of doing business, or it entered all pores of the society and became,
almost, a completely open public activity. Poverty and the crises of morals,
on one hand, and preoccupation of the majority of the population with
basic survival, on the other, prevented wide condemnation by citizens of
this social phenomenon.
At the same time, it is necessary to point out that private entrepreneurs,
as other citizens of Serbia, from the new, democratically elected authori-
ties, expect the decrease of the level and scope of corruption in public serv-
ices. Also, they directly state that corruption is now somewhat lesser then,
for example, three years ago. 
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ANNEX
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1 2 3 4 5 Dont Average Rank
know
President of Yugoslavia
and his staff 30 18 12 7 13 20 2,42 19
President of Serbia
and his staff 6 10 18 17 29 20 3,65 6-7
Assembly of Yugoslavia 8 20 23 14 13 22 3,05 15
Assembly of Serbia 9 19 22 15 13 22 3,07 13
Federal government 10 19 22 13 15 21 3,06 14
Republican government 10 18 21 14 16 21 3,09 12
Ministry of economy 5 9 22 20 19 25 3,52 8-9
Army 18 23 22 13 11 13 2,73 17
Customs service 1 3 11 23 52 10 4,35 1
Tax administration 1 4 16 27 40 11 4,1 22
Courts 2 6 15 27 41 10 4,11 3
Police 2 6 16 26 41 9 4,06 4
Post-Telecommunications 
company 4 11 27 23 20 16 3,52 8-9
Electric power company 3 9 25 23 24 16 3,65 6-7
Privatization agency 2 7 17 17 26 31 3,85 5
Service of social 
bookkeeping 4 12 22 17 14 31 3,35 11
Chamber of commerce 3 10 19 19 15 33 3,49 10
National bank 13 16 20 13 15 24 3,03 16
Statistical bureau 15 17 17 6 7 37 2,58 18
Table A1. 
Perception of outspread of corruption in certain fields and institutions (in %)
(There is no corruption at all [1], to very outspread [5])
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Table A2 
To what extent are following professions included in corruption (in % )
Profession 1 2 3 4 9 Average
Directors of social (state) companies 32 45 16 3 5 3,11
Teachers 5 20 57 12 6 2,20
University professors 7 27 46 71 4 2,40
Employees in republican ministries 13 32 40 4 11 2,62
Employees of city administration 13 33 43 3 8 2,61
Judges 17 43 30 5 6 2,76
Lawyers 22 38 28 5 6 2,82
Policemen 23 39 27 5 5 2,85
Customs officials 40 35 14 6 6 3,17
State leadership (presidents, ministers, etc.) 18 24 32 13 13 2,55
Doctors 21 40 30 6 3 2,78
Private entrepreneurs and businessmen 23 36 26 6 8 2,84
Banking officers 10 28 45 7 10 2,47
Municipal employees (inspectors) 24 33 33 4 6 2,81
Sales people in stores with scarce goods 25 35 27 5 7 2,86
Leaders of political parties 15 27 36 6 15 2,61
Party officials, local political activists 14 28 36 7 15 2,58
Employees in communal companies
power, post, heating 12 28 41 7 12 2,50
Journalists 10 20 39 13 18 2,31
(Legend: 1. Almost all are included;
2. Majority included;
3. Only some included;
4. Almost no one included;
9. Dont know/No answer)
Note: Average (average mark of outspread) is calculated in reverse from 1 (least
corrupted) to 4 (most corrupted); therefore, the larger the average  the largest the
assessed corruption.
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Table A3. 
Who sought a bribe from a citizen?( in %)
Yes No I wasnt in Dont
a situation know
Doctors and medical staff 26 29 43 2
Teachers 5 36 56 2
University professors 4 23 71 2
Municipal employees 12 33 52 2
Employees of public utility company 9 33 56 2
Judges or court employees 9 22 67 2
Customs officers 17 15 64 3
Policemen 19 22 55 3
Assembly representatives 
or party leaders 1 15 75 10
Ministry employees 3 16 78 3
Tax collectors or inspectors 11 22 64 3
Banking officials 4 32 61 3
Sales people 16 37 44 4
Private entrepreneurs 1 22 85 73
Activists of political parties which
in power in my municipality 4 24 69 3
Other 1 3 17 79

IV Manifestation of Corruption
CORRUPTION IN THE JUDICIARY 
Introduction 
Working definition and subjects of corruption 
The most general concept of corruption in public services  the doing,
in execution of a public service, function or affair, that which is not
allowed (prescribed, foreseen) or not doing of what is an obligation (pre-
scribed, foreseen), for a counter favor in money or some other benefit 
demands more precision when focusing on the judiciary 
Having in mind the formal side of the executing of a judiciary function,
corruption can result in the majority of cases in, passing of court decisions
of different kinds, either incorrect (unlawful), or correct, so that corrup-
tion is aimed at accelerating or securing of its passing, removing the threat
of not passing of a decision, or removing the danger of the passing of an
incorrect decision. The same purpose has the not passing of a decision that
would have to be passed. However, corruption can have as its goal (conse-
quence) the incorrect activity or lack of an activity pertaining to other
matters (for example the executive proceedings), or something that will
influence the content of the court decision (for example, corruption of
court experts or witnesses), or another official activity which will influence
the accomplishment of rights which do not exists or the not attaining of
rights which do exist (for example, issuing of incorrect deeds for land or
another public document, verification of false documents, and the like).
If one has this in mind, corruption in the judiciary can have the follow-
ing participants (subjects):
 judges, professionals or (rarely) jury judges, who participate in mak-
ing of court rulings (under influence of corruption) and court admin-
istration (presidents of courts or court departments), indirectly, by
influencing a judge or by other activities (for example, by awarding a
case to a suitable or taking away cases form unsuitable judges), or
directly, for example by implementing of the withdrawal rule. It is
surely possible to talk about the corruption in the judiciary;
 public prosecutors, as organs of criminal prosecution, directly,
because of the (needed) wide discretionary authority (decision to
indict someone, or to lift an indictment, for example because of the
assessment of the social danger of an act, qualification, etc.);
 lawyers, indirectly (influencing the court), or directly (by way of
using the procedural rights, for example)
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 court experts, which in the implementation in the statutes, equally in
criminal and civil, in the Yugoslav law have an over-sized role, and
from whose findings and opinion often the outcome of the proce-
dure depends;
 court employees (executive officials, cadastral employees, court
archives employees, summon servers and similar) who by illegal
actions or lack of action can influence the outcome of the court pro-
cedure or the (un)realizing of a certain right;
 interpreters and translators, who by willfully falsely communicating,
or translating or interpreting statements of participants or falsely com-
municating to them statements of others, can influence court decisions
Indirectly, a part of the widely understood phenomenon of corruption
in the judiciary or concerning the judiciary is, the corrupted witnesses.
Consequences of corruption 
Having in mind the function of the judiciary, it is clear that we are deal-
ing with an extremely dangerous form of corruption. The mission of the
judiciary is, most widely said, the realization of the principle of constitu-
tionality and legality and the protection of individual rights and interests1.
The perception of citizens that judiciary organs do not act legally and that
they are prone to influence, leads to the weakening of legality and social
morals. Ruined is not only the legal consciousness and trust in law, degrad-
ed the idea of the necessity of behavior in line with laws, but a corrupt judi-
ciary necessarily generates an increase of corruption in other fields.
With the corruption of the judiciary, except conditionally in one case,
the goal (perceived objectively, not as an individual, psychological motive)
that is to be attained by corruption lies outside the courts; the judiciary is
only an intermediary in the attainment of that goal.
The exception when the goal of corrupting is attained in the judiciary
zone itself is corruption aimed at avoidance (reduction) of criminal or
another sanctions. An event in life, breaking of laws, from which the chain
of corruption starts, has already taken place. The goal is to remove the reg-
ular functioning of the judiciary and it is attained inside of the judiciary.
(Here also corruption can influence respect for legality in other fields: if
the belief exists that it is possible by corruption to avoid criminal penal
responsibility, this includes the avoidance of responsibility for corruption,
and makes it easier to enter into corruption in other fields).
In other cases passing or not passing of a court decisions should lead to
the realization of a certain right which does not exist, or avoidance of
some other obligation aided by corruption, of a certain interest which
lies outside of the judiciary, in any sphere of human activity.
For this reason corruption in the judiciary has, as a rule, a double
adverse consequence. On one hand, it ruins the judiciary system as a vital
element of state authority, and on the other hand, it corrupts the legal
functioning of relations in the sphere from which it came to the judiciary. 
As another example, corruption in a business dispute about the execu-
tion of a contract has as a consequence not only the improper functioning
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1 See Article 95 of the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia .
of the judiciary, but also the weakening of contractual responsibility,
which leads to the endangerment of the economic system. 
Or, corruption in an administrative dispute, aimed at the annulment of
a legally passed administrative act, has for its consequence the incorrect
functioning of the state administration.
This harmful influence of corruption in the judiciary is not exhausted,
however, in these direct consequences. Indirectly, the consciousness, be it
right or wrong, about the possibility of existence of corruption in the judi-
ciary implies also the consciousness about the possibility of avoiding of
responsibility for corruption, which again leads to the growth of corrup-
tion in other activities.
Because of this it is not an exaggeration to say that corruption in the
judiciary is the most dangerous type of corruption. It destroys the most
vital functions of the state and for this reason its most aggressive suppres-
sion is needed. 
Corruption in the judiciary and criminal responsibility 
No one who participates in court proceedings can be held responsible
for an opinion given during the passing of a court ruling, and in a case ini-
tiated for a criminal act committed during an execution of a judiciary
function cannot be held in custody without the approval of the National
Assembly, states article 96 point 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Serbia. 
The right of a judge to make a mistake is one of the guarantees of the
judiciary independence. But a right to err, along with certain other rights
included in all of the procedural laws (criminal, civil, and administrative)
as is the free appraisal of proof, can be a sure screen for mistakes behind
which corruption looms. 
Because of this criminal cases dealing with corruption performed by
judges and other participants in the procedure are rarely discovered and
processed in this country. The object of judiciary reaction to corruption in
the judiciary were only a small number of drastic cases in which corrup-
tion was determined and uncovered directly, for example, by determining
the act of giving of a cash bribe, or in other drastic cases. 
Criminal liability for corruption, in the current Penal Code of the
Republic of Serbia, covers:
 judges  Article 243, for breaking of the law by judges for acquiring for
himself or someone else of a certain benefit;
 witnesses  Article 206, giving of false testimony;
 lawyers  Article 179 point 2, misuse of trust;
 translators and interpreters  Article 207.
Corruption of other participants in the judiciary system including pub-
lic prosecutors can be covered by the general act of the misuse of official
position or authority.2
83Manifestation of Corruption
2 The draft Law on Changes and Amendments of the Penal Code of the Republic of Ser-
bia, which entered procedure in April 2001, contains several new incriminations in the
domain of corruption (for example, corruption in the process of privatization, corrup-
tion in public procurement), but there are no new incriminations for corruption in the
judiciary.
The small number of processed cases of corruption in the judiciary
surely is not a sign that the extent of corruption is small, but is a result of
the characteristics of the phenomenon itself and of problems related to
obtaining proof. In support of this statement one can cite the results of a
survey performed for this project, according to which the judiciary, along
the customs service and the police, is the most corrupt field of the society,
according to those polled. 
The increased activity of organs of detection and persecution can cause
that a larger number of corrupt judges and other participants in the judi-
ciary be brought before law. This would surely be both useful and fair, but
it seems that the real space for fighting corruption in the judiciary is locat-
ed somewhere else, and not in the domain of criminal repression. 
Indirect corruption 
The standard form, or model of corruption in the judiciary is a situa-
tion when the judge passes a wrong ruling, or another participant in the
process decides to decisively contribute (witness or a court expert by giv-
ing false testimony, prosecutor by a lessening the qualification of the act)
to the passing of a wrong ruling. Corruption originates from a side in the
proceedings (or it is carried out for their benefit), and the corrupted is the
judge or another participant.
In this country one can notice another, most likely most dangerous type
of indirect corruption. It is manifested in passing of assumedly wanted
decisions, and the motive is certain indirect benefit: a position in the
judicial hierarchy or another privilege. Simply put, wrong rulings are
being passed which are desirable for the state or other government bodies,
those who manage the country, the executive or political elite.
A line cannot be clearly drawn between this form and classic corrup-
tion. If a judge (or another person) acts illegally in the direct, individual
interest of a member of the nomenclature to accomplish direct or only
indirect benefit, this is a classic case of corruption. It the law is incorrectly
implemented to accomplish a certain supposed state interest (a classic
example is the persecution of political adversaries, or granting privileges to
those politically eligible), then it is hard to determine the dividing line
between corruption and the dependent judiciary, a judiciary which does
not pass rulings in accord with the constitution and laws but according to
the will or interest of those managing the state. The dividing line is even
less clear if one has in mind that in our law textbooks as a material source
of law the will of the ruling class, which runs the state; is cited. Is inter-
preting and application of law not a search for that will?
These cases of corruption allowed us to, put forward a working hypoth-
esis: corruption in the judiciary in Serbia is a systemic phenomenon and it
demands a systemic strategy of its extermination.
Corruption and the prosecutor
The public prosecutor is an independent state organ, which prosecutes the
perpetrators of criminal offences, and other prescribed by law punishable
acts and uses legal means for protection of constitutionality and legality.
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Prosecutors office as an organ of prosecution
In penal-legal affairs, the prosecutor is present as an organ of prosecution.
The principles on which a prosecutors office is organized regarding its
role does not have to be only a guarantee of its legal and effective work, but
could also be a zone of discretionary authority and insufficiently con-
trolled activity which leaves free space for development of corruption.
In the empirical survey of corruption in Serbia presented at the beginning
of this study, the prosecutor was not separately noted. Statements regarding
corruption in the judiciary pertain to prosecutors and there are no elements
that could support a statement that there is more or less corruption among
prosecutors then in other segments of the judiciary. Therefore here one
should point out the rules and principles pertaining to the operation of the
prosecutors office and which assist the development of corruption.
The prosecutors office is a highly hierarchically organized depart-
ment, more so then any other in our legal system. The Republican Prose-
cutor answers for his work to the National Assembly, and lower level pros-
ecutors answer to him. The Public Republican Prosecutor has a right to
issue mandatory instructions to district and municipal prosecutors, both
general instructions and instructions pertaining to individual cases
(mutates mutants, the district to the municipal). He can take away a case
from a lower-level prosecutor and act on it himself or transfer it to anoth-
er prosecutor. The instruction can be a means for influencing a working
prosecutor, and simultaneously a screen for this prosecutor.
The prosecutors office acts in specific coordination in the investigative
proceedings with an investigative judge and the police. The investigative
judge heads the investigative procedure, decides which proof will be col-
lected or inferred, he decides in the first degree on the detention and
releasing of the suspect, passes the decision on the suspension of the pro-
cedure, or on the completion of the investigative procedure and forwards
the case to the prosecutor for the initiation of the procedure before a
court. Regarding all of these activities the prosecutor has the initiative: he
suggests detention or the lifting of detention, appeals the decision on
detention, proposes the inferring of proof (and new, additional proof
which can influence the length of detention), decides on the initiation of a
bill of indictment or on the lack of reason for doing so, later he decides on
discarding of the bill of indictment. In the bill of indictment he qualifies
the criminal. At that, he is bound only by the Constitution and the law,
which means that the prosecutor has a very broad discretionary authority.
In following the indictment policy, one can notice a specific political
dependence of the prosecutors office. It is clear that certain criminal acts
are in one period prosecuted, and in another period they are not, that cer-
tain activities in one period are qualified in one way, and in another peri-
od in another way. This indictment policy does not have to be (and was
not) a result of the evaluating of the prosecutor (which can vary depend-
ing on social circumstances), but of some other state organs or political
centers of power. This is the reason why this policy did not vary (and it did
not vary) only in regard to time, but also in regard to representatives of
certain social groups. The different position of certain elites before the
law is a result of direct or indirect corruption.
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Also there is a special relationship between the prosecutors office and
the police. Even thought it has a right (and a duty) to demand from the
police (and other government departments, including the court, and other
legal entities) acts, statements, information about things from within its
competence, the prosecutors office as a rule waits for the initiative of the
police. And when that initiative takes place, the prosecutors office does
not have the efficient means to oblige the police to carry out efficient activ-
ities linked to discovering, and aimed at indicting. Those means at its dis-
posal that it does have it does not use enough. Therefore, on the triangle
investigative judge, prosecutor, and police it depends whether enough
facts will be collected so that one could talk about the uncovering and
indicting of a crime, enough proof for a serious bill of indictment, and a
guilty verdict, although it is absolutely obvious (from the financial situa-
tion, or the relationship between income and wealth) that the acts and
perpetrators exist in the public eye. 
That this is an area of corruption, and that there is corruption, one has
elements to adequately assume, but also to believe so based on hearsay,
although in regard to the prosecutors office the number of processed cases
is relatively even smaller then when dealing with judges.
The prosecutors office as an arm of protection of constitutionality and
legality 
The prosecutor is authorized to initiate an extraordinary legal remedy
against a valid court decisions in all, and even non-penal issues, when he
finds that the decision has broken a law or an international treaty. In prac-
tice, the public prosecutor initiates a demand for the protection of legality,
as a rule, at the initiative of the litigant that is not satisfied with the deci-
sion in the validly concluded proceedings.
In deciding on the initiative of a litigant, the prosecutor is armed with
discretionary authority and is in a position to, based on an evaluation, sig-
nificantly influence the flow and outcome of court proceedings. In prac-
tice, prosecutors act very differently in similar cases, which leads to the
conclusion on the presence of direct or indirect corruption.
The scope of this possibility is even greater when one has in mind the
extent of the authority of the prosecutor, who decides to initiate an
extraordinary legal remedy, to order a postponement of the execution of a
valid court decision up to the time of completion of the decision on the
extraordinary legal remedy. 
The postponement of the execution can be enough to satisfy the interest
of one, or significantly endanger the interest of the other side, so that this
is obviously a potential source of manipulation.
Practice proves this indication. Recently it can be noticed that the fed-
eral public prosecutor ever more frequently is issue demands for the
protection of legality against decisions allowing the execution of a valid
court ruling. The procedure has at that time passed all jurisdictions,
including the possibility of the prosecutor to issue a demand for the pro-
tection of legality. Only when the procedure of execution has begun, the
prosecutor appears and, at the least, postpones the execution for a long
period.
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Conclusion
The role of the prosecutor is very significant and very delicate. The
prosecutor necessarily has to possess wide, in essence discretionary
authority. Simultaneously, he is placed in between the judiciary, state pol-
icy, and the police.
There is no reason not to assume, that the prosecutors office is exposed
to corruption. It is known that it often was, or that it used to be. At the
same time, this corruption is most difficult to prove; activities of the
prosecutor are covered by actions and decisions of other departments
(investigative judge, police) and by hierarchical relations, but also by the
authority in assessment of the factual and legal material.
This very hierarchical organization of the prosecutors office must be
the first obstacle against corruption. The rest are linked to the overall posi-
tion of the judiciary.
Corruption in the judiciary
Introduction 
Corruption in the judiciary is ever more and more often talked about.
Statements are general and vague. Yet, they are disturbing. In courts this
item is either not talked about or only whispers can be heard. However,
different stories are getting through and they are all credible. This was a
reason for the Association of Judges of Serbia in March 1998 to call a
round table and to the esteemed participants (colleagues, lawyers, court
experts, psychologists, scientists, and others) clearly pose a question  Is
there corruption in the judiciary?
Even thought the discussion about this issue was serious and alarming,
no names were named. At the same time, however, they remained worri-
somely convincing. Anyway, if corruption is present in the society, why
should it not be found in the judiciary? It is very possible, therefore, that
the virus of corruption has also attacked the courts. The judges who
receive bribes already have a nickname  receivers..
And what can a receiver receive? Everything: money, an apartment,
gifts, election to a higher court, a ministerial position, position of a court
president, political office, a roasted lamb or a piglet, lunches and dinners,
various services, and every other material and immaterial benefit. And
what can he give? There is no great choice: a ruling according to what is
ordered. Corruption in the judiciary is, therefore expressed in the
exchange of every dishonorable ruling for every dishonorable benefit, fully
in line with Latin corruptio, meaning: rotten, perverted, tainted, mis-
guided, bought. 
The world sees corruption as misuse of public authority with a goal to
gain any material or non-material benefit. The material benefit is not only
money, but also other material goods. Non-material benefit is every bene-
fit, privilege, advantage or other non-pecuniary gain. Corruption is, there-
fore, not only carried out with money or by other material goods, but also
by meeting various needs and interests, as are: promotion in service and
career, a political office, a position of status, a position in the professional
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hierarchy, a privileged position and the like. This is a common occurrence
in the Serbian judiciary.
Such understanding of corruption was noted in the canon No. 7 of the
Code of Judiciary Ethics: A judge cannot rule while securing or expecting
any benefit for himself or another person. Also canon No. 6 reminds him
that: A judge should avoid any action that is unusual or seems that way,
and from actions which cause distrust, induces doubt, diminish confi-
dence, or in another way degrade the trust in the court and its objectivity!
The syndrome
If preconditions exist for the development of corruption, usually there
is corruption, regardless the fact that stories are faceless, and participants
anonymous. This holds true for corruption in the judiciary.
This belief is deeply rooted with citizens, so they are, to a large extent;
sure that corruption has a hold in the judiciary. In a survey performed by
Argument in February 1997 with a sample of 200 citizens who did not
have cases before courts 71% of those polled believed that there is corrup-
tion in the judiciary. In a survey of the same agency in February 1998, with
a sample of 100 citizens who do have a case before a court, 95% of those
polled believed that there is corruption in the judiciary; that it is most rep-
resented in economic cases (42,1%) and criminal cases (28,4%); that it is
executed through holders of political power (40%), judges (36,8%),
lawyers (13,8%), and court experts (8,4%); that the greatest pressure on
the court is exerted by politicians in power (47,4%), powerful individuals
from business circles (17,9%), and criminals (14,7%). That with a good
connection one can influence the court, said 95% of those polled. That
cases of special importance are always given to certain judges, said 95% of
those polled. Court corruption can be most efficiently suppressed by
removing of the pressure by politicians against the court, said 57,9% of
those polled. That this can be accomplished by increasing of salaries of
judges, said 32,6% of those polled.
In a survey conducted by the Association of Judges of Serbia in Febru-
ary 1998, judges themselves confirm that there is corruption in the judici-
ary. From 95 judges of Belgrade courts: 21 judges said that there is corrup-
tion; 39 judges  that there is pressure on the courts; 33 judges  that court
decision can be influenced; 54  that corruption will attain worrisome
proportions if the financial situation of judges and other court employees
is not improved; 45 judges  that cases of special significance are given to
certain judges; 40 judges  that the existing operational management
serves corruption in the judiciary.
The Association of Judges simultaneously conducted a survey among
the Belgrade lawyers. From 69 participants: 17 believe that there is corrup-
tion in courts; 43  that there are pressures against the courts; 28  that a
personal contact can influence a court; 50  that corruption will attain
worrisome proportions if the financial situation of judges and other court
employees is not improved; 32  that the existing operational manage-
ment serves corruption in the judiciary.
The judiciary, therefore, is not immune to corruption According to a
survey conducted by Argument in 1997, corruption is present the most
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is in health care, municipal services, and judiciary. According to this sur-
vey, the descending order of corruption is: customs service, judiciary,
police, health care, republican, city, and municipal administration. 
According to the discussion at the mentioned round table of the Associ-
ation of Judges, and from appeals of citizens, the centers of corruption in
the judiciary are: merchant courts, investigation, execution of a court rul-
ing and reduction of sentences. Merchant courts pass rulings in business
and status cases, manage a register of companies, and manage bankrupt-
cies. Since in those cases there is strongest conflict of interests of various
centers of power, the court authorities have failed the most during resolu-
tion of these cases. The cause was most often the state, by protecting the
interests of partners conducting semi-legal and illegal business activities.
Investigation is also the goal of corruption, especially in cases where some-
one is taken in custody. Also present is an interaction between the court
and the police, public prosecutor, correctional institutions, and lawyers.
The execution of court decisions is the final phase in providing court pro-
tection. If it is neutralized, then there is no court protection even when a
valid court ruling exists because of this the execution phase is the last
chance for corrupting of the court. Assumptions and complaints of citi-
zens point out that corruption also overtook the sensitive field of the
reduction of sentences. To their increase significantly contribute the med-
ical certificates of dubious validity. In every of these fields, corruption is
supported by the discretionary authority of the judge.
Corruption is not announced nor is it published. It is not transparent,
but discreet, without witnesses and other proof. Yet, there are signs that
cause the lack of trust or induce doubt. They are: taking away of a case
from one judge and giving it to another, transferring of a judge to a differ-
ent court or to a different department of the same court, forming of spe-
cial councils for certain cases, giving of cases to certain judges and thus
bypassing an existing court schedule, promotions after dubious rulings,
and the like.
Corruption is not linked only with judges, but also court employees,
especially those who by their work in administrative services can match
certain cases with certain judges, or can by removing the bill of lading or
other tricks, obstruct conditions for the holding of a proceeding.
The targets for corruption are also court experts who cannot refuse the
so-called private giving of evidence, or more precisely giving of false
reports. Corruption in courts can be a part of a wider organization in
which linkages are formed with the police, public prosecutor, and lawyers.
Causes
Corruption is like weed. It grows as soon as there are sufficient condi-
tions. For this reason of the utmost importance are the answers to follow-
ing question: what caused in our judiciary a climate so for the rapid
growth of corruption?
First the loss of independence, as the result of the moral downfall of
society that sacrificed the law to violence, legality to interests, and judici-
ary to party politics. This fall was initiated by the killing of justice in the
judiciary, which became a will of the ruling class, and in the judiciary,
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which became a class institution. The will of the ruling class was embodied
in the party, its avant-guard, which placed under its control not only the
judiciary, but also the legislative and executive branches of government.
Reined courts expressed almost religious affection for their historic
goals, and since those goals were contained in the Constitution and laws
according to which they brought decisions, this affection (or should we
say bias) was a part of the formal independence. The judiciary had lost its
identity and gave way to the mentality of a subject, acceding to serve the
political will of the ruling party. Since that will was later translated into
informal centers of power, the judiciary begun to get accustomed do
serving another master, which was good preparation for getting accus-
tomed to serving any one master.
Along with the loss of independence, politics were brought into the
judiciary. Party membership, was an informal, but a sine qua non-condi-
tion for a function of a judge. Who did not fulfill that unwritten condi-
tion, could not be a judge. And the one who did meet the condition had
party obligations and responsibilities in carrying out of the judiciary
authority. This condition did not lose its significance in the last decade of
the last century, although it was somewhat milder, but in the past few
years it again grew in strength by the political demand that the representa-
tion of ruling parties in the courts be the same as the representation in the
National Assembly. Obvious signs of political influence on the judiciary
were: the practice of forming of special councils in politically sensitive
cases; operetta trials of Bill Clinton and the other angels of mercy; turn-
ing of chambers into political cabaret, political processes, kangaroo trials,
extralegal arrests; various misuse of judiciary authority. In this way the
respect for the courts was destroyed. So one should not be surprised that
the court first found itself lacking authority, and then it was placed under
the care of the executive branch. By this supervision (in which interests of
the political elite and criminals were mixed), influence over the courts
spread, towards para-state and para-political organizations, criminal cen-
ters of power, and powerful individuals. So the courts became available
to be influenced, and therefore corruptible.
The financial position of judges is unfavorable. Judges live at level of
poverty, with salaries at the level of a nutritionist minimum. It is almost
indecent to talk about it. Judges do not have a right to hold an additional
job to supplement their income, which makes their position more diffi-
cult, especially if they have not solved the issue of housing. Of course, this
influences the possibility of corruption, because material misery weakens
the resistance to temptations. Growing poor and coercion of judges lead to
the decreasing of the quality of the judicial function, since many more
experienced judges sought better paid jobs, turning over the duty of judges
to the incompetent, unsure, and unable colleagues, who were susceptible
to the influence of others. 
The legal system of the country is drastically ruined. The Serbian consti-
tution is not consistent with the FRY constitution, because it was passed
before, instead of after it. Numerous federal laws are not consistent with
the valid FRY constitution, because they were passed at the time of the for-
mer federal constitution. Numerous republican laws are not consistent
with the Constitution of Serbia, because they were passed at the time of
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the former republican constitution. Many republican laws are not consis-
tent with federal laws, because they were not harmonized.
The law is fully derogated. Chaos rules. Within that disorder, the ineffi-
cient courts begun being replaced by efficient debt collection agencies,
and courts were only good for party politics, especially pertaining to the
electoral rulings. Judges who were obedient were awarded by ministerial
positions and presidencies of courts, which was a clear sign that the judici-
ary was corrupted from its own state. A judiciary that is ready to do so
demonstrates readiness to also be corrupted by others, also.
Corruption was also encouraged by the hypocrisy of officials in the
executive and legislative authority, who publicly proclaimed their support
for an independent judiciary, and in secret applied pressure against the
courts, knowing that the judges have not freed themselves from political
narrow-mindedness.
CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
Corruption in the police force
Introduction
Corruption is a phenomenon that is hard to determine and measure. In
this paper we will first point out to certain general characteristics and
causes of corruption in the police force, and then examine the results of
previous surveys on corruption in the police force of Serbia.
Integrity of the police is one of the key, if not the most important issue
that deserves to be at the center of attention of every examination of the
manner of fulfillment of the role of police in a society. In some countries,
as the US and the UK, discussions about this problem are very intense and
all encompassing. This does not mean that by doing so the problem of
police corruption is resolved in these countries, and also it is not true that
corruption exists only in those countries where it is discussed, or that it is
most widespread there. It only attests to the level and character of democ-
racy, which is made possible by the political system, and the openness of
the police force.
Since the basic function of the police force is to take charge of the
implementation of laws, corruption among its ranks represents the basic
negation of the purpose of existence of this service and institution. For this
reason it is necessary to develop a precise definition of corruption pertain-
ing to the police. At the UN a definition was reached according to which
the notion of corruption comprehends every activity or every mistake that
a responsible person makes during the carrying out of duty or connected
to his duty, and for that as compensation seeks or accepts a gift, promise,
or some other benefit.
According to American authors, the concept police corruption per-
tains to such punishable behavior of a member of the police force when
because of his official capacity accepts or expects to accept certain unal-
lowed real or potential compensation or benefit. More direct is a defini-
tion given in 1973 by the US National Advisory Committee on Standards
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and Goals of the Criminal Legal System: Corruption in the police is made
up of activities which imply the misuse of police authority aimed at mate-
rializing of personal gains for members of the police; activities of a mem-
ber of the police force which endangers or can endanger his readiness to in
an unbiased manner implement law or provide other services; the protec-
tion of an unlawful activity from the activity of the police, regardless if the
member of the police is assisting the business of one person, and simulta-
neously discouraging the business of another person.
There are several definitions of corruption and attempts to point out
their constitutive elements. In this paper, corruption consists of two sig-
nificant elements and their simultaneous existence in a certain activity or a
deliberate lack of activity. The first element is a desire to fulfill a personal
benefit. Certain authors go further and state that police in general can be
corrupted if in the system of power it wins a position that places it above
the law. In this understanding which somewhat departs from the original
idea of corruption, the highest level of police corruption is attained in a
police state.
The second element is the breaking of a certain rule by the misuse of
official capacity, of course by a person who has the official status.
A corrupted police cannot fight corruption in a society, in the same way
that a corrupt society will not initiate activities for removal of corruption
from the police force. One should add an observation that the police to a
great extent influence the nature and quality of relations in a society. 
Due to an exceptional position in society, the police is subject to pres-
sure of corruption from all sides: from below (from criminals), from the
side (from citizens who are not criminals, but with an interest in breaking
the law at a certain point in time), and from above (from the administra-
tion  municipal, city, republican, etc). The founder of the Belgrade
police, Archibald Raise, pointed out that the police profession is possibly
the one where its members are subject to greatest temptations. One of the
reasons for that pressure lies in the fact that discretionary rights of the
police are very significant because often and to a greatest extent, it
depends on them it if the law will be implemented.
Since policemen are almost constantly offered compensation for not
carrying out of their duties, it can be said that police corruption is an
endemic phenomenon. With the increase of crime, especially drug related,
the offered compensation is extremely high. At that the policemen remain,
in essence ordinary people although some of them are perceived as super-
men, and numerous policemen have a tendency to see themselves in a
similar way.
Since he is responsible for the state of his police unit and for its per-
formance, a police commander at every level is also responsible for mat-
ters of corruption. For him the biggest problem is to determine if there is
corruption in the unit. It is present everywhere, but the same activity does
not have to be considered everywhere an act of corruption. If in one place
it is considered normal that a policeman does not pay for a cup of coffee,
in another place or country this can be treated as an act of corruption.
Corruption is as a rule a phenomenon linked to an individual. There
are, however, cases when illegal activities become a characteristic of the
whole unit, so that even the commanding officer takes part. This is the
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organized corruption, because it is linked to the police force as an organi-
zation. Finally, in certain cases police corruption can be tolerated (even
encouraged) by politically influential groups, and even the populace itself.
Then we are dealing with the environmental corruption which is its
worst manifestation. 
The stability, or lack of stability or social and political relationships is of
great importance for development of corruption in general, and therefore for
the development of the corruption in the police force. In conditions of insta-
bility of society and institutions it has created demonstrate less resistance to
the influence of corruption. The policeman protects the society from crime,
but if he understands that big, and even bigger criminals are at the top of the
political and social hierarchy, then he cannot but change his compass bear-
ings and his value system. His loyalty to the society as such changes or disap-
pears. In this regard the policeman is in an exceptional position, because
more then any other social group he knows about the criminality of all oth-
ers, and not only those who are officially labeled as criminals.
Police corruption is also influenced by the nature of the police system.
A position prevails with police experts that fragmented police systems, in
which local police forces are under the competence of the local authorities
and is to a great extent independent from central police organs, are most
accessible for development of police corruption. The US is taken as a
model, and in Europe the Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland. (It is a
paradox that for such systems of which it is said that they are to a great
extent accessible to corruption, and inefficient at that, it is simultaneously
said that they are democratic. This poses a question: whether or not any
police system can be denoted as democratic, if it bears a seed of corruption
and inefficiency). Yet, corruption is also to be found se in the so called cen-
tralized police systems, and the difference is that in this case it is consid-
ered that the highest level as a rule is not accessible to corruption. But if it
is overtaken by corruption, then corruption unavoidably spreads to the
complete organization, which confirms the folk moral that a fish smells
bad from the head down
Corruption of police in Serbia 
This was the situation in Serbia before the downfall of the Miloeviæ
regime. The regime used international sanctions as an excuse for the over-
all voluntarism in interpreting and the implementing of the Constitution
and laws. A non-transparent system was additionally clouded by various
ad hoc measures of the federal or republican governments, increasing the
motives for evading already high customs duties, which lead to the
increase of corruption, because interest groups sought exemption for
themselves from the implementation of such decisions.
In spite of the non-transparent system, which seemed like an iron cur-
tain, the Yugoslav public was aware of the outspread of corruption even at
that time. This was contributed to by activities of democratic forces and
civil society organizations, but also an almost permanent and daily experi-
ence of citizens in contacts with state officials.
Only now is the tangible proof of the shocking scope and content of
corruption and organized crime in which the state and other structures
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participated, all under the control of the then ruling parties becoming
public. The public has not learned that any one person was sentenced for
offering or accepting of a bribe, although the act was a felony3. It is at the
same time an international criminal act, because it is a subject to interna-
tional instruments both material (for example the UN Code of Conduct
for Officials Responsible for Implementation of the Law), and formal (UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, signed in Palermo
in late 2000; EU convention on fighting corruption in which includes offi-
cials of European bodies or officials of member states of the EU).
There is no exact data on corruption in general, and the same holds
true for corruption of the police force in Serbia. However, since our state
is one of the most corrupt in the world, it is certain that our police could
not have been left untouched. It is also clear that the top of the police
hierarchy (or their families) could not have grown rich as they were from
salaries they received. Corruption of one or another form and type was
the basic source for their new wealth. Regardless of whether it was pas-
sive, active, individual, organized, corruption or environmental corrup-
tion, a widely held belief was present that the Serbian police was com-
pletely corrupted.
However, the public did not know if and what measures were taken
inside the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) of Serbia to deal with and
suppress cases of corruption. So the activities of internal control units,
which do exist in MUP of Serbia, remained cloaked by a veil of secrecy.
This significantly decreased the effect of measures that were, possibly,
undertaken. If they were, and were not made public, then there was no
effect on the public opinion. 
The social and material status of the members of the police force repre-
sents a very important element for police corruption. Even Aristotle
focused on the low social status, when he talked about the extreme dislike
of the service, which in the beginning was made up of only slaves, while
free Athenians scorned the new profession. Similar views in general
remain today. If such a social status is accompanied by insufficient finan-
cial compensation, then a policeman becomes especially vulnerable and
accessible to corruption.
Before early 1998 (when armed fighting intensified), in the Serbian police
an assignment in Kosovo was very popular and sought after. Members of
MUP not only received special financial bonuses (which is normal), but as a
rule returned from Kosovo with large amounts of money or other valuables.
Unfortunately, one part of those goods was acquired by taking bribes form
Albanians who needed to register a vehicle or obtain a drivers license, a cer-
tificate to buy or sell something or for other kinds of activities.
Police corruption significantly influences the capability of this institu-
tion to carry out duties entrusted to it, and that influence can be either
direct or indirect. The direct influence is the essence of police corruption:
94 Corruption in Serbia
3 FRY Penal Code, article 179 (receiving a bribe); Penal Code of the Republic of Serbia,
article 254 (receiving a bribe) and article 255 (giving a bribe). Certain other felonies that
are included in the notion of corruption are also covered. During the modification and
amendment of the Penal Code it would probably be useful to foresee corruption as an
individual criminal act, based on international definition. 
it does not react, as it should regarding the breaking of laws and regula-
tions. Indirectly, corruption negatively influences the capability of the
police in such a way that the police force is criticized more, even much
more then it deserves. Even if police corruption was a rather limited phe-
nomenon, it has a character of a sensation in the media, and therefore the
effects are increased multifold.
Information on police corruption in not disseminated only by the
media. If a policeman, or a police patrol, eat at a restaurant every day with-
out paying, other patrons will doubtlessly conclude that the restaurant
owner does not have to worry if he does, or is already doing something,
that is not allowed. The word about it spreads, and the rumor does not
target only the individual policeman, but the complete police force itself.
In Serbia there were foundations for spreading such rumors. In frequent
cases citizens could see a policeman warmly greet a person who is a well-
known underworld figure and a black marketer.
Very often, if not most often corruption pertains to traffic violations. In
Serbia it was, one could say, an everyday occurrence. Police almost never
acted preventively by warning drivers of a restriction before they broke the
law and initiated a dangerous situation for themselves and others. The
police as a rule took a position past the place where the dangerous situation
existed. Then traffic fines were collected from violators, or very often deals
were made that the driver should pay an amount less then the fine but pay
it to the policeman, without a receipt. Additionally, issuing of vehicle regis-
trations for cars without proof of their legal origin and status used to be a
common reason for giving and receiving of bribes to members of MUP.
Police corruption is linked with the gray economy, and during the times
of great discrepancies between the official and black market exchange rates
of the Dinar, members of MUP were often to be found in the role of black
market foreign currency traders. In one period in the 1990s, they were
receiving their Dinar salaries a day or two before all others (and before
pensioners) and they bought foreign currency under a favorable exchange
rate (because citizens had no Dinars). As soon as the foreign currency
price went up, they sold them at the new, higher rate. The police partici-
pated in extortion or protection of restaurants and stores, and for these
services split the money with criminals who were paid by the extorted
owners. Members of the Serbian police practically forced small shop own-
ers to sign owner parts of their businesses so they would be protected from
extortion. Such accusations were stated in public, (although not always
with the needed accuracy) and were never denied, nor was anyone ever
held responsible. 
During the times of gasoline shortages, certain policemen had their own
gas stations; they secured gasoline thanks to contacts with importers
from government or public companies. The contacts received part of the
income (rent) made on the difference between the import price and the
sale price.
The Serbian police was misused for making possible and concealing
various illegal activities by private persons or social companies in connec-
tion to import of gasoline, cigarettes, etc. This was in a way encouraged by
the fact that FR Yugoslavia, up to the democratic changes of 2000, had that
misfortune to be subject to different types of international sanctions,
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which significantly contributed to the destruction of public morality and
the system of values which limit the growth of crime. 
Besides the general safeguards in the penal legislation, for acts of cor-
ruption sanctions are foreseen in the laws governing police activity. The
Internal Affairs Law of Serbia (ar. 50) qualifies as a serious breach of work
obligation and duty the illegal acquisition of personal or material benefit
for oneself or others if it is connected to the job. In similar fashion, the
concealment of a grave breaking of work obligation and duty carried out
by the directly superior officer was qualified.
Lack of trust in the police 
In one survey from 1994 carried out by the Open University of Suboti-
ca, the police won the high third place regarding the trust of the populace
(after the church and the army). 
The table points to significant differences in the perception of the police
in Serbia and Montenegro. In Serbia, only 43,7 percent of those polled had
a high or average trust in the police. In Montenegro, that percentage was
rather higher (60,6).
Among eleven institutions that were subject to the survey (government,
parliament, president of the Republic, constitutional court, army, police,
education, church, health services, media, labor unions), the police was
placed in the third place in the group of institutions that were highly trust-
ed (after the army and the church). Yet, the police in Serbia simultaneous-
ly received the fourth place in the group of institutions that were granted
no trust (after the parliament, labor unions, and media).
Empirical research carried out in 1996 in Belgrade (Nikoliæ-Ris-
tanoviæ) gave 42,4 percent of negative answers to the question if police
was efficient in fighting crime, and additional 31,5 percent of those
poled answered with Dont know. Additionally, 72,1 percent of those
polled stated that they were victims of a conventional crime in the peri-
od 1991-1996; and only one third went to the police in regard to those
crimes.
The most frequent reason for not registering a complaint with the
police is the belief that the police will not do anything. At the same time,
the majority of those who did register a complaint were not satisfied with
the way police acted on the complaint. The percentage of those not satis-
fied ranges from one half (for robberies) to three fourths (for sexual
assaults). This means, for example, that from 100 victims of robberies only
15 were satisfied with the way the police came to their aid regarding the
critical situation that they found themselves in.
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High Average Small None Dont know
Serbia 21,5 22,2 17,5 31,8 7,7
Montenegro 39,3 21,3 13,8 7,7 17,9
Table 4.1. 
Trust of the populace in the police 
The noted survey was conducted in Serbia in mid-1997 and it demon-
strates that 84 percent of those polled believe that in this country organ-
ized crime exists, and that they feel seriously endangered, both physically
and materially. Organized crime, by definition, always implies the partici-
pation of state organs in illicit activities. 
According to empirical research carried out in 1996 and 1997 (Slavuje-
viæ), lack of trust of citizens of Serbia in the police was constantly increas-
ing. While in the second half of 1993 the difference between those who do
not trust the police (50%) and those who do (44%) was 6, in 1996 that
negative difference increased to -18. In 1997 the difference has more then
doubled: almost two thirds (61%) of citizens expressed the lack of trust,
and less then one third (only 31%) trust, in spite of the fact that the nega-
tive difference was -30. In 1997 a greater negative difference was registered
only in Ukraine (-40), Belarus (-47) and Bulgaria (-50). In Montengro the
difference was also negative, but it amounted to -11, in the Check Repub-
lic -9, in Croatia 0, in Slovakia the difference was positive (+1), as in
Romania and Poland (+2), and in Hungary the positive difference was
+17.While in developed countries the police force represents a strong
integrative institution, police in Serbia found itself in the category of ille-
gitimate institutions that act disintegrativelly.
A survey conducted in Serbia in January 2001, as part of this project is
fully presented and examined in chapter III, so here we will only examine
briefly some findings regarding the police. Those polled were asked,
among other things, to name one of eight institutions (army, church, edu-
cation, President of FRY, health care, Serbian Academy of Sciences and
Arts, opposition parties, police) that they trust the most. Only two percent
of those polled stated they trust the police the most. The police was placed
on the last, eight, position.
The reasons for the lack of trust of citizens towards the police are differ-
ent. The influence of politics over the police, as its failure to solve several
extremely important murders, surely decreases the trust of citizens in the
police force. Their knowledge or belief that the police is corrupt is surely
one of the most important findings, and most likely the most important
one. The outspread and deep-rooted ness of corruption is one of the most
destructive types of crime. How can then citizens trust a service that is
heavily affected by this phenomenon? 
For this reason the most recent surveys confirms the fall of the trust in the
Serbian and Yugoslav police. Among institutions that were the subject of the
survey, those polled assessed that the police and its members take the second
or third place in corruption, right after or ahead of the corruption in courts.
In answering a question of what do they think about the extent of corrup-
tion in the police force, 76 percent of those polled answered that they believe
that it is present in that service much or very much. The customs service has
taken the first place with 84 percent, and courts the third with 75 percent.
The police is in the second place regarding answers to the question
Where is corruption most widely spread? In the police answered
12,4% of those polled, while 31,4% of those polled said it was the customs
service, and 12,3% believe that corruption is most widely spread in courts.
To the opposite question Where is corruption least widely spread? only
0,6% of those polled said in the police. Worse places were assigned to the
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customs service and the courts (0,5% each) and three more institutions.
When asked to what extent are members of certain professions involved in
corruption, police was chosen by 62% of those polled. At that, 23 percent
of those polled believe that almost all members of the police are part of
corruption, and 39% believe that we are dealing with the majority. In
answering this question the first place was assigned to the managers of
social companies (32%+45%), and the second place to customs officers
(40%+35%). The police, therefore, was again placed in the third place.
Finally, citizens believe that the police force is extremely corrupted in con-
nection with public (state) procurement, although somewhat less then
public works (average 4,16) or health care (average 4,11). Te average for
the police force is 4,04.
The police in Serbia is very corrupt, which has very negative conse-
quences for implementation of laws and suppression of corruption. When
the institution that has a job to protect the law and the legality and to fight
all types of crime, including corruption, is heavily contaminated with the
virus of corruption, then it is difficult to expect that in other areas or insti-
tutions of society there is room for improvement. The poor effort by the
police simply provides an incentive to citizens and entrepreneurs to break
laws, or manage their affairs in muddy waters. 
Corruption in the Customs Service 
If an importer does not pay customs or does not pay the full amount of
customs duties, it makes it possible for him to capture rent. Other
importers are paying customs duties and the equilibrium price of import-
ed commodities is formed according to thus defined total costs (purchase
price is increased for customs duties). Since his costs are lower (decreased
for the amount of the customs duties which he did not pay), the difference
between those costs and the equilibrium price of commodities represent
the rent. For this reason every importer has an incentive to avoid payment
of customs duties, or to resort to corruption, to free his commodities from
payment of customs duties. Unpaid customs duties (in full or partially)
directly lead to forming of and of capturing rent. 
Public opinion poll results, and surveys of experiences of entrepreneurs
demonstrate that the customs service is seen as the most corrupt state
service. The multi-year inheritance of the Federal Customs Service under
the leadership of Mihalj Kertez obviously produced results that cannot be
easily annulled. During the past ten years a union was formed between
people, or clans form the customs service and people from the police, both
from the Public Security Service and from the State Security Service. On
all border crossings besides customs officers there are police officers, both
in uniform and in plain clothes. The police carries out passport control
and provide physical security of the border at the border crossing. There-
fore, for carrying out of practically any kind of corruption of the customs
service, participation of policemen is needed. If they did not participate,
they could have easily prevented the majority of customs offences. Addi-
tionally, impartial and effective police force at the border would have been
a sure signal for customs officers not to engage in corruption, or inten-
tional irregularities of customs procedures. 
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The above named union of customs and police in corruption was
amplified by the fact that the two services did not have clearly differentiat-
ed spheres of competence at the border. That meddling of competences
was increased by the naming of Mihalj Kertez for director of the Federal
Customs Service. Kertez was a confidant of State Security, so with his
arrival meddling of the police in customs procedure was increased, and
especially by State Security Service. Additionally, a large number of newly
employed customs officers were either transferred directly from the State
Security, or were indirectly linked with State Security (for example wifes of
State Security officers). 
Corruption of customs officers (together with the corruption of their
colleagues from the police), or mechanisms of corruption, aimed at not
paying full customs duties, i.e. making of a profit, can have several forms. 
First the lack of import records (commodity bypass) which represents
the best solution for the importer (full exemption from customs duties).
This method is the most difficult for implementation, since a number of
customs officers have to be corrupted, or a network of corrupted officers
has to be formed (police and customs) and the division of labor among
them has to be accomplished. In Serbia a commodity bypass, or practical-
ly bypassing of customs by trucks with commodities, occurred most often
on the border crossing Horgo, because of the specific configuration of the
border crossing. The mechanism was based on corruption of the customs
officer who first meets the truck at the border crossing and instead of
sending it to the parking for customs clearance the officer sends it directly
to the highway. Since there were a large number of witnesses (officials), it
is necessary to achieve their cooperation, i.e. include them in the chain of
corruption. Since the bypassing of vehicles implies that the driver does not
have all the necessary documents in case of later control on the highway, it
is justified to assume that in this corruption chain the traffic police was
very probably included, or those patrols which stop and check trucks, and
their documents. Often for the purpose of avoiding control license plates
were replaced, and falsified transport orders were used. 
For these reasons this kind of corruption of customs officers, even
thought most advantageous for the importer, was used relatively seldom
compared to other kinds of corruption that we will discuss later. It seems
that it was implemented in cases when the importer had great political
weight, a very close relationship with the State Security Service and the
police, since in those cases trucks passed thought the customs crossing at
high speed and under police escort without any customs records of com-
modities, and without customs clearance. 
Another, rather effective, and less risky way of bypassing commodities is
the so-called false transit. Of course, all commodities in transit do not suc-
cumb to payment of customs duties. After entering the country the truck is
registered, or its load is registered and appropriate documents are issued,
i.e. documents that confirm the intent of the shipper to deliver commodi-
ties in another country. One copy of the document is given to the driver of
the truck, and the other copy goes into the customs documentation. Addi-
tionally, depending of the announced point of exit from the country, the
driver and the truck are given an amount of time to leave the country. At
the point of exit, documents from the truck are compared with documents
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that are exchanged between customs offices and after departing the country
all obligations to pay customs duties cease to exist. Transit for the import of
commodities without payment of customs duties. It was necessary to cor-
rupt customs officers in at least two customs offices, or border crossings. At
the first customs office, or border crossing, the truck driver meets the cor-
rupt customs officer, which fabricates documents not according to the real
state of affairs but according to the wishes of the exporter. Even thought the
truck is full of cigarettes for the domestic market, the corrupt customs offi-
cer enters that soybean shot is transiting, for example, Macedonia. The
truck enters the country with no payment of customs duties and cigarettes
are sold on the domestic market, with a large profit for the importer. On
the border crossing towards Macedonia, another corrupt customs officer
simulates the exit procedure for the truck and constructs full documenta-
tion as if the truck has really left for Macedonia. 
The second method of evasion of customs duties is unpaid duties for
recorded imported commodities, which means finding a false base for the
exemption from paying customs duties. This method of corruption is
somewhat simpler, although for its implementation it is often necessary to
include a person outside of the customs service in the corruption chain, in
order to provide a false basis for exemption. This method is used most
often in cases when there is a large number of different bases for exemp-
tion from payment of customs duties. Complicated foreign trade regula-
tions in FR Yugoslavia and a large number of exemptions have increased
the possibility for this kind of corruption, specially in conditions where a
significant part of import consisted of humanitarian aid, which is exempt
from customs duties. Therefore, it was important to prove that import
consists of humanitarian aid and it would be exempt from payment of
customs duties. Consequences of such exemptions are significant differ-
ences between the nominal and actually calculated customs duty. Accord-
ing to data for year 2000, that difference was around 1.400 million Dinars
or around 30% of the total nominal customs duties. Even though one part
of such exemption is legitimate, if exemptions reach almost one third of
nominal customs duties, it is certain that many of those exemptions are
caused by corruption, not necessarily of customs officers, although they
are an unavoidable part of this chain. 
Additionally, this method of corruption is often used during customs
clearance and collection of customs duties from citizens who carry com-
modities across the border. A collective customs control is carried out for
5-6 vehicles, and for all except one customs duties are calculated and col-
lected, and the person who has paid a bribe on time and to the right per-
son, crosses the border with commodities he did not pay customs duties
for. Since inspection is executed for several vehicles simultaneously,
potential witnesses have a hard time determining who actually paid cus-
toms duties, and who did not, making corruption of this sort easier. 
Still the basic problem in this and similar case is the payment of the
bribe, since payment at the border crossing is technically difficult and it
takes a long time. Due to this payment is most often carried out through
an intermediary, with the existence of economies of scale. The intermedi-
ary pays amounts for several transactions, or for more corruptors. In such
operations it is necessary to very precisely determine a number of details,
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like shifts of customs officers, when each corruptor crosses the border
crossing, etc. It is most often necessary to include in such operations top
officials of one border crossing. It is especially important to ensure corre-
sponding control mechanisms, i.e. mechanisms by which corruptors will
be able to follow the implementation of the informal agreement, or the
providing of services they have paid for. 
Problems in implementing of informal agreements on corruption came
into existence after staff changes late last year in the Federal Customs Ser-
vice. Certain customs officers, who were dismissed for corruption, were
not in a position to provide services for which they had received payment
in advance. Corrupted officers had already spent the up-front payment,
and the service they could no longer provide. Corruptors do not know
how to solve the problem. 
Moreover, effective customs duties can be lowered by biased valuation
of commodities, or by effective lowering of the customs base, which is
most often initiated by issuing of a falsified invoice, or an invoice for a
smaller amount then the real cost of commodities. Additionally, this low-
ering of the customs base can be achieved by reclassification of commodi-
ties. According to Customs data, over 95% of sneakers imported into Ser-
bia are cloth sneakers of Chinese manufacture. Of course, the supply of
sneakers on the domestic market clearly demonstrates that this is a case of
incorrect registering of imported commodities  over 95% of offered
sneakers in domestic stores are sneakers of different kinds. Falsifying of
commodity lists has a goal of the lowering of the value of commodities,
since cloth sneakers are worth 12 DEM, and therefore the paid customs
duties are much less, than an unbiased valuation of the real value of sneak-
ers being imported, which would be near 100 DEM. In this case one part
of customs duties is collected, and the importer is rather content, since
this corruption mechanism is rather simple and does not need the forming
of a network of corrupt civil servants  one right man at the right time is
enough, which is relatively easily achieved. 
Finally, effective lowering of customs duties can be achieved by reclassi-
fication of commodities, or by false identification of commodities that
enables the use of a lower customs tariff rate. This method is especially
appreciative for countries, like Serbia, which have a large number, or great
spans of customs tariffs. Namely, up to the passing of the new Law on Cus-
toms Tariffs in May 2001, customs tariffs had an extremely wide span (0-
40%) and there were a large number of customs tariffs (even 37). At the
same time, similar products had customs tariffs with very different rates.
For example, ribbed reinforced concrete steel used to have a tariff rate of
3%, while smooth reinforced concrete steel used to have a tariff rate of
21%. The reason for this difference is the supposed intention to protect the
domestic manufacturer of smooth reinforced concrete steel (Sartid), while
the ribbed reinforced concrete steel was not manufactured domestically.
The consequence of the named difference and corruption of the Customs
Service was that the complete import of concrete steel up to October of last
year was classified as ribbed concrete steel, regardless if the steel was ribbed
or smooth. So, a large number of tariff rates and significant differences
between them in cases of similar products lead to this form of corruption.
There is no excuse for such customs policy. The domestic manufacturer
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was not protected, since the effective tariff rate was 3%, and not 21%. The
customs procedure was not transparent and it enabled corruption. There
were no winners, all were losers,  except, of course, the corrupt customs
officers who found another way to take bribes. 
According to unofficial, but trustworthy estimates from the Federal
Customs Service itself, a very large number of customs officers, or state
servants in this service were a party in corruption. According to certain
estimates, even around 50% of customs officers had contact with corrup-
tion. Only by their dismissal, employment and training of new people,
implementation of new rules (from the law to the Charter), the defining of
new procedures and the introduction of better technologies, conditions
will be formed for the Federal Customs Service to cease being the most
corrupt service as perceived by citizens.
Federal and Republican Government: State Intervention and Corrup-
tion
Federal Government and the implementation of foreign trade rules
Until the changes of federal foreign trade laws in early May 2001, a very
large number of products were on the permit of the import regime. That
regime included 482 products, or tariff lines according to a standard inter-
national classification of products. That makes up around 4,5% of the
total number of products, and roughly the same participation in the over-
all import. 
Of that number for around 100 products permission had to be sought
because of international conventions  for products like explosives, poi-
sons, and similar products on permission which are on the permission
regime in countries with most liberal foreign trade regimes. The next 203
permissions deal with iron and steel, or products form iron and steel, and
90 more for the supposed protection of some other domestic branches
(trucks, tractors, and the like). There are 47 positions on the permission
regime, which deal with agricultural and foodstuff products. Additionally,
there are products on the permission regime that are there for totally
unknown reasons, like old clothes, certain medical equipment (EKG),
compressors and others whose total number is around 40.
The biggest problem in assigning permits was subjectivity and lack of
transparency in decision-making. Civil servants assign permits, to individ-
ual companies that requested the permits and assign a permit for a clearly
specified commodity and with a limited value of the transaction, meas-
ured either by quantity or value of commodity. Additionally, civil servants
have the discretionary right to issue or to reject the issuing of a permit
based on a subjective judgment regarding protection of general interests,
which meant domestic manufacturers, or the protection of the countrys
balance of payments. These very general guidelines make it possible for
civil servants to easily offer their services for the issuing of permits, or to
be corrupted. 
The largest number of permits for import of foodstuff products (chew-
ing gum, sugarless chewing gum, sugar, bananas, chocolate, etc.), or prod-
ucts with an extremely high profit margin, was reserved for large
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importers, often close to the authorities. For example, Delta M, Genex
(and companies which are part of Genex), Nelt, Stankom trgovina, Deljug
were among them. In addition, often smaller companies were present,
often with two or three employees which received permits for import of
certain products, for example Food Industry Dunja, registered in Bel-
grade, Bulevar Revolucije 276 (no factory or industry exists on that
address) which in the year 2000 received permission for the import of
chocolate in the value of 1 million USD.
The next interesting phenomenon is the unrealistically low price under
which import was reported and in this manner corruption was covered.
Namely, the nominal amount of allowed import was relatively small, so
that doubt would not be raised in the regularity of awarding of permits. In
regard to unrealistic prices presented on permissions, the leader is the com-
pany named International CG which is a part of Genex, and at the time
under direct control of Radoman Booviæ, and which received permits for
the importing of 6.100 tons of bananas, with the reported price on the aver-
age being less then 10 cents per kilogram. Furthermore, companies under
control of Genex received permission for the import of an additional 1.500
tons. Other importers received permits for the import of 900 tons of
bananas. The average price for them was from 40 to 50 cents per kilogram. 
It is interesting that a rather significant discrepancy exists between
amounts of issued permits and realized import. In certain cases as the real-
ized import is several times greater than issued permits. This indirectly
demonstrates significant corruption of the customs service, or of the insti-
tution that should implement foreign trade regulations. For example, total
issued permits for import of trailers and tractors during 2000 were in the
value of 9 million USD, and the total import of these products exceeded 20
million USD. Also, for buses, the value of issued permits was 2.1 million
USD, and imports amounted to 5,1 million USD. For trucks the value of
permits was 7 million USD, and import exceeded 18 million USD, while
for sidecars were issued permissions for import of 1,12 million USD, an
imported is over 10 million USD. 
Having in mind that a large quantity of bananas was sold on the green
market and other locations where payment was in cash, it was noticed that
International CG (Genex) imported bananas in the quantity of 3.400 tons
for a company Neretva Fruit from Novi Sad (the city where Radoman
Booviæ grew up) which does not exist in the register of the federal Statis-
tical Administration. Several things can be concluded from this. Above all,
that through this company Genex introduced the bananas on the cash
market through which it could have avoided payment of the sales tax, and
also to take all income off the books of the company. Next, the Federal
Ministry of Foreign Trade had certain criteria for issuing import permis-
sions. Among others, according to this criterion, small private, and even
socially owned companies were denied a chance to import freely, and spe-
cially to import such significant quantities. Obviously in this case this cri-
terion was not observed. 
It can also be noticed that at the time of the collapse of the old regime in
proportionally large number of permissions was issued. For example,
from October 6 to October 10, 2000, 16 out of 18 permissions for import
of sugar in the year 2000 were issued.
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And finally, one should mention the cadre that issued licenses in the
former Federal Ministry for Foreign Trade. It is assumed that licenses were
worked on by people linked with the State Security Service. This can be
substantiated by the fact that one of the main persons in the committee for
licenses was the wife of one of the heads of the State Security Service. In
cases of the most delicate import deals, licenses were approved personally
by the then Minister for Foreign Trade, a high official of JUL. 
State control of prices
The state control, or limitation of prices, as a means of state interven-
tion, is also very often used, especially in certain economic activities, like
agriculture. Over 40 percent of prices on the average were under direct
state control in Serbia while in certain periods this went to even above 60
percent. Such state activity could not have been taken without certain
consequences. First of all price control had demonstrated its unavoid-
able negative effect  a tendency to grow in scope. Deciding to persevere
in price control the Serbian government was forced to pay subventions
to industries where prices were under control. In this way it brought
itself into the situation that it had to increase the level of price control to
prices that make up basic costs in those industries. Very often this did
not work either, and operational costs of companies with controlled
prices were higher then their overall income. Therefore, the companies
were making losses. 
Typical products of this kind were the basic foodstuff products in Serbia
during the rule of SPS and their coalition partners. Very often, because of
the maximized price that was not followed by an adequate mechanism of
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Frame 1 
Regulation of foreign trade transactions:
Not according to likes or dislikes 
The most regulated field of business operation in Serbia during the 1990s was for-
eign trade. Imports were limited by quotas, and when during 1999 the quotas were
lifted, the very widespread use of licenses for import and export began.  Import quo-
tas were granted by the Federal Ministry for Foreign Trade together with the Federal
Chamber of Commerce. Import and export licenses were issued by the Federal Min-
istry. Additionally, one had to have a company registered for foreign trade activity,
which demanded the meeting of certain conditions regarding the number of
employees and technical standards, and a paid deposit. Also, an obligation existed to
register every individual foreign trade deal, a mandatory deposit of foreign currency
with the National bank during import, and the mandatory sale of one part of the for-
eign currency made on the export according to the official (for exporters unfavor-
able) exchange rate. Of course for all of the listed obligations, or for their real of fic-
tive fulfillment appropriate certificates were issued. Since foreign trade deals
brought in significant profits, entrepreneurs, most often importers had a significant
incentive to pay for issuing of any one listed certificates, or licenses.  Therefore, it is
less then likely that they were issued to personal likes or dislikes, but on market prin-
ciples  to the one ready to pay the most. 
fanatical incentive for the manufacturer, there was no interest of manufac-
turers to manufacture the product. Accordingly, equilibrium supply was
not adequate to satisfy the full demand for the given price. Insufficient
supply formed irregular shipments, shortages, and a queue in front of the
stores. For this reason certain consumers were ready to pay an additional
amount in order to acquire the adequate number of units of the product
in question. For example, sugar at controlled prices, was almost never to
be found in stores. Then one should not be surprised over corrupted store
managers who receive money or counter services. 
Public companies 
Public, or state companies, which provide infrastructure services, are
very often centers of corruption. Namely, it is customary that prices of
services of these companies are depressed, often significantly under the
level of their costs of supply. The supply of those services under such
administrative limitations of prices is insufficient. Such a price policy of
infrastructure services in Serbia was explained by protection of the stan-
dard of living, although it turned out to almost always, be a part of the elec-
tion campaigns. Since, on a free market, equilibrium prices of these servic-
es are higher, consumers were ready to pay a higher price for those services.
Due to administrative limitations, such a price would not be legal, and it
surely transforms itself into illegal payments, or into corruption of those
who can provide such a service. Corruption for connecting new telephone
subscribers in Serbia is a typical example (example in Frame 2).
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Frame 2
Corruption for connecting new telephone lines:
"Bottle of spirits for 200 DEM"
The tariff policy of Telecom Serbia is not based on the cost of providing services. For
this reason in a large number of cases the telecommunication company is not inter-
ested in providing those services. A typical example is the price of a new telephone
line. At the present price, a large number of citizens have applied for a telephone and
following that they have to wait a long time. In such conditions they are ready to by
payment influence the queuing of their own telephone line. Sometimes, a contact
is used, which also represents corruption, in this case of an investment in the social
capital of the one who is in a position to take care of the telephone line. A separate
type of corruption is the one that speeds up the already approved telephone line. The
lack of interest of employees of the Telecom Serbia can lead to months of waiting for
an approved telephone line. Then action is undertaken by entrepreneurial workers
of the Telecom itself. Namely, the new telephone user has to, at his expense, secure
the home wiring of the new telephone line. Since few new telephone users have the
technical knowledge needed for such a task, the job is often offered to one of the
Telecom workers. Accepting of a job very often means that besides placing of home
wiring he speeds up its linkage to the telephone exchange. According to testimonies
of new telephone users, the price of this service varies greatly (used to be 200 to 500
DEM all inclusive). Sometimes the prices of this service are even broken down, pos-
sibly even with a rational: Give me about 200 DEM so I can buy a bottle of spirits
for the people at the exchange.
Tax administration 
Payment of taxes unavoidably decreases the well being of taxpayers,
since it decreases their available income. In principle, regarding this issue
there are no differences between legal and private entities. Corporations
want to pay profit tax as little as possible, while citizens want to pay a
smaller income or property tax. Of course one of the available options for
those who do not wish to pay taxes is classic tax evasion, but in many
countries it represents a high-risk activity, which most often constitutes a
criminal offence (one should remember the instructive case of Al
Capone). On the other hand, corruption often represents a reasonable
alternative for those who wish to decrease their tax burden. Corrupt sate
servant in the tax administration, for example, can calculate the tax return
in a biased manner, decrease the tax base or use a more favorable tax rate,
which would decrease, if not eliminate payment of taxes for the total
income of citizens. Also, the value of personal property can be assessed
with bias, so that the assessed value is several times less then the market
value. By this the tax base is decreased, and therefore the amount of taxes
due. Additionally, others can be included in corruption. For example,
those who carry out financial auditing of the working of a corporation, so
that they accept the final financial statement that depicts a lesser profit less
and thus decreases the burden of the profit tax on the corporation. 
The tax system in Serbia during Miloeviæs rule represented an excep-
tionally strong generator of corruption. Survey findings confirm that citi-
zens place the tax administration right after the customs service as an insti-
tution they link massive corruption with (4,12). The tax code in Serbia used
to be too complicated and hard to understand. There were a large number
of different taxes, overemphasized was the tax directed at spending (sales
tax) and income tax. Also, there was great space for discretionary state
measures, or discretionary decisions by state servants. The practical man-
ner of functioning of the tax system shows how operative it really was.
When one has in mind the complete nature of the economic and political
system in Serbia, it is not hard to conclude that authorities purposefully
made possible, for certain groups and large companies, whose managers
were members of the political elite (often ministers), to attain a privileged
position (to pay decreased taxes) or even to without punishment, without
any fear and any responsibility, fully avoid payment of taxes. This repre-
sented one of the ways or assigning privileges to certain companies, and
even to complete economic industries. On one hand, by not paying taxes
they could lower their prices, which made market competition extremely
uneven and made it possible for them to eliminate the competition, i.e. the
establishing of uncompetitive market structures. On the other hand, if they
did not decrease the prices, since their overall costs were significantly less
compared to income, the privileged businessmen seized a significant rent. 
In the context of the fiscal system of Serbia, a significant issue is taxa-
tion of salaries. Salaries were, simply put, overtaxed. Namely, according to
then relevant laws, for one Dinar of net salary companies were under obli-
gation to pay an amount of over one Dinar for taxes and other dues. Such
an extremely high tax burden for salaries caused a direct incentive towards
evasion of this tax that was realized in different ways. Before all a massive
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gray market of labor was formed. It is estimated that this market still
numbers at least one million people. Additionally, even those workers
included in the formal labor market were not in the majority of cases paid
in the standard manner, but through work contracts and in similar ways,
so that taxes would be avoided. An incentive for corruption and the gray
labor market was a consequence of the fact that the majority of workers,
who were included in the gray market of labor, were formally employed
elsewhere. In other words, they have based on formal work contracts
secured social protection. Therefore, they were encouraged to join the
gray labor market. Essentially the management and workers divided a
part of the profit that was made by evasion of payroll taxes. 
Corruption linked to the tax administration, or the tax system in Serbia
at the time of Miloeviæs rule became a symbol of the business elite of that
time and the dominant way of doing business. Growing rich through
crime and, of course, corruption became a common place and formed
new business rules. It is clear that entering into these closed arrange-
ments had to be paid well. Only those who were chosen could go unpun-
ished for tax evasion, to introduce or carry on blackmail, to organize
smuggling, to have access to credits under special conditions, often with
negative interest rates. Those companies which strictly followed the rules
could not survive the competition with those who did not pay taxes, break
all rules and norms, use funds from money creation of the National Bank.
In this way corruption became a component of managerial activity, some-
thing considered an unavoidable part of business costs. Survey results
have shown that private entrepreneurs slated from 1 to10 percent of their
annual budget for paying bribes. Corruption in this way became a way of
doing business  in Serbia. Preconditions for a higher living standard and,
therefore, social prestige were not secured by successful entrepreneurship,
but by political lobbying and corruption. Economic dependence grew
stronger between state companies and holders of political power. Prof-
itable businesses could not be carried out without the knowledge of the
state, or more often, without someone in a high political position. 
Market monopoly and barriers 
A significant cause of corruption in Serbia was the monopoly structure
of its market. Empirical research, or the standard econometric measure-
ment of monopoly power, show that the market in Serbia in the past
decade was to a large extent monopolized. This fact by itself does not repre-
sent a great surprise. It represents a natural consequence of events that took
part on the territory of former Yugoslavia. Companies in Serbia in previous
decades have opened up, like in all the republics of the then unified state,
having in mind the complete market of the former Yugoslavia. Only as part
of such a unified market were these companies exposed to strong competi-
tion. Additionally, since the market was significantly larger then today the
companies could have used the positive effects of the economy of scale. 
At the moment of disintegration of the former Yugoslavia and the turn-
ing of her then republics into independent and internationally recognized
states the economic situation was drastically changed. Above all, the then
unified market was overnight divided into several smaller and closed units
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overnight, which lead to the situation that many companies were left with
no competition, or certain industries became classic monopolies. Addi-
tionally, since the new market was much smaller, some companies were
able to by lowering capacity use meet the existing demand. Simultaneous-
ly with the process of monopolizing of the market in Serbia one could feel
and see a constant lack of certain products, especially of those which were
previously supplied by the of companies from the former republics of the
joint state. At that time one could notice the full extent the inadequacy of
the existing economic structure.
It is a fully obvious that there exists a very strong link between the
monopolistic structure of the market in Serbia and the incentive for corrup-
tion. The monopolistic position makes it possible for a company to acquire
a growth of profit above the amount it would acquire in conditions of free
competition and open market  in other words, rent was captured. Having
this in mind, monopolists were naturally interested in maintaining their
position as long as possible, if possible permanently. For this reason they
were ready to corrupt state servants to stimulate them to intervene in the
market in their behalf. Every entry of a new company in the existing
monopolistic activity would reduce the monopolistic profit, which the exist-
ing monopolists attempted to oppose by all available means. In preventing
of market entry and growth of competition they are using corruption. 
The process of corruption used by the monopolists was additionally
supported by the fact that activities of the former authorities in Serbia
were to a great extent, arbitrary. Members of the ruling elites were granted
great authority that the common public could in no way control. The
monopolists in reality shared one part of their rent with those state ser-
vants who enabled them to achieve their position. 
Multiple exchange rates 
Certain countries use multiple foreign currency exchange rates. It is rather
hard to understand the economic logic for such a solution. However, regard-
less of the motives, in Miloeviæs Serbia there was at least a double daily
exchange rate. The official rate was linked to the German Mark, while on the
street a freely formed market rate was present, and there also existed a so-
called deposit rate, an exchange rate for deposit account transactions. With
an expansive monetary policy which was in place, the difference between the
official and market foreign currency exchange rate increased constantly, so
that in the last year of Miloeviæs rule the market rate of the German Mark
was on the average five times greater then the official one. The authorities
persisted in the implementing of the fixed nominal foreign currency rate. It is
hard to say what caused such a policy. In other words, is the reason stupidity,
elementary lack of knowledge of economic policy, or is the issue more com-
plicated. Such rate differences presented very large possibilities for corrup-
tion. To purchase foreign currency at the official rate and sell it at the market
rate  surely represented a business practice with an extremely high profit
rate, or practices that generate an extremely high rent. Access to buying of
foreign currency at the official rate had, of course, only the privileged, those
who for such a position were ready, or forced to pay well. This especially held
true for banking and foreign trade dealings (see frame 3).
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Special pensions and giving to citizens 
Disability pensions are designed for those people that were left with no
work capability. Such a solution exists practically in all civilized states.
However, many people who are still capable for work, in these conditions,
have an incentive to receive disability pensions. Such pensions make possi-
ble for them an additional income and free benefits (free spa rehabilitation,
for example). Namely, they acquire through welfare and disability pen-
sions, fixed income and free benefits. Therefore, people who wish to
acquire a disability pension, and have no right to do so, are ready to corrupt
civil servants who make decisions on the granting of such pensions. In Ser-
bia the price of a decision on a disability pension is around five thousand
DEM. The level of potential corruption is determined by the discounted
amount of the expected benefit that the corruptors (false pensioners) are to
seize in the future. Since it is rather difficult to grant a disability pension to
someone whose work abilities are fully preserved, the most serious candi-
dates for this kind of corruption are people whose work ability is partially
preserved, and they wish to demonstrate that they have no work capability
at all. Corruption of this kind can be indirectly examined through the
number of people who receive regular and disability pensions. 
State subventions to manufacturers
The mechanism of realization of a subvention to a manufacturer is
linked to measuring of the quantity and quality of the delivered product.
For example, for the subvention of milk production, the quantity of deliv-
ered milk and its fat content is measured. The manufacturer has an incen-
tive to, by corrupting the one who is measuring the named parameters and
issues the adequate document, increase the amount of the subvention he is
seizing. In other words, by corrupting the one who is measuring the named
parameters, he can acquire a fake report with the specified quantity, or
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Frame 3
Corruption and Multiple Exchange Rates:
A bank in Belgrade
One of business specialties of local large banks was the granting, to privileged users,
of course, the so-called Dinar credits with a foreign currency base. This, somewhat
simplified, looks like this. A client at a time when both nominal and real Dinar
exchange rate is equal and is 6 Dinars for 1 DEM receives a Dinar credit in the
amount of 100.000 DEM, or receives 600.000 Dinars for two years with an interest
rate of 10% per year which is calculated and paid with the return of the principal
amount. The client, of course, buys German marks on the market right away in the
amount of 100.000. Two years later the Dinar rate has fallen, and equals 20 Dinars
per 1 DEM. For client to pay back the credit of 600.000 Dinars, or 100.000 DEM
nominally, he needs only 30.000 DEM, or 36.000 DEM if interest is calculated. So,
the net benefit from this operation is 64.000 DEM. It is very clear that the user of
such a favorable credit would be very willing to share a part of the windfall profit
with someone. With whom? With the right one at the right place. 
quality that are higher than the value of the parameters of the delivered
commodities. The one issuing the certificate is not paying the subvention,
but is only an intermediary in this process, so his is not extremely interest-
ed to exactly measure quantity and quality. On the other hand, a buyer on
the green market, who pays for the bought goods out of his pocket, is very
interested to receive more and better quality. All of us pay special attention
when buying at the green market, to both check the quality and the quanti-
ty being delivered. The person who issues certificates of the delivered com-
modities for payment of subvention is surely not that interested. 
Free medical protection 
In Serbia during the last decades there existed, at least in theory, a free
health protection system based on the so-called mandatory health insur-
ance. All citizens are obligated to, according to previously defined crite-
ria, pay a certain amount in the central, state health insurance fund.
Accordingly, in case of sickness, they receive free medical protection. In
many countries, for different reasons, such a system of health insurance,
or providing of medical services, leads to insufficient supply of those
services. Therefore, individuals who are seeking medical services have an
incentive to, by corrupting doctors or other medical staff, receive the
sought medical service. The market value of a medical service for any one
sick person is very high. In other words, everyone is ready to pay a rela-
tively high amount for obtaining adequate health service. Since such a
service cannot be obtained under regular procedure, a space opens up for
corruption. Corruption can pertain to basic medical services (examina-
tion, therapy, operation, hospitalization, ect) or to other services (better
conditions in a hospital, better treatment by non-medical staff, ect.). In
addition, corruption in health services can be of various types. Besides
paying cash, they include expensive gifts, and also an investment in the
social capital of the corrupted, or different counter services that patients
can provide. 
State public procurement and sales
For a state to function it needs to acquire various goods and services.
They include, for example, computer equipment used by the Ministry of
Finance, or vehicles used by the customs service. Additionally it includes
the commodity reserve formed by the state to intervene on the market if it
assesses that conditions for this are met. In principal, the listed goods and
services should be acquired from the most efficient manufacturers, or for
the lowest price for the same (prescribed) quality. Doing so fulfills the law
of economic efficiency. Budget expenditures are also minimized. Unfortu-
nately, state employees engaged in these jobs have an incentive to break
this principle. By acting rationally, they are not interested in the general
economic efficiency, nor in minimizing of state budget expenditures. They
are exclusively interested in personal gain. If a manufacturer is ready to
corrupt them to get the job, or to deliver his products to the state, they are,
in principle, ready to accommodate him for payment of, for example, of
2% to his bank account. Cash is, of course, even better. The question is:
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are manufacturers ready for such an arrangement? Of course, all are ready,
except for the most efficient ones, and those most efficient are ready for
such a deal if they think that others will attempt to corrupt the civil ser-
vants. The manufacturers are ready to corrupt civil servants, in order to
acquire a job at a better price, and cover all of their costs which are higher
than those of the most efficient manufacturers and to by doing so seize a
certain benefit. 
Many states have introduced formal procedures of public procure-
ment, minimizing the possibility for corruption of civil servants in this
field. Private, or direct (closed) deals are the best arrangement for corrupt-
ing of civil servants; so many contemporary states avoid such procedures.
Miloeviæs Serbia was surely not such a state, and public procurement was
always done by direct dealing, and details of those procurements will most
likely be known during a series of trials that can be expected this year. 
The mentioned arrangements in the former economic-legal environ-
ment in Serbia formed a number of possibilities for corruption. Surveys
have shown that a large percentage of citizens intuitively know that pub-
lic procurement is the very activity in which massive corruption was pres-
ent (as a special field causing corruption pubic works were listed  4,16,
or works linked to the reconstruction of the country). Additionally,
public procurement in health care was named as extremely effected by
corruption  4,11. 
The mechanism itself is very simple. Having in mind the overall setting
of the economy of Serbia, or a state in which all significant decisions and
transactions were hidden from the public, in these activities participation
was reserved for those picked by the state. They gave offers and were
granted deals, but had to pay bribes for such contracts. In this way corrup-
tion represented a result of an informal auction. A larger number of
interested groups would show up, or one could call them pressure groups,
which were competition with one another. In such free competition the
winner was the one who has offered the largest bribe. 
Public procurement tenders in countries different from Miloeviæs Ser-
bia are based on forwarding of closed offers of contractors. This mecha-
nism, if there is no collusion, in general, makes possible effective procure-
ment. Possibilities for corruption are, thereby, significantly lessened.
However, they still exist, and are only redirected to the corruption of the
tender committee. Yet, transparency, public opening of bids, keeping of
tender documentation as public documents significantly decreases these
possibilities. Better yet, from the standpoint of the elimination of corrup-
tion, is the use of public auctions, where transparency is even higher. 
Besides public procurement, public sales can also be a source of corrup-
tion. Typical pubic sales are to be found during privatization of state, or
public companies. The sale of public companies forms a room for corrup-
tion. Potential buyers have an incentive to, by corrupting the seller, or civil
servant in charge of the implementation of the sale, decrease the price of
the company that is being sold. The greatest possibility for corruption of
this kind is during direct bargaining of interested parties, which is preced-
ed by private (closed) negotiations of participants in the sale. Mechanisms
used in this case are rather simple (see the example of the privatization of
Telekom Serbia, frame 4). Due to this for sales of state companies tenders
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and auctions are usually used. A wave of privatization in East European
countries in 1990s have demonstrated that tenders and auctions is a solid
barrier to corruption during privatization. 
Certain models of mass privatization in countries in transition can gen-
erate room for corruption. In that sense Serbia has offered the world a very
good example how this is not to be done. As early as 1989 the Law on
Social Capital was passed (later to be several times changed and amended),
which institutionalized conditions the opening of privatization in Serbia.
The process of privatization after 1994 was reversed and practically
stopped, so that a significant portion of the Yugoslav economy was for-
mally kept in state and social ownership until today (first half of 2001) 
only about 6 percent of the economy was privatized at this time. It was
said that privatization was postponed until conditions are met for its fair
execution. In contrast to the proclaimed, the privileged political elite in
fact carried out a massive hidden privatization. Some analysts believe
that it can be concluded that in Serbia the complete state was privatized.
Therefore corruption became one of the successful and very fast ways to
privatize social and state property.
The hidden, or spontaneous privatization, in fact is a euphemism for a
plundering transfer of resources of the social, or state companies, into
private hands. Most often the mechanism included the forming of a pri-
vate company owned by the manager of the existing social company. It is
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Frame 4
Privatization of Telecom in Serbia:
Pronto Italia, can you hear me?
For a long time, the Italian STET, or today Telecom Italia, was interested in buying
at least one telecommunications company in East Europe. STET failed in its
attempts to purchase MATAV (Hungary) and  SPT (Czech Republic), and since
STET lost on both tenders, even thought it offered the highest price, even 10% above
the offer of the one who won at the tender. STET then turned to Serbia and decided
that it will never lose another tender. A most certain way of not losing on a tender is
that there is no tender. The story of no tender begins in September of 1996, and
when problems arose Lamberto Dini, then the Italian foreign minister, visited Bel-
grade. Evil tongues say his wife is one of the largest shareholders of Telecom Italia,
but evil tongues are not to be trusted. So, minister Dini then said in principle that
Miloeviæ was right, that the Serbian opposition should not demonstrate, seeking the
return of annulled elections (winter 1996-97). A bit later, a deal was cut, of course
without a tender, on the privatization in which STET became the owner of 29% of
Telekom Serbia. The price, having in mind conditions that were granted to
investors, can be assessed as very low, conditions for this country in general as very
unfavorable, and for investors, headed by STET very favorable. All this points out to
possible corruption, or that one part of funds that was paid did not end where it
should have  in the budget of the Republic of Serbia. The District Public Prosecutor
in Turin has initiated an investigation regarding this case. Possibly we will soon
know the answers to three questions: Who? How much? When? However, even
before we get the answers to these three questions we already know the answer to
one. And that is  what no government at any time should do. 
customary that this new company be registered in the name of managers
wife or a close relative. The former Macedonian defense minister registers
his private company in the name of his  father in law. To the new, pri-
vate company owned by the manager most significant funds, or resources
of the state company are transferred. This most often pertains to business
contacts, or business network (sales network, procurement network,
financing network, etc.), and sometimes direct transfers are at hand, or
clear asset stripping. In this way the value of the capital of the state com-
pany is decreased, or the capital is transferred into the new, private com-
pany. Since the named process has many witnesses, it is necessary to
secure their silence, or cooperation, to use this euphemism, and for this
corruption is used. Regardless if discretion will be paid at once in cash or
by a well paid position in the new private company owned by the com-
rade manager. 
Public works and transactions pertaining to public works
Public works have become very popular in the 1930s, when in the US
they lead to very favorable macroeconomic effects (they had even better
effects in Hitlers Germany, but it gave them no great popularity in other
parts of the world). Public works represent a specific form of public pro-
curement, only instead of procurement of goods and services; investments
are provided and financed from public sources. So, basically, mechanisms
of corruption are similar to public procurement. Potential contractors are
ready to corrupt state employees to get a job and to increase its value, or
their income. However, the complexity of projects to be carried out by
public works opens up the possibility of different kinds of corruption,
even wider then in the case of public procurement. One way is bias in the
project design for public works, so that the project would have a higher
value then the needed (known as inflated project). The second method
is lobbying for a certain project, where experts are directly bought off so
they support the most expensive version, regardless the fact that it is not
economically justified which is another form of corruption. 
A special type of corruption in public works is collusion of potential
contractors. Collusion is a way to avoid the tender, so to increase, or
inflate the price and in that way still seize the rent. Namely, a tender
leads to the selection of the most favorable offer and economic efficiency
only if competitors (potential contractors) are not in collusion. It is cus-
tomary that collusion is attained with the help of corruption.
Obtaining a government job 
In many countries, especially developing countries, people are ready
to pay a certain amount to obtain a job in government services. In other
words, to corrupt civil servants so they could themselves become civil
servants. As a rule, salaries of civil servants in those countries are rather
small. Therefore a question arises of why would someone be ready to pay
a certain amount, or to corrupt a civil servant to become a civil servant.
The basic motive of seeking employment in the government services in
these countries is an expected income from corruption. Namely, it is
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expected that a position of a civil servant will bring income from corrup-
tion for, for example, issuing of licenses for import. In other words, by
corrupting of civil servants for a job in the government service entry fee
is paid for a club of those who have access to income based on corrup-
tion. This is a kind of investment in the future. I pay now to win income
in the future. This forms a chain of corruption. The basic incomes of
civil servants in these cases become income from corruption, and not the
basic salary.
In Miloeviæs Serbia, corruption linked to obtaining government jobs
should be added to the corruption linked to employment in general.
Namely, this corruption is a consequence of inadequate solutions in local
employment laws. Lack of functioning of the labor market in Serbia also
presented one of significant sources of corruption. Formally the non-
functioning of the labor market resulted in the fragmentation of national
and local labor markets to a large number of small, monopolistically
organized and closed markets. Since there was no market verification of
economic results the amount of the salary depended the most from the
economic branch the company is doing business in, which naturally
resulted in attractiveness of jobs in those priority branches. Especially
attractive were jobs in the public sector. At that there was a question of
how to obtaining a job where there is no free labor market, or when there
is no mechanism of free selection and competition where chances are
made for those more capable and more ambitious. For this reason, to
arrive at a new job, especially in state services, one usually had to be made
up. Directors of social and state companies (members of the political
elite), since they were not interested in the efficiency of the company
because they did not function in market conditions, decided very easily to
do such thinks. When the mentioned elements are integrated, it is easy to
understand that different mechanisms of corruption were very active here
in their full force. Therefore 41 percent of citizens answered that they
would pay a bribe if asked to do so during a competition for a job. 
Corruption of local government 
Corruption in Serbia exists in all levels of power, as on the federal and
republican, also, in a considerable amount, on the level of local authori-
ties. It, surely, with the local government has specific forms connected
with prescribed functions and of municipalities and cities, which make up
the local level of government.
Local government in Serbia has very limited functions, much less then
in other countries in the region or in West Europe. Former wide decen-
tralization of government in 1990s was turned into a process of centraliza-
tion, or transferring of functions from the local to the republican level in
numerous fields of social life. In this way municipalities and cities were
liberated from all functions pertaining to education, health care, the
judiciary, and police, and in greater part of social welfare, culture, business
activity, regional development, and the like. This trend of transferring
functions from the local to the republican level was a result of aspiration of
the previous regime to transfer all vital powers, and also financial funds, to
the level in which it felt strongest and most durable, having in mind the
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possibility that it will lose local elections in a large number of municipali-
ties and cities. The democratic opposition won local elections and took
power in local communities, but all significant levers of power remained
out of their reach, on the republican level.
Besides administrative functions in the strict sense, municipalities and
cities in Serbia exercise governance in field of infrastructure (water works,
garbage collection, public transport, heating, graveyards, public lighting,
streets, parks, etc.), in urban planning, the use of lots for real estate devel-
opment, and in managing of commercial real estate in state ownership.
In the framework of the listed functions of local authorities in Serbia
corruption can be found. The four main fields of corruption are:
 granting of locations for building kiosks,
 granting the use of commercial real estate,
 granting lots for of real estate development and building permits and 
 public procurement.
In numerous cities in Serbia, beginning with Belgrade, in the past
decade a developed frequent and massive corruption connected to granti-
ng of locations for the construction of kiosks. Kiosks are considered tempo-
rary buildings and, therefore, do not succumb to the rigorous urban plan-
ning regulations, and thus it is easier for local authorities to grant loca-
tions for their construction. On the other hand, the private sector was suf-
fering from the lack of commercial real estate, because the existing is
mostly used by social companies, and very inefficiently at that. Social com-
panies were not showing an intent to free the excess commercial real estate
because they have low costs of its keeping, either if it is in their ownership,
or if it is owned by the state company managing the commercial real
estate. In the second case, the rent is low, much lower than the market
prices, and even the worst used space still brings in sufficient funds for
covering rent. The only quick solution, even in the current conditions, for
the shortage of commercial real estate in the private sector, especially for
small retailers, is the construction of kiosks. Corruption linked to loca-
tions and licenses for constructing kiosks developed quickly, especially in
attractive locations in city centers. A customary price used to be between
5 and 10 thousand DEM, and for the best locations and largest kiosks the
amounts were much higher. 
The Serbian state is the owner of a large number of units of commercial
real estate in the cities of Serbia, especially stores and offices. This commercial
real estate came into states ownership mostly by nationalization after World
War II. This commercial real estate fund is managed by public companies of
municipalities, of cities. The larger part of this commercial real estate is used
by social (or mixed) companies, while a smaller part by craftsmen and the
private sector. Present tenants are protected by indefinite contracts and it is
difficult to move them out even if they do not pay rent regularly. 
Corruption in granting of commercial real estate exists to a great extent.
The basic cause is the low, below market rent, and this policy is main-
tained, supposedly, for he protection of tenants and consumers. When the
rent is low, then a rent is present which someone will seize  either the ten-
ant or the one who decides who the tenant is. It is usually the latter. This
kind of corruption, as other on the local government level, has two types:
the first is cash payment, and the second is granting of commercial real
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estate to party friends. For the further growth of corruption pertaining to
commercial real estate the basic problem is the slow removal of present
tenants, which causes the relatively small number of free locations for
making lucrative deals.
City building lots in Serbia are owned by the state, while local govern-
ment and decides who will be granted which lot and what right of use he
will have. As with the commercial real estate, with the building lots the
official costs of acquisition and use are much lower than the correspon-
ding market values, and again rent is present which will be seized by some-
one. When the market does not stabilize supply and demand for lots, then
corruption does. Nevertheless, the Law on City Building Land prescribes
that lots are granted on a competitive basis. That rule holds no water,
however. In practice they are granted in direct bargaining of interested
parties, to mutual satisfaction.
In the field of residential and commercial construction there are points
where corruption is possible and frequent. The first is the acquisition of
urban planning conditions, either for a location for which there is no
detailed urban plan, or regulatory plan, or for deviations from that plan
when it does exist for a certain location. Then there is the building permit,
and finally the usage permit. At each of these points there is a possibility for
corruption, and for making payments of often large amounts, especially for
most attractive locations (for example, of several million in the Dedinje dis-
trict of Belgrade). Participants in corruption are often the building inspec-
tors, who are in charge of controlling the legality of construction, and who
demonstrate leniency towards offenders, for compensation.
Public procurement on the local level, as everywhere else, is the favorite
pastime of corrupt employees. When procurement is not competitive, the
fixing of prices is unavoidable. Corruption exists both for procurement
from the budget, and for public utility companies (the Belgrade Public
Transport Company was often mentioned). The favorable aspect lies in
the fact that procurement in Serbia is mostly small  in the last ten years
there were few large investment projects, which are on the top of the list in
corruption potential. Yet, even the small -scale gains, if they are frequent,
can bring in large amounts of money.
Corruption on the local level  either with kiosks, commercial real
estate, construction and lots, or public procurement  was usually party-
based. The ruling party would organize corruption, and trustful clerks
would carry it out. Also the coalition partners knew to participate in the
division of the loot. 
Citizens of Serbia know there is corruption on the local level of govern-
ment. The survey conducted for this project has shown that the citizens
think that corruption is very much developed with the local authorities 
they grant it with 3,78 on a scale of 1 to 5. In contrast with other state insti-
tutions, local authorities are still not rated highly corrupted. The private
entrepreneurs give even worse marks to the local government, granting it
an index of 3,91, and stating that among all dealings with the public
administration of all levels corruption is most present in the granting of
locations by local authorities.
Corruption surely harms the local community budget. When the prices
of commercial real estate, building lots, or kiosks are low, then the rent
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(the difference to the market price) is seized by either the tenant, or
municipal employee and his party, and not the budget. And along with the
budget the citizens are at a loss, or the local community in general.
CORRUPTION IN HEALTH CARE: CORRUPTION OR EXTORTION?
If we understand corruption as a voluntary exchange in which actors
are the one who is receiving a bribe (someone who holds a public func-
tion) and the one who is giving a bribe (someone who is seeking a service
and is ready to pay for it) we will face a serious problem in implementing
this definition to health care. Why? Because the one who is giving money
so he could receive a service (be given medical attention) to the one why is
holds a public function (medical worker in the state sector of the health
care service) is not in a position to decide freely, without serious conse-
quences to his health, if he will pay for the service to which he is entitled
under law. According to our empirical research, as much as 53 % of those
polled would offer a bribe to acquire better medical protection  which in
first place from nine offered possibilities. This means that one cannot
speak of any voluntary activity here. 
According to form of appearance the problem of illegal forms of pay-
ment can be treated as corruption, but in essence this phenomenon, which
in health care has grown to endemic proportions, is closer to extortion or
blackmail. A person who is in a state of need of medical attention some-
times is not in a situation to choose if he will pay for an operation which
he has to have performed, for a referral for treatment to a medical institu-
tion of higher rank, or a similar service from which in final consequence
the length and quality of his life can depend. Yet, we will use for this paper
the World Bank definition of corruption, which is a misuse of a public
position to acquire personal benefit. 
Types of corruption in health care 
Corruption, or illegal out of pocket payment in health care in Serbia can
be manifested in several basic forms. 
Donation 
For numerous services it is necessary that the user pays for the cost of
material or medicine that will be used so that the service can be provided.
For example, during long periods health centers or hospitals did not have
material for basic dental interventions, diagnostics linked to x-rays, cer-
tain medicine that were given to patients intravenously while he was under
hospital care or for therapy in medical centers, or material necessary for
surgical interventions. In this case a director of the medical institution
would, through certain departments (dental, x-ray, surgical,..) inform the
patients that it is necessary that they buy certain material (x-ray film, tooth
filling, scalpels, gauze, string...) or medicine (drug, anesthetic, infusion
solution...). The purchase was carried out, generally in two ways: directly
in pharmacies (in this case the patient would purchase the material, then
he would turn it over to the doctor or a nurse in which case he did have
control over the use of the acquired medicine or material) or by way of
donation. Namely, in a longer period of time the practice was to ask the
patient for money, even for emergency treatment, so that with that money
costs of medical treatment would be financed. The donation depended
on to the kind of intervention the patient would pay into a deposit
account, or directly in cash to the authorized official.4 An appendix oper-
ation cost around 500 DEM, a cataract operation around 400 DEM,
embedment of an artificial hip around 3.000 DEM. Medical transport or
house calls by mobile units was paid around 0.5 DEM per kilometer. The
route of money that the patient gave as a donator was obscured. The
money ends up on the deposit account of the medical institution, and if it
is spent for the necessary material and medicine for a given intervention,
or the purchase for apartments for the staff, travel abroad for specializa-
tions, the user of the service  the donor will never learn.
In certain medical institutions permission was given to doctors can sell
to the patients the necessary material. Based on the price difference (one
for which they acquire material or medicine and the sales price) the
employees in health care make additional profit.
Direct soliciting of money 
The second form of corruption, or illegal payment, is direct solicitation
of money from patients or his family. To secure quality care, speed up a
necessary intervention, for emergency services to make a house call money
is sought. Here too, there are a few ways for carrying out of this operation.
In the high rank institutions with the highest price of services, someone
will inform the user that the doctor who should treat him has problems to
acquire financing for a trip to a congress where he will present a tremen-
dously important paper. For this reason the doctor is busy more then usu-
ally during these days, and the patient will be admitted with a certain
delay. The message is clear  if you pay, you will be admitted with grati-
tude and right away, if not, wait. The second way of soliciting money,
which is the practice in the majority of institutions, is that a good friend of
the doctor says how much money should be paid. The third way is that
doctors ask for money themselves. Usually they do this directly by telling
the patient, and naming the reason, usually the miserable salaries that do
not motivate them to work, or asking for a loan which will be paid back
when they are in a position to do so. In both cases the patient knows that
he is giving money for good.
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4 We will list only two cases characteristic for this phenomenon. The first is Order No.
667/12 issued by the director of the Medical Center in Kruevac: To beginning with
September 01, 1994 bill medical services, according to the attached price list, in the
organizational unit General Hospital Medical Center in Kruevac. The price of a
medical service will be paid by users as donation. This means, if services are paid in
non-cash transfers they will be noted as: PAYMENT OF FUNDS FOR A DONA-
TION. This text will be written in during cash payments, for the purpose of issuing
receipts for the payments to departments of the General Hospital. The second is the
decision of the Managing Council of the Medical Center in Zrenjanin No. 01-145/2 of
May 12, 1997. Among other things, the decision states that the following is to be billed
transport of patients for control examinations or release of patients, and home visits of
emergency services. This obligation pertains to children and pregnant women.
Illegal private practice
In many public medical institutions certain doctors openly conduct ille-
gal private practices. This way of taking money from patients is practiced
often in dental and dermatological services. For making of dentures
(mobile or fixed) the patient pays a participation which is prescribed by the
Republican administration and in arrangement with the dentist a certain
amount directly to him in cash (for mobile acrylic dentures around 100
DEM, for skeleton dentures around 250 DEM, and for fixed bridges 50
DEM per element). Dermatologists in these cases use the medical institu-
tion (space, equipment, material) they work in to provide services.
Sick leave and retirement
Bribery of doctors exists for granting sick leave when it is not valid. In
the past few years this phenomenon is rare when employees of our compa-
nies and factories are concerned, but is practiced with workers employed
abroad. According to health insurance contracts findings of our doctors
are valid. If a worker who is employed, for example in Germany, falls ill
while on leave he is granted sick leave. 
To acquire a disability pension, payment for additional care and aid, it is
often necessary to bribe doctors who are members of committees that grant
disability pension or additional care. The tariff for retirement varies from
two to three thousand German marks, depending on the level of disability. 
Treats
From the above listed forms of corruption one should differentiate the
treating of doctors and other medical staff, which is to a large extent a part
of tradition. A treat understands giving of cash (rarely) or gifts (often)
without prior agreement. If the patient is satisfied by the manner in which
he was treated and has a need to thank the doctors and staff, he will do so
in line with his financial means. This form of giving of a gift or money is in
certain cases so deeply rooted that it has become an exception if it is not
carried out. For example, when a child is born a gift should be given to the
person who brings the child out and places it in the hands of the father or
another family member. 
Indicators of corruption in health care 
Based on data obtained in this research, every second person surveyed
from those who were in a position to give money, did give a bribe to a doc-
tor. This means  every fourth citizen.
In the ranking of fields of social activity in which corruption is present
the most, health care is in a high place, right after the customs service,
police, and judiciary. Those polled in answering the question To what
extent are following professions included in corruption? granted doctors
the thirteenth place among nineteen offered. The average answer is 2,78.
The grade for outspread of corruption in public, or state procurement,
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places health care in the second place, right after public works (recon-
struction of the country).
Causes of corruption in health care
The causes of the outspread corruption in health care should above all
be sought in the inability of the Republican Administration for Health
Insurance to fulfill the obligations under the Law on Health Insurance, or
to finance the treatment of those insured  the users of health protection,
the costs of operating health institutions, and salaries for medical workers
who provide services to those insured. Then, the outspread of corruption
in health care is caused also by social anomy or the crises of morals, and
finally the drastic increase of poverty of the populace, and therefore of the
health care employees.
The low level of funding which is set aside for health care is the first
cause of the general crises in health care, but also of increasingly expanding
corruption. During several decades in Serbia the health care system has
grown and rights of users were increased, above the economic means of the
country. When the FRY fell into an economic crisis, all of the weaknesses of
the systems of health care and health insurance became obvious. This
caused not only the decrease of the standard to those working in health
care, but also to the drastic fall of health care standards, and in the past
years the question of the very existence of the system of health care. The fall
of salaries in health care was the first consequence. Later came the technical
basis of health care, because of the inability to purchase modern equipment
and service the existing equipment. Finally the shortages of medicine, med-
ical material and food in medical centers became a problem.
Because of the decrease of the amount of money slated for health care,
there is a decrease of the quality of health services and an ever more pres-
ent phenomenon of the qualm of citizens towards the health service. In
the sphere of regular payment the citizens, users of services, because of
shortages of medicine and medical material have to make additional pay-
ments, besides the mandatory payments for health insurance. 
Crises of morals. Those employed in the health protection system could
not remain immune to the changes of general values and moral criteria
that exist in the society. While the state was in a process of political and
economic transformation and crises, a chance for progress was lost, first of
all, for those who held on to the old system of values (learning, good work,
substantial accomplishments at work and in private life, full respect of
law). Many, of weaker moral views, noticed that one system of values was
being replaced by another, that those who should prevent illegal activities
had themselves acquired illegal earnings and that political protection is
more powerful than the law. They themselves attempted to try their luck
in previously forbidden, and now ever more desirable form of behavior. 
For medical workers, an additional stimulus for turning to forbidden
activities (billing patients for provided services, asking for a bribe, using
state facilities for private practice, theft of equipment and material, etc.)
was the behavior by managers of medical institutions. Management was
poor, based on party loyalty and orders from the top. It could not have
been different since the managers were named on the grounds of loyalty
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and, therefore, those chosen were not the best but the loyal. This was
accommodated by a very high centralization of the health care system in
Serbia, or the decisive role of the ministry in all affairs. The managers did
not use adequate instruments for management, planning, programming,
and quality control. Their only role was to be a transmission between the
higher level, the ministry (or party committees) and the staff. 
The extra-legal status of managers of medical institutions who under-
took even clearly criminal activity certainly could not have a positive effect
on the staff to conduct all of their activities in line with the ethical princi-
ples of the profession and laws. Anyway, the recent arrests of managers
who used to run the most important medical institutions in the country,
and one of them was for a period of time the minister, for fraud, serves as
a strong supporting argument for the above statement. As a rule, the high-
er the rank of the institution one is seeking medical services in, the higher
the amount one has to pay for that service, and it is more certain that a
price list will be presented to patients. 
The predisposition of managers of medical institutions to do business
in an illegal manner had spread to the staff. Therefore a network of bribe
takers was organized, or of those who blackmailed the patients. By follow-
ing the logic if the director can do it so can I, if the department head can
do it so can I, if the colleague can do it so can I, if the doctor can do it so
can I, if the nurse can do it so can I, the lever of corruption was formed
vertically in every medical institution and a precise tariff system was estab-
lished that kept all of those who were corrupt in an mutually non-compet-
itive relationship. On one hand the amount the nurse assistant received
for taking care of basic bodily functions of a immovable patient is never
larger than the amount taken by the nurse to secure adequate care, and a
bribe that she takes is always less than the amount taken by the doctor).
On the other hand, interest based linkages which results in a conspiracy of
silence when the issue of bribes is initiated, were formed. 
Why are those who do not participate in criminal activity in health care
silent? Why do they not present the facts well known to them? Above all
due to sanctions which they can be faced with in their organization from
colleagues or other employees. Namely, since corruption is hard to prove,
it is assumed that an attempt of one person who is not corrupt or is fight-
ing corruption would be ineffective. Sanctions that he could face are
numerous, from not receiving extra shifts that are paid separately, through
an increased workload, transfers to a position dislocated from the center
of the institution, to the direct sabotage of his work. It is clear that the cost
of uncovering of corruption of health care employees is high, and that the
benefit can be small  more often non -existent.
Why are those who were asked for money not ready to talk? Because
they fear they could hurt themselves and their families. It is a fact that even
if corruption is proven in a given case, there is always fear that this will
make enemies in the medical institution, which will lead to different treat-
ment towards them or their family if they seek help in the future.
Small salaries. The rapid growth of poverty in the society affected those
who were previously adequately, or well paid. Salaries in health care have
been miserable for a long period of time. From 1991 to changes of October
2000 salaries of doctors most often were not above 150 DEM, and were in
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general lower  except for the period of high inflation and hyperinflation
June 1992  January 1994, and election manipulations of 199697  salaries
were not over 100 DEM. At the same time, many other professions were
better paid, even those which needed a lower level of formal education, less
health risks for those employed, and less responsibility for results of work.
A value system was established in society where your worth is equal to
the amount of money you have. Highly valued professions in the previous
period, among them the medical profession, have become totally value-
less. Many of those who could not enter the private medical sector became
hostages of a delusion that by the illegal making of money they can return
to a position of a respected members of the community. Many turned to
illegal activities for reasons of survival or due to a lack of ability to secure
regular conditions for the education of their children. 
COMMON ROBBERY
Up to now we have examined classic forms of corruption in Serbia,
classic in the sense that implies the misuse of the valid legal system and
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Frame 5
Pyramidal bank of the "Serbian mother"
Dafiment bank robbed a great number of clients during the first half of 1990s. It
offered enormous interest rates for foreign currency and Dinars, brought in numerous
clients and finally failed. It was a classic pyramidal bank, which functioned while the
influx of the money of new clients was greater than the outflow of the old. Judging by
all available data, the state leadership backed this great swindle of the population. The
bank was founded in the name of Dafina Milanoviæ, who finished secondary econom-
ic school and was previously sentenced several times for fraud and forgery. 
All the time during the Dafiment operation it was clear that it is backed by the state,
which managed and determined the dosage of the defrauding of citizens. The bank
was granted credit lines from money creation, consciously fabricating an illusion of
safety for the clients, and the people from the shadows created the business and inter-
est rate policy. At the time of the crises of the bank, they had agreed to by "rigorous
control secure that the process of bank consolidation does not reach the public, having
in mind the possible (also political) negative consequences, and that collaborators, or
persons of influence, who will be included in this process, must remain for these rea-
sons fully anonymous". There even existed an intent that this bank should be entrust-
ed with the buy-out of foreign debt of the Republic of Serbia, by engaging the foreign
currency of the bank, about which previously consultations were to be held with the
President of the Republic, or with Slobodan Miloeviæ, as is stated in one of top secret
memos of that time. Those memos show that the state was an active participant in
activities of the Dafiment bank, and that president Miloevic knew very well what was
going on there and that the highest representatives of the then state leadership and
leadership of the National Bank of Yugoslavia and National Bank of Serbia were co-
participants in the defraud of the people carried out by this bank.
Even today it is not clear how much money was robbed from the citizens through
the Dafiment bank and who profited. Dafina Milanoviæ herself has, writing from
abroad, where she was with the approval of the former regime, stated that the state
by different means has taken from her bank 880 million DEM.
(Bojana Jager)
the finding of ways for private gain in this framework. However, this was
not enough for those in power. They sought a more direct route towards
profit and  they found it. In the following two frames we will present in
short two great robberies, one of the populace, and the other of the state
property.
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Frame 6
Plunder of state apartments and villas
In the previous decade a great robbery was carried out of the state residential fund by
highest state and party officials. The system was simple: state housing commission
allowed the purchase of official residences for small amounts to all important and
unimportant officials, and sometimes to their favorite staff members (chauffeurs,
secretaries). Thus the law was broken twice: first, because according to the Law on
residency and Law on Property of FRY, official residences could be used exclusively
during the execution of a state function, and not purchased, or transferred from the
state to private property; second, because they were purchased at low prices, which
had no correlation to market prices.
Greatest misuses were carried out in three residential funds: the federal, republi-
can, and diplomatic. Among the highest officials especially popular was the diplo-
matic fund, which was the owner of numerous large, representative and luxuriously
set villas in the best Belgrade locations (Dedinje, Koutnjak, Senjak). 
Profiteers from this robbery were presidents of the republic, prime ministers,
ministers, ambassadors, highest officials of the army, judiciary, customs service, and
the police, chiefs of state organs, party officials, directors of media and so on.
According to partial findings of the inspection, around 1100 official apartments
from the federal fund and 1264 from the republican fund were illegally allocated.
Investigation has shown that the register of state apartments is incomplete, and
probably the number of allocated apartments is much larger. There still is no avail-
able data on findings of the inspection on the use of official apartments in other state
funds (customs service, police, ministry of defense, etc.).
The former regime rewarded its members for obedience and loyalty, making possi-
ble illegal wealth. So Serbia, in this way too, became a poor country with rich officials.
(Jovo Vukeliæ)

V Causes of Corruption
For any society, and Serbia is no exception, to be able to efficiently fight
corruption, it is necessary to identify the causes, which support its forma-
tion, functioning, and spreading. At that, one has to have in mind a
proven fact that corruption represent a much more complicated social
phenomenon, then it might seem at first sight. Its causes, and its manifes-
tations, are numerous, and the effects are dispersed through almost all
parts of a society. To a great extent corrupted society, as was the case with
Serbia in the previous decade, represents an ailing society. The illness,
among others, is manifested by a massive lack of trust of the population in
the existing institutions, the undermining and erosion of the existing sys-
tem of values, as well as by an overall disorientation and uncertainty. As
we have already illustrated by the results of the survey, a very large number
of citizens of Serbia place corruption among the most significant problems
of the society, even ahead of economic problems.
Massive corruption, besides a number of negative effects, can have one
positive influence  it demonstrates clearly and directly that there is
something wrong with the existing system of institutions and rules.
Therefore, it focuses the attention of public opinion to basic causes of the
main of problems in one society. In that context, a question can be asked:
are there, and if so, what are the institutionalized causes of corruption in
Serbia? In that way the analysis focuses on examining mutual linkages
between the key elements of the economic, political, and legal systems in
Serbia, and on ways of its functioning regarding the formation, level, and
intensity of corruption.
The American Nobel Prize laureate Gary Becker believes that the
cause of corruption is always the same: the existence of the state, or of
state intervention, which is redistributing wealth to different social
groups. Every regulation, law or public program opens up free room
for manipulation in the interests of certain social groups. In that way
the strong link is formed between the institutionalized framework of a
society and corruption. Entrepreneurs in such conditions are not
encouraged to invest an effort in bettering of technologies, internal
organization of a company, advancement of business management,
and market competition, but to a great extent to impose their own
interests as general social interests during the defining of measures of
economic regulation. This activity is known as rent seeking, which is
explained in detail in the introductory chapter. The named processes
have been present in Serbia in full. 
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ECONOMIC CAUSES OF CORRUPTION 
The further analysis will examine the past functioning of the relation-
ship between economic institutions, or the economic policies that were
carried out, on one side, and corruption in Serbia in the past decade, on
the other side. The central attributes of the institutionalized, or economic-
systemic framework which made possible and encouraged corruption in
Serbia is represented by the statist economy, outspread state intervention,
arbitrary decisions by the state, discriminatory social policy, but also eco-
nomic sanctions against Serbia. At that, the majority of corruption mech-
anisms are universal, operate in all countries in a similar way, and possibly
in Serbia they had only certain specific attributes. 
Statist economy
In answering the question of what caused, looking from the perspec-
tive of the existing, or former economic institutions, an extremely high
level of corruption in Serbia, it is necessary to go back ten years. In the
early 1990s the country was at the peak of the political and economic
crises, the outbreak of war, and final disintegration of the state (former
SFR Yugoslavia). This at the same time marked the need for the forming
of a new economic-systemic infrastructure. The transition to different
mechanisms of economic coordination caused the need for the formation
of different economic institutions. In Serbia the worst possible scenario
went into effect: one institutionalized system was destroyed, and in the
mean time an alternative system was not established. In this way, the nec-
essary orientation was lost, a state of institutionalized disorder was
formed and, as a consequence of all of these factors, cleptocracy and cor-
ruption branched out. 
In the early 1990s, Serbia did not implement decisive measures of social
and economic reform and, therefore, corresponding institutions of demo-
cratic society and market economy were not established. In spite of the
formal existence of certain market institutions, the Serbian economy in
the past decade doubtlessly functioned as highly statist. Instead of initiat-
ing the transition, it has, in the economic-systemic sense, turned back a
few decades in the past. The manufacturing and allocation of resources
were not directed by consumers and their preferences, or by managers of
relatively independent companies, but by administrative activities of the
government. 
Since there was no market verification of business results, political medi-
ation in business processes formed a privileged position for certain individ-
uals and groups. Politically influential individuals and groups imposed
their own economic interests as strategic goals of the state and the socie-
ty in general. The process was additionally complicated by the fact that the
largest part of the political nomenclature was also the managerial elite 
managers of large manufacturing and trade companies (often monopolies)
or large banks. It is also interesting survey results place managers of social,
or state companies, on the very top of the list of professions incorporated in
corruption. Thus, 75 percent of citizens believe that managers of state com-
panies are corrupt. They are positioned right after customs officials, for
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whom around 78 percent of citizens, who participated in the survey,
believe that they are massively corrupt. 
In Serbia the very thing happened that was analyzed for decades in the
framework of institutional economic theory. Individuals have in reality
only reacted rationally to outside stimuli, or they secured for themselves
the best possible position having in mind given systemic limitations. A
strong interest based link was formed between the economy and the state,
the state and one part of the workers and trade unions, as well as, between
the banks and the economy. In this way a strong network was established
of overlapping interests and lobbies that supported the status quo, or even
supported the strengthening and increasing of state intervention. 
The most frequent mechanisms used were the regulation of economic
activities and price control. However, they represent only a part of numer-
ous mechanisms of corruption in Serbia. 
State regulation of economic activities in Serbia 
The basic institutionalized cause of corruption in Serbia was to be
found in the excessive economic normativism. Price control was not able
to resolve the issue of the adequate balance of demand and supply, which
lead to new and ever more serious economic problems. They piled up and
the government attempted to resolve them by using the same prescription
that caused them in the first place  by issuing additional norms (it is pre-
scribed, it is forbidden, it is ordered). The hypertrophy of economic
norms in Serbia leads to a situation where sometimes even the experts
were not able to successfully orient themselves. So the hypertrophy of eco-
nomic normatives became, possibly unintentionally, an incentive for cor-
ruption. Over-regulation caused the opposite effect  institutional sclero-
sis, which induced direct evasion of regulations. Economic regulation, or
control, in such circumstances lost all meaning  it was often much more
costly then the very value of a transaction whose legality it controlled. In
Serbia, the old and well-known rule, that when one attempts to control
everything, then in reality nothing is controlled became evident.
It is certain that extensive regulation of economic activities, or limita-
tion imposed on the free market, form very fertile grounds for the forma-
tion and development of corruption. The state regulation is reflected, for
example, in issuing licenses for import and export, granting import quo-
tas, issuing licenses, or agreement for business activity in many fields, or
concurrence for executing certain transactions, issuing of urban planning
and other permits for investment projects, or construction of buildings,
work permits, etc. Since without such licenses it is not possible to carry
out business activity, or to seize a profit, any one of these licenses has its
market value. Entrepreneurs are ready to pay a certain price for such
licenses, but not greater than the profit which they lose by not acquiring
of such licenses, regardless of the fact that anyone who meets certain con-
ditions has a right to such a licenses free of charge. Additionally, entre-
preneurs are ready to pay for the more rapid issuing of such licenses,
since waiting for a license causes a loss of profits. Experience has shown 
if someone is ready to pay a certain amount, he will very probably find a
way to do so. Corruption is generated at the moment when the licenses
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like the ones mentioned find their way to the market, i.e. if in place of
regular issuing, they are bought by way of corrupting the government
employee in charge of issuing them. 
A typical example of state regulation was the so-called mandatory regis-
tering of foreign trade deals. For every deal of this kind, the imported, or
exporter had to register the transaction, had to fill out a form, or to pro-
vide all sought information, and for the competent state agency had to
certify the registration. At the beginning these registrations were certified
at the National Bank of Yugoslavia, and later the activity was transferred to
the Federal Ministry for Foreign Trade. Queues in front of the Ministry
were enormous, and in all situations where there are queues, there are
ways to circumnavigate them. Among the first measures that the new fed-
eral government passed was abolishing of these mandatory registrations.
From the standpoint of record keeping, there was no change. What was
missing were the queues in front of the government building, the need to
circumnavigate the queues, and the difference was noticed by clerks in the
department for the certification of records. They were left without work
and maybe, without something else, also. 
Economic sanctions
A special kind of institutional constant, or the business environment
of the economy in Serbia in the past decade was made up of economic and
political sanctions, introduced in 1992 by the UN Security Council. Dur-
ing the 1990s, those sanctions were strengthened, lifted, implemented
again, modified, divided into internal and external walls, and at the end of
2000 they were finally abolished. They additionally strengthened the basic
degenerative characteristics of the already statist economic system. On the
other hand, the old regime reacted, from the standpoint of society, in an
irrational way. Instead of opening up the market and providing space for
incentives for local potentials and the increasing of the individual initia-
tive, the authorities decided on freezing of elements and processes of the
existing inefficient and inflexible economic system. Instead of supporting
of free private initiative and opening of space for business operation of the
successful part of the economy, a politically motivated promotion of eco-
nomic miracles and various ways of robbing of the populace was initiat-
ed. Especially popular for a time were the banking miracles  opening of
private banks that offered astronomical interest rates for foreign currency
deposits. 
The economic sanctions were therefore supported by the internal eco-
nomic blockade, imposed by the regime. Authorities in Serbia in reality
assessed that an uncontrolled growth of a free private initiative could in a
relatively short period of time lead to a different differentiation of eco-
nomic and political interests and, accordingly, to the electoral division of
power. In line with this assessment, mild support was given to private ini-
tiative, but only in the scope and in those economic segments that were
approved by the authorities. Everything outside this limit was directly and
indirectly controlled and neutralized. In this way a paradox was arrived at:
businessmen in Serbia were under a double blockade  one from sanc-
tions, and the other (internal) imposed by the creators of the economic
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system and economic policy. These were excellent conditions for boosting
crime and corruption.
Closing up of the economy caused shortages of numerous goods and
opened a significant space for the informal (gray) economy and pursuant
corruption. In such conditions corruption represented a special cost for
the overcoming of foreign and local barriers. An informal market is always
present in situations when there exists a consumer interest for certain
kinds of goods or services whose legal transactions are disabled. Thus, it is
not present only for goods and services whose trade is forbidden or repre-
sents a criminal activity. The splitting of a unified market formed a situa-
tion where certain goods were constantly undersupplied, which was only
emphasized by the economic sanctions. All these factors lead to extreme
attractiveness of trade in deficient articles. It is natural that such activities
could not remain out of the control of the authorities, especially of
authorities like the one in Serbia during the 1990s. In places where the
control of authorities is strong, the terrain for corruption is ready. 
State functions not related to the state intervention in the economy 
The previously listed causes of corruption mainly pertain to state inter-
vention on the market, or those measures by which the state, regardless of
motives, or results, limits the free market activities. Additionally, however,
there are significant causes of corruption that are not linked to state inter-
vention on the market in the classic sense of that word. In this case we are
dealing with state functions, or those functions that every state unavoid-
ably carries out, regardless of the level of its interventionism regarding the
economy, or the scope of state intervention. 
A basic function of the state is surely the enforcement of laws. Without
enforcing of laws, or the existence of the rule of law, simply there is no
well-organized society, and therefore there is no free market. Namely, one
of the necessary conditions for establishment and functioning of a free
market is effective protection of private property rights. If the private
property rights are not protected, or if entrepreneurs on the market can-
not enjoy the fruits of their efforts, they will no longer have an incentive to
go to market or to undertake any economic activity. There will be only
anarchy and plunder of the existing property, and no one will have an
incentive to manufacture and generate new value. All activities will be
directed towards redistribution of wealth, and not on its formation.
Namely, every entrepreneur will ask the key question: why should I work
and increase my property, when tomorrow someone can very easily take it
away from me? The answer to this question is very clear. No one, except
criminals, will be interested in doing his job.
The same finding stands for the next state function, oversight over exe-
cution of contracts. All market transactions represent specific contracts.
Some are formal and written, some informal. Contracts are voluntary, i.e.
interested sides freely, without coercion, enter into a contract, exclusively
because it is in their mutual interest. However, both contractual sides, in
general, have incentives to break, or not implement the contract, since in
that way they can maximize individual profit, or their personal wealth.
Due to these incentives it is of key importance that the state, or its court
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authorities, secure impartial and effective execution of contracts. If the
state does not accomplish this, few will enter into contracts, and there will
be no trade on the market, or there will be a decrease of economic activity,
and there will be no market. As in the previous case of the protection of
private property rights, no one will have an incentive to manufacture and
generate new value, and all activities will be directed towards the redistrib-
ution of wealth, and not on its formation. 
The listed state functions are potential causes of corruption. The key
question is: how much is an individual ready to pay not to bear conse-
quences of his criminal activity, or for breaking of a law or contract? The
amount depends on the criminal offence, the benefit the individual
attained by the criminal offence, the prescribed sentence for that criminal
offence, and the expected negative issues linked to the serving of the pre-
scribed sentence. In other words, the question is: how much is someone
ready to pay to avoid a jail sentence, or how much does one value, for
example, three years of freedom, instead of jail? It is clear that perpetrators
of criminal offences are ready to spend significant funds to by the corrupt-
ing of a government official avoid punishment for perpetrated criminal
offences. Since criminal offences secure for them significant funds, it can
be said that in this case there exists a demand for corruption in Serbia. 
The targets of potential corruptors are above all civil servants in the
judicial branch of the government. This pertains not only to judges, to
whom the law almost in all situations bestows a discretionary right to
(within certain limits) pass a sentence (of course, it is not the same if
someone serves a three or a ten year jail sentence). The same holds true for
the members of the jury, or jury judges, and for lower court employees,
who can prepare the case with bias. Possibly, the same holds true to a larg-
er extent regarding investigators who by biased activity can cause that cer-
tain cases of breaking of law, or criminal responsibility, not go to trial.
Finally, the same holds true for the police, as part of the executive branch,
whose biased behavior can result in concealment of numerous criminal
offences. 
Thereby we arrive at the next function of the state, which is protection
of the public security. Without an adequate level of protection of public
security, contemporary society simply cannot function. If the physical
(personal) security of citizens and safety of their property is endangered,
no one has an incentive to undertake manufacturing activities and
increase the wealth of the society. Everyone will invest all of their resources
in protection of their security, and some in endangering of the security of
others, or organizing of theft. 
Real and potential criminals violate public security to increase their
wealth. Some of them to increase their material wealth, and different
pathological cases to feed their perverted souls by the very act of commit-
ting of criminal offences. All of them have an incentive to corrupt the
police, so to be unhindered in committing their activities, which are prof-
itable for them, and destructive for the society. Corrupting of the police
represents a relatively simple operation, and there is rather sound evi-
dence (book and film Serpico). At that, corruption pertaining to viola-
tions of public security does not have to be limited to the police, but it
spreads to judicial authorities (Don Vito [Corleone] is a simple man. He
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controls all judges of the district court, and wont let us [other Mafia fam-
ilies] use them). Corrupting of the police and the judiciary regarding vio-
lations of public security, or breaking of laws, represent a very grave dan-
ger, since in such cases corruption almost unavoidably leads towards the
establishing of organized crime. The relationship of corruption to organ-
ized crime will be examined later. 
Finally, one of customary functions of the state is national security.
Accordingly, almost all states have their armed services, which should pre-
vent any violation of national security. Mechanisms of corruption in the
armed services are partially similar to mechanisms of corruption pertain-
ing to public procurement, but there are a few specifics. One part of pub-
lic procurement by the armed forces deals with armaments and military
equipment, which are not simple high series consumer products. Many of
these items are developed especially for the military, so that during acqui-
sition it is not possible to acquire market information. Manufacturers of
military equipment have an incentive to corrupt military employees in
charge of procurement of armaments, so that the military, would make a
decision in line with the economic interests of the manufacturers. The
payment does not have to be in cash. When you reach the well earned
pension, dear Colonel, a place is waiting for you on the board of directors
of our company and of a special advisor to our manager. Your duties will
not be all that great, in contrast to your remuneration. Additionally, the
system of the mandatory military service creates an incentive for all who
do not wish to spend 12 months in uniform to corrupt employees of the
recruitment office, so to avoid their military service. For that different
techniques can be used. For example, direct corruption of the recruitment
commission or corrupting of the medical committee that will prove that
the corrupter is incapable for service. The discussion of possible corrup-
tion mechanisms for avoiding of the obligation to serve in the military we
end with a question: did Marko (of Slobodan) Miloeviæ serve?
It is very significant to notice that in many cases of state intervention
the problem of corruption can be resolved by deregulation, or removal of
that state intervention. However, state functions, like law enforcement,
have to be carried out. Therefore, it is not possible to dispose of these serv-
ices performed by the state, which means that in these cases room for cor-
ruption will always exist. Therefore, the anti-corruption strategy in these
situations unavoidably has to be different from the anti-corruption strate-
gies in cases of state intervention, especially of the one which is counter
productive, regardless if it is followed by corruption or not. 
POLITICAL CAUSES OF CORRUPTION IN SERBIA
Social preconditions for corruption 
Are there societies that are prone to corruption? Is it possible to establish
a division of societies to those that are, according to their characteristics,
predestined for corruption and those that are not? Which group is Serbia
in? Answers to these questions demand an examination of social precondi-
tions for corruption. Although the social preconditions for corruption are
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unavoidably numerous and interconnected, let us attempt to identify the
most significant. 
The character of human relations in a society represents the first precon-
dition for corruption. In certain societies inter-personal relations are tradi-
tionally very close, while in others they are rather distant. One Indian
anthropologist in the early 1990s made a comparative analysis of relation-
ships of people in a Danish and an Indian village. Inter-personal relations
in the Danish village are, according to this analysis, very superficial. Inhab-
itants barely know each other. Practically, they never visit each other, and
remaining mutual contacts are very rare. Villagers have very limited infor-
mation on other villagers, even their neighbors, and they are not too inter-
ested to learn more about them. Even relationships between children and
their parents in a Danish village are not close. When children grow up, they
leave the parents, go on to acquire an education, and live in another settle-
ment, rarely visit, and the largest number of contacts in by phone.
In contrast, interpersonal relations in an Indian village are very close.
All people, especially family and neighbors, practically live together, regu-
larly, or daily visit each other, share among themselves almost all problems
and often offer support to each other. Everyone knows everything about
everyone else, or they are interested to learn all about all of the people in
the village. 
If we go back to the basic definition of corruption and remember that
corruption exists if there is intentional violation of the principle of impar-
tiality in decision making aimed at seizing a benefit, it is sure that the cul-
ture of interpersonal relationships in an Indian village represents a much
more suitable surrounding for generating of corruption compared to the
culture of interpersonal relationships in a Danish village. Namely, mutual
remoteness of people in a Danish village forms a very favorable social
framework for the respect of the principle of impartiality. People almost
dont know each other, and it is easy for them to be impartial. This impar-
tiality is almost the result of their culture of interpersonal relations. If
someone from a Danish village becomes a civil servant, almost no one
from the village (including his parents) will even think of asking him a
favor, or for his biased decision. Even if someone asked, it is even less
probable that he will agree to make such a biased decision. In this way, the
character of interpersonal relations is a condition for the lack of favorable
grounds for the demand of corruption, and for its supply. 
In contrast, mutual closeness of people in an Indian village forms a
favorable social base for corruption. Traditionally, all participate in every-
one elses problems. If someone from an Indian village becomes a civil ser-
vant, he will continue to behave according to the already established cul-
tural model. He will be expected by almost everyone to be biased in pass-
ing of decisions in favor of his relative, neighbors, and friends. In such
models of behavior, bias in decision-making is not only unacceptable, but
is considered socially desirable, as part of previously formed culture of
interpersonal relations. It is socially unacceptable to be impartial. Such a
model of interpersonal relations forms a favorable social base for, both the
growth of the demand, and the growth of supply of corruption. The model
of impartial behavior, or lack of corruption, opposes the already estab-
lished system of values. 
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The mentioned models of behavior, or inter-personal relations, repre-
sent extremes and it is very likely that the majority of contemporary soci-
eties are located somewhere between the two listed extremes. But, it seems
that the process of urbanization unavoidably leads to a drift towards the
Danish model of behavior, or to breaking of certain established inter-per-
sonal contacts. Models of behavior in the cities of Serbia, especially in
large cities, have become rather close to standard European models. 
Types of state and corruption
The next significant social precondition for corruption in every con-
temporary state, and therefore in Serbia, pertains to the character of pub-
lic administration, or the nature of the public sector in every state individ-
ually. From the theoretical models of public administration, Max Weber
developed the best-known model. Webers public administration, or
bureaucracy, is considered ideal, or a normative type of public administra-
tion. Public servants in Webers model behave according to rational pro-
cedures and universal principles, with no space for individualism (in the
sense of bias), personal contacts and, most importantly, mixing of the
public interest, protected by the public servant, and their personal interest,
or benefit. It is clear, on one side, that Webers model of bureaucracy
describes the public administration, or servants, which does not exist in
any one country (although the opinion can be found that the Prussian
bureaucracy was used as an example for this model). On the other side, it
is clear that in his model of public administration there are no possibilities
for development of corruption. Accordingly, the greater the deviations of
public administration of one country from the ideal model, the greater are
the possibilities for the formation, and growth of corruption. In other
words, if all public administrations in the world were in line with Webers
ideal model, there would be no corruption. 
Unfortunately, the reality is very distant from Webers model. Public
servants in reality, as in Serbia, and in other countries as well, act very dif-
ferently than the ideal public servants. Namely, public servants are people,
who like all other mortals, wish to maximize their wealth, and very often
the division of activities between the protection of the public interest and
the maximizing of personal interest is not fully separated. Such activity of
public servants, and especially of the elected representatives of the people
(politicians), or the lack of ability to explain this model by Webers model,
lead to the formulating of the theory of public choice, which shows that
during collective decision making the expressed public interest does not
have to be (and most often it is not) the maximizing of wealth of the soci-
ety in general, but maximizing of wealth of only certain interest groups.
With this the phenomenon the problem of corruption is unavoidably con-
ceptually expanded. Therefore, we are not dealing only with the corrup-
tion of government employees, so- called administrative corruption, but
also the corruption of legislative authority, so-called political corruption.
The difference between these two kinds of corruption, and especially the
difference between their economic effects, will be examined later in more
detail. Regardless of this, it can be concluded that by departing of the pub-
lic administration from Webers model, the possibility of generation, or
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growth of corruption grows. To what extent, in the reality of todays Ser-
bia, is the deviation of todays public servants from Webers ideals? Con-
siderable, one could say based on public opinion survey results, and espe-
cially based on the survey of private entrepreneurs, who are, because of the
nature of their work, in daily contact with public servants. 
Thus we reach the next social factor of corruption, and that is the char-
acter of the state. In the contemporary world we can see states with differ-
ent character. One extreme is the so-called benevolent state, whose only
goal, generally speaking, is maximizing of the wealth of its subjects. The
other extreme is cleptocracy, or an order in which the state is only means
for maximizing of the personal wealth of the ruler. The first case repre-
sents a theoretical abstraction, since a state with such a goal is yet to be
found in political practice. Unfortunately, the second case does represent a
theoretical abstraction, having in mind the rather long list of rulers-rob-
bers, both those from history and of the contemporary world. It is clear
that deviating from the extreme position of cleptocracy decreases the pos-
sibility of corruption and that the benevolent state is not immune to cor-
ruption, the analysis of mechanisms of corruption to be found it the next
section will show. Although it is relatively easy to pass judgment on the
character of a state headed by a man like Slobodan Miloeviæ, later we will
present more facts about the character of that state.
The next social precondition for corruption is based on the character of
state authority. That character can be described best by the use of extreme,
or diametrically opposing notions: democracy and dictatorship (tyranny).
Namely, corruption is, in its nature an activity that is carried out in secret,
or is not carried out in public. The democratic character of state authority
is based on continuous control of that authority by the electorate, or the
citizens of that state. Therefore, social conditions for generation of cor-
ruption in the case of a democracy are lesser then in a case of a dictator-
ship, in which there exists no institutionalized control of state authority.
Democracy is characterized by the free flow of large amounts of informa-
tion about functions of the state, which is caused by the existence of oppo-
sition political parties, free media, non government organizations, and
everything else which makes up for a democratic order. In other words, all
of this makes up an effective public control of the state, state functions,
and politicians in power, or public servants who implement authority.
Although democracy is not an impervious damn for corruption, the dem-
ocratic order is a far less suitable framework for the formation and growth
of corruption compared to a dictatorship. 
Another significant social factor of corruption can be the type of the
dominant relationship of citizens towards the state. Namely, the state can
be perceived in different ways. On one hand, the state can be perceived as
an institution that provides certain services to its citizens and towards
which citizens have a constant lack of trust. Basically this concept is indi-
vidualistic, the citizens of a country are placed in the foreground, while the
state is perceived only as a service of citizens, in which they closely control
the scope and quality of the service provided to them by the state. This,
liberal concept is dominant in Anglo-Saxon countries and is followed with
a constant distrust of citizens towards state, which means that great
resources are invested in the control of the working of the state bodies.
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Therefore, social possibilities for the genesis of corruption are lesser or the
probability of formation and growing of corruption is less under such
social conditions. 
On the other hand, the state can be perceived in a totally different man-
ner. This is the state as an object of respect, almost worship. The state is in
the foreground, while the citizens are only subjects of that state, or means
for executing of important functions of the state. Even thought this con-
cept is usually linked to the Prussian state and Hegels political philoso-
phy, such perception of the state is present in almost all of the countries of
the world many years after the disappearance of the Prussian state. One
should only remember the message of American president John Kennedy
on his inauguration: Ask not what your country can do for you, but what
you can do for your country. Not even Bismarck himself would be
ashamed of such a statement. The problem is, however, that the percep-
tion of a state based on respect, or worship forms fertile ground for cor-
ruption. Subjects do not meddle in state functions, there is less probabili-
ty for control of the state, and in the final analysis, everything is allowed in
the name of higher goals. Even corruption. 
In Serbia during the 1990s many perceive the state as an object of great
respect, some even of worship. Patriotism became a key word and a mis-
used word. Volunteers left for fronts, many not to come back, without even
knowing the goal of the war they fought in. At that time, those who ruled
Serbia learned vary well the magic power of the words  state and patriot-
ism. They were never interested in the Serbian state, nor did they have the
faintest idea of what patriotism is. In the name of higher goals they formed
a framework for plunder and personal accumulation of wealth. Higher
goals, general social interests and the like were of no interest to them. Many
higher goals and too little cold reason was the order of the day. Because of
such patriots, at the beginning of last century, James Joyce, leaving Ire-
land wrote: patriotism is the last refuge for the last tramps. 
Decentralized and centralized corruption
Faced with corruption, a citizen or an entrepreneur has before him a
representative of authorities  a government employee, policeman, judge,
or someone else. He curses their greed and his bad luck, but usually does
not think what kind of corruption is at hand: are they only supplementing
their income by taking a bribe, playing this old game for themselves, or is
it something larger, with the participation of the higher echelons of public
administration and politics? 
In countries of mature democracy small, administrative corruption
dominates, where individual state officials work alone, or where, possibly,
smaller groups work together, hiding from the law, colleagues, and inves-
tigators. The type of corruption is the same, regardless if the lowest clerk
or the minister undertakes corruption. It is significant that we are dealing
with a situation where individuals place themselves above the law, in their
own interest, and that the state is not inclined towards this activity. This is
the usual, so-called decentralized corruption. However, in many countries
in transition and in many developing countries corruption is played on a
significantly higher level. Powerful individuals and groups are attempting
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to conquer the state, or to place it under their control and use it for per-
sonal accumulation of wealth. Sometimes they have partial success, some-
times full. 
The two theoretically clear types of corruption are the decentralized and
centralized. Within decentralized corruption the state is honest, and cor-
ruption is undertaken by civil servants on their own account, fearing they
will be caught and punished. 
Centralized corruption represents a completely different type of cor-
ruption, where one disregards the assumption of an honest state and
those who lead it. A wholly different perspective is opened. The state
leadership becomes then the generator of corruption, and the state appa-
ratus represents an instrument for accumulation of wealth for members
of the ruling circle. 
Imagine one band of thieves, whose goal is the winning of power and
growing rich. It is headed by an individual with the greatest abilities, who
decides on the division of spoils among the other members of the group.
He must not give them too little, because the possibility of a court coup
will arise, but not too much, so as not to unnecessarily decrease his share.
His goal is, therefore, to maximize his own income, but also to retain the
loyalty of his accomplices so they would not overthrow him or turn him
in, and in a way that will secure for them a part of the acquired bribes. This
relinquishing of one part of income has two goals: to keep collaborators
interested in the joint affair, but also to keep them linked to the ruler by
threat of sanctions for corruption if they attempt to become independent.
An additional useful mechanism for increasing of cohesion is prescribing
small salaries for civil servants, because then they are forced to indulge in
corruption so that they can live decently. This places them again at the
mercy of higher authorities.
The model of the centralized corruption is, as we can see, of an eminent-
ly political nature. The political sphere generates corruption, its scope and
modalities, and corruption is endogenous in regard to the political system. 
The political system of Serbia 
During the 1990s in Serbia a specific political system was constructed,
which served well the development of corruption, and was possibly even
modeled in such a way as to provide for the ruling political elite a possibil-
ity of growing rich off the state and society in general. 
The new Constitution of Serbia of 1990, besides certain deficiencies,
abolished the socialist system and proclaimed political freedoms, democ-
racy and a multi-party system, opening up a possibility for the formation
of a free, democratic society. However, life did not follow the Constitution
and laws, but took another route. The ruling political elite retained the
existing control over the political, economic, and social life of Serbia, in
contrast to the essential provisions of the Constitution and numerous
laws, written in a freer and more democratic spirit, and it even expanded
its control over many fields. 
The regime that ruled Serbia during the 1990s and until October 5,
2000, was autocratic in the full meaning of the word. The bearer of the
regime was Slobodan Miloeviæ, in two aspects. First, the regime stayed
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alive thanks to him, because he was an expert in political technology, a
master in behind the scene games and tactical strikes against the unexpect-
ed adversary. By his great political skill he also secured great authority
within SPS, which gave the regime the much-needed homogeneity; no one
dared stand up to the leader. This formed an authoritarian organization
that functioned smoothly. Second, he alone made all the significant polit-
ical decisions, probably after consultations with his wife. He decided what
road Serbia should take, what the political system should look like, what
should be done with the opposition, with the economic or foreign policy,
and all other spheres of life. He determined political goals, dictated the
system of values, and made strategic decisions. Others implemented them
like obedient soldiers. The few collaborators from the phase of Miloeviæs
ascent to power that used their own heads lost their positions over time.
Others came to the boss with fear and respect, not knowing enough about
the complicated games he played, received the orders they only carried
out, believing in the leader. A system was formed much like the one of
Prince Milo from the first half of the XIX century, when one smart head
did all the thinking for the whole nation.
On the other hand, the early phase of political and economic transition of
the former Yugoslavia around 1990 brought, even on the normative level,
institutions of the democratic order, which could have presented a problem
to the establishment of an autocratic system. Miloeviæ chose the following
strategy: he constructed an autocratic regime, with ignoring of institutions
of the democratic order as much as was needed to attain the goal. He kept
the facade of a democratic order, attempting to avoid, as much as possible,
accusations about the illegality and illegitimacy of his power. He organized
elections, but he manipulated them as much as he needed to win. Laws were
passed by legitimate parliaments, but it could have been done without them.
Finally the aspiration for certain legitimacy brought Miloeviæ his political
ruin: he erroneously evaluated his popularity in the summer of 2000 and
organized federal elections, which lead him to defeat.
The mechanism of control of the pillars of the regime was the old, com-
munist personnel policy, or placement of loyal, obedient people in all of the
important places in state, social, financial, media, and other fields. To
secure loyalty, a system for their special rewarding was constructed, which
sometimes took the form of high salaries, when it was possible, and some-
times by granting extraordinary, hidden privileges. For example, managers
of companies had the right to set high salaries for themselves, but also to
embezzle from their companies in numerous ways, known throughout East
Europe. For example, the president of the Board of Directors of the Oil
Industry of Serbia, also a high JUL official, received US$ 204 thousand for
membership in the board of directors of the daughter company registered
in London, which had no commercial income of its own; other members of
the managing council received a somewhat lesser amount (Danas,
4.13.2001). On the other hand, obedient judges could not count on high
salaries, but were granted various privileges, like state apartments without
queuing, which they later bought for small amounts of money (the well
known example of the 1996/97 election fraud and awards granted to
judges). Editor and managers of the leading state media had exceptionally
high salaries, but also other income from hidden funds.
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The first pillar of power was the media. Their propaganda and promo-
tional role regarding the regime were exceptionally important. A great
majority of media was under the control of the regime. In these media
authorities were presented in the best light, daily were listed their sup-
posed great successes and a great future was promised, in spite of poverty,
wars, disintegration of the state, and continuous defeats. Activities of the
opposition were consistently not reported, and the opposition itself was
always represented as traitorous and incompetent. All problems were
reported as temporary and never was even one criticism directed at the
authorities. Independent media was suffocated, especially the electronic
media. The regime bestowed much attention to television, as the basic
medium of the propaganda message, knowing that the impoverished pop-
ulace meant decreasing newspaper circulation and that television gained
in importance. It did not allow registration of new, independent media
outlets; new licenses (frequencies) for broadcasting were easily obtained
by media controlled by the regime, and no one else. Broadcasting without
licenses was punished and made impossible by impounding of equipment;
opposition control of individual television stations did not last long,
because the regime was quick to take control back (example Belgrade TV
station Studio B). The print press was used for propaganda and brain
washing (dailies Politika, VeŁernje novosti, ect); independent dailies did
exist, but they were occasionally neutralized and suffocated, for example,
by punishing them according to the Law on Information, by illegal
takeovers (Naa borba, Ekonomska politika), and by blackmailing print-
ing plants not to provide printing services for them, as well as, by forming
artificial shortages of newsprint (with a ban on imports) ect.
The wide regime control over the media had a direct influence on the
growth of corruption, because it almost removed the public control of
authorities, which media usually bring. And when the state and its bodies
do not have to report to the public, then it is a very fertile ground for
development of all illegal dealings, including corruption.
The second pillar of the regime was the repressive apparatus, above all
the police, but also the judiciary. The police was turned into a protector of
the regime, and not of the state and law. It not only protected the regime
by physical force, when needed, but also in the role of an investigative
body, turned a blind eye towards the members of the authorities. Mem-
bers of the nomenclature could break laws at will, and all eventual conse-
quences would be gone with one phone call. Even worse, the border
between criminals and the police began to fade. The criminals did dirty
jobs for the police, while policemen begun to undertake criminal activities
(extortion and other corruption activities). The present Minister of Inter-
nal Affairs Duan Mihajloviæ states that this Ministry was politicized,
criminalized, and linked with leaders of the underworld, and adds that it
is very hard to discover which employees of the Ministry are engaged in
criminal activity, and which criminal has an official identity card of the
public or secret security service. In the judiciary the main role was played
by presidents of courts, appointed by the former regime and still loyal to
it. All important or sensitive cases were awarded to loyal judges that could
be told, or ordered, what ruling to pass. The state of the judiciary during
the last few years of the Miloeviæ regime is probably most accurately
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depicted by a statement of a lawyer: in the past I had to pay a bribe to get
a positive decision; now I pay bribes to get a lawful one.
When the police and the judiciary serve the authorities based on the
principle of loyalty, then the most important barriers to both centralized
and decentralized corruption disappears. When no one is fighting corrup-
tion, corruption spreads and engulfs all spheres of social life, and basic
players being the members of the nomenclature.
The third pillar of power was the control over the finances of the coun-
try. Authoritarian power that does not control finance has no chance to
survive for long. The personnel policy of the authorities brought to the
head of all state banks loyal people, who included their banks in a unified
financial system of the country, but also of the ruling regime. The banks
did not do business based on the profit motive, but served as a service of
authorities. Since the trust of citizens in banking was destroyed a long time
ago, the banks depended on the National Bank and its operations, and,
essentially, they represented branch offices of the National Bank. Their
main role was to, as much as possible, to block the financial leaks of the
authorities, to hold in submission the mixed companies by threats of with-
holding of credits when needed, and to, as a secondary effect, discriminate
against the independent private sector. Among private banks those owned
by the people close to the regime dominated. An especially shameful oper-
ation was the pyramidal Dafiment bank, whose formal owner was Dafina
Milanoviæ, and the real one the leadership of the Republic of Serbia.
The fourth pillar of the regime was the control over all larger compa-
nies. The basic goal of this control was political: the pacification of work-
ers, potentially dangerous adversary of the regime. The second goal was
accumulation of personal wealth of the nomenclature through various
machinations.
Change of morals
In the early 1990s a change was made in the relationship of the ruling
nomenclature towards ownership, or private property. The previous gen-
eration of communist officials, from the time of Josip Broz Tito, did not
aspire to grow rich and attain their own private property, but were content
with benefits which were brought by membership in the communist lead-
ership  socially owned villas, official cars, free travel abroad, plentiful
entertainment accounts, inexpensive and luxurious summer vacations on
the coast and the mountains and the like. They believed that the socialist
system was eternal and that there was no need to, for safetys sake, amass
their own capital, even more since it would not be in line with the spirit.
To all of them the idol was Tito, who had tens of villas in all parts of the
country, a large number of luxury automobiles, yachts, servants, works of
art, lovers, and everything else that makes life good available to him.
In 1990 a multi-party system was formed in Serbia, which, although
deformed, suggested the old truth that no regime is eternal and that old
methods of securing of a decent life of officials were no longer enough.
Additionally, the communist dogmas on the surpassed ideas of private
property were surpassed, since Serbia entered the first phase of transition, in
which, at least normatively, limitations were lifted in regard to acquisition of
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wealth and to the spreading of private property. Both the possibilities and
the need for growing rich were formed and  the ruling nomenclature did
not miss its chance. The old model disappeared; it was replaced by greed.
When in 1987 he was ascending to power Miloeviæ pointed out that he lives
in a modest apartment in the city, in contrast to Ivan Stambolic, his political
opponent, who resides in a villa in Dedinje. He played to the old communist
ascetic morality. Not much time passed before Miloeviæ too moved to Ded-
inje and soon for a small amount bought his residential villa. This was a
symbol of the new times and of the change in the relationship of the nomen-
clature towards the wealth.
State activism
The rule of law means the limitation of activities of both the individuals
and the state: limitation for individuals in their mutual relations, so that
they do not undermine each others freedom and so that it would protect
property and contracts. Limitations of the state, so that it would not
decrease the scope of liberty of the individual. However, an activist state
bans limitations imposed by the liberal democratic concept of the rule of
law and attempts to accomplish goal conditions, or conditions perceived
by the holders of state authority as more desirable from those that would
be brought by a system based on free competition in the framework of a
set of very general rules. In other words, the activist state is not satisfied
with the role of the protector of the rules of the game, in which an individ-
ual seeks his own well being, but it wants to influence the game itself and,
more importantly, the results of the game. It does so, generally speaking,
for reasons of redistribution. On the other hand, economic freedom, as is
clearly confirmed by both economic theory and historic experience, brings
superior economic results in comparison to alternative regimes with a
very active state. As was finely said by Adam Smith: little is needed to
ascend a country from the lowest barbarism to the highest level of abun-
dance except peace, low taxes, and good distribution of justice; all the rest
is brought by the natural order of things. This says it all.
The former government of Serbia is a typical example of an ambitious
arbitrary authority. It provided for the peasants fuel and compost, it built
apartments, initiated manufacturing in factories, secured medicine, gave
out salaries, decided on what can be imported and exported, decided to
whom the banks will give credit to whom they will not, prescribed prices.
It presented itself as a good father who is taking care of his children and
attempt to secure for them all that they need. Surely this is not a job the
state should do. Not only because authorities were mostly made up of eco-
nomic ignoramuses, but since no government can do this job in a satisfac-
tory manner. And then, according to the age old formula, the mastermind
government of Serbia was responsible for the small number of good
things, and all great problems were someones elses fault. 
Legislation in the field of the economy, for example was generally cata-
strophic. There were several kinds of laws:
 The majority were bad in the legal-technical sense, which made pos-
sible liberal and wrong interpretations by the state bodies, and at the
expense of companies and individuals; 
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 The majority of laws were intentionally restrictive; for example, free
trade in foreign currency was forbidden, under penalty of jail, and no
one explained why. There are two equally convincing explanations: so
that states pets could buy foreign currency from state reserves at the
low official exchange rate and that it would be possible to persecute
those businessmen who were not members of the ruling coalition;
 Numerous laws made it possible for the cleptocratic oligarchy to
grow rich through monopolistic privileges of different kinds. A good
example are import and export quotas granted to members of the
ruling parties, with a note that officially it could not even be learned
which companies received those quotas.
 The small number of good laws was not implemented. For example,
the bankruptcy law was not implemented against the numerous
favorites, supposedly important, banks and companies,
 The laws were often replaced by government bylaws, which is uncon-
stitutional. For example, the government of Serbia frequently intro-
duced new duties; although the Constitution clearly prescribes that
exclusively a law can do this. The Government of Serbia often by its
bylaws regulated issues from the federal domain (import, transaction
tax, financial discipline, ect),
 The Government of Serbia often acted if there existed a regulation
giving it the right to intervene, although that was none. A good
example is the constant misuse of the anti-monopoly laws for estab-
lishing of administrative control of prices in fields in which there
existed no monopoly; 
 The state bodies often consciously undertook illegal activities. One
example is the fully illegal and extra legal takeover of ICN Galenike
by the state, based on a decision of an incompetent body, while
avoiding the contractually agreed on arbitration. The second exam-
ple is the keeping of the position of company manager by ministers,
in collision with the clear provision of article 49 of the Law on Public
Administration.
It is obvious that the previous authorities did not respect even the ele-
mentary legality, and that the idea of the rule of law was totally foreign. To
them laws were needed only to limit the competition of the independent
companies in regard to their own companies and to grow rich, regard-
less of the cost for the economy and the country.
The state was the basic generator of destruction of legality in Serbia. Its
intentionally poor legislation, its lack of respect for its own legislation
and, even more, its misuse of legislation have had extremely negative
consequences on the general respect for laws. When the one who should
set an example of abiding to laws does that, then it is not strange that all
others, in line with the same model, acted that way. When the state is not
an unbiased actor in the social life, then it cannot be expected from indi-
viduals and companies not to be biased in their own favor. The state
muddies the waters, and the fish act as best as they know how. Until
recently the state here was a party state and a cleptocratic state, and it
seemed to have existed only to provide for private interests for a small
class of people. Corruption was widespread, and organized crime had
merged with the authorities.
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The Miloeviæ regime was irresponsible towards the electorate and
towards the public and towards the law. It had a strong control over the
legislative, executive, and judicial authority, making impossible the checks
and balances through the division of power. It could have done what it
pleased. This was used to the utmost.
LEGAL CAUSES OF CORRUPTION IN SERBIA
Introduction 
Legal conditions of corruption are considered those factors that are to
be found in the characteristics of the legal system, and which influence the
generation and expansion of corruption. Conditionally, they could be
classified in the following way: 
1. Factors influencing that which is more comfortable or quicker in
order to attain (existing) rights through corruption; 
2. Factors influencing that which is difficult or impossible to attain
without corruption; 
3. Factors influencing that which makes it possible through corruption
to attain something where no right exists;
4. Factors influencing that which makes it possible, through corrup-
tion, to avoid a sanction or some other unfavorable legal conse-
quence, including the execution of a legal obligation.
The first two cases have for their consequence the passing of a legal
decision (or other activity based on law). Corruption has the goal to
speed up the procedure, or to cause the making of a decision that would,
by breaking of the law, be omitted. The second two cases mean that by
corrupting one is aspiring towards an illegal decision of action. 
In the first group of cases corruption is caused or at least made possible
by the fact that some state body or civil servant, or a servant of a business
company, or some other official in a position to be able to, without conse-
quences, not carry out his function, or not to execute it orderly and effi-
ciently, and in a way as expected of him. In the second instance the body
or official can, again without consequences, act against the law. 
If we discuss corruption as a phenomenon, and not as a limited number
of in essence criminal occurrences, it is possible to construct a hypothesis
that this phenomenon also has exclusively legal causes, or that the legal
system, or more precisely legal order in both of its elements, normative
and factual, is such that it allows both kinds of decisions or activities under
the influence of corruption, and at that in a relatively concealed manner.
In what follows we will point out certain deficiencies of our legal system
which in the described manner generate or make possible the appearance of
corruption, pertaining to immanent, internal features of the legal system,
therefore not causes which could predominantly be classified in another way.
Incompatibility of the legal system 
An orderly legal system implies, first, the vertical compatibility of the legal
system, which in theory is usually called the realization of the principle of
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constitutionality and legality. If for the sake of simplicity one neglects the
federal principle, which if undermined in our case, hence the necessity
that all rules of the federal units be in accord or not to be in contradiction
to the federal constitution and federal laws, under which we assume the
compatibility of laws with the constitution, bylaws with constitution and
law, constitutionality and legality with autonomous origins of law. The
constitutional court should secure this vertical compatibility, anyway; and
according to many views it has, especially in the past decade, functioned
problematically to put it mildly.
Additionally, the horizontal compatibility of the legal system is also
necessary, a mutual lack of contradiction in regulations at the same level
of power. If two laws regulate the same issue differently, the system is
incompatible. Legal theory knows of rules for interpreting of these incom-
patibilities, for example, the rule Lex spetialis derogat lex generalis and Lex
posteriori derogat lex priori (specific law abolishes implementation of a
general, and later of former), but these rules not only are not perfect (what
happens if the former law is more general?) but forms with the addressee a
doubt regarding the content of the legal rule, gives the one who has the
authority to implement the rule a possibility of arbitrary or selective
action. Of course, this is room for corruption.
It is especially dangerous when the incompatibility has the temporal
dimension, when specific parts of the legal system, rules, change signifi-
cantly and others do not follow those changes. (For us this is surely the
case having in mind the fact that the deadline was extended several times
for the implementation of constitutional laws that regulate the compati-
bility of rules with the constitutions). What legal voids and illogic can be
found there can be shown through an example, (I do not suggest it was
linked to corruption): it was interpreter that the PTT was authorized to
issue licenses for mobile telephony. 
Excess regulation and legal voids 
Excess regulation of a certain kind of relationships by legal rules or
excess regulation and therefore excess authority of the state and her
bodies necessarily generate one of the two phenomena: an unaccept-
able slowing down of legal affairs (different forms of corruption are
then customary to shorten the queue) or the departing from law, and
entering of relationships which should be regulated by law into the no-
law zone, in which everything seems to be allowed and is out of any
control.
This phenomenon is present in many domains. Usually it is noticed in
the foreign trade and foreign currency dealings, urban planning and con-
struction regulations, but the phenomenon is present in the everyday life
of an ordinary man. One should point out, for example, complicated and
unclear rules that existed at one time and regulated the possibility of
receiving free medicine based on doctors prescription. The consequence
was that for some, thanks to direct or indirect corruption, medicine was
available, and for others, it was not. 
In essence, excess regulation by law makes possible the selective imple-
mentation of rules and that is an ideal milieu for corruption.
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The same effect arises in a situation when there is a lack of legal rules
that should regulate one relationship that by its essence demands to be
legal. Then there is a legal void. With all legal interpretations, or filling of
the legal void, the state body which implements the law necessarily has
great freedom in choosing the manner in which it will regulate the legal
relationship. In circumstances of a disturbed hierarchy of institutions, this
means a possibility of inconsistent interpretation, or unequal practice. Of
course this is a space that opens the doors of corruption. 
Bylaw regulations 
The need for the necessary flexibility (adaptability) of the legal system nec-
essarily requires that within these laws there remains a competence for exec-
utive and managing bodies to pass bylaws (regulations, orders, directives)
that more closely regulate the manner of the implementation of the law. 
There always exists a latent danger, especially in legal systems that lack
great legal conscience and culture, that this manner of regulating of a legal
relationship can cause a lack of legal confidence. The lack of legal confi-
dence is an environment that generates corruption. These bylaws are sub-
ject to fast and easy changes, and thus to the accommodating interests of
certain parties or the repressing of interests of others. 
For this reason this form of legislative technique should be used care-
fully which is not the case here. Moreover, here bylaws sometimes regu-
lated matter which is legislative according to its nature or explicit consti-
tutional text. The most drastic example is the situation of introducing,
or changes of taxes by bylaws. (The Constitutional Court would speak
up only after bylaws ceased to apply without retroactive application of
the decisions, or reimbursement of taxes paid based on a bylaw.) Vice
versa, by bylaws individuals and certain legal entities were exempt from
paying taxes, customs dues, or duties, which by itself qualifies as a wider
form of corruption: a state body secures material gain for someone by
unlawful activity.
Ruling by bylaws can in yet another way be a factor that can be deter-
mined as a legal cause of corruption. It accomplishes that the legal system
is unclear and too complicated, and therefore the regime of individual
rights is unclear and uncertain. This is an environment that is suitable for
arbitrary acts and corruption.
Decomposition of classic legal institutions
There are classic legal institutions that have a century long legal regime
where the rules of conduct for all of the involved subjects are clear in
advance. When the word, for example, ownership is used, it is clear that
only the owner has the right to hold and use the object and that all the rest
have to restrain from acts of the use of someone elses property. A contract
has to be carried out as specified, and if the debtor will not or cannot pay,
there will be a forced realization by confiscation and public sale of things
of his ownership. Who causes damage to another is obligated to reimburse
it, and if he is insured from responsibility, the insurance company will
reimburse the damage. 
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These and other institutions were so reshaped in the development of our
legal system that the legal certainty that stood in its base was practically lost. 
When we talk about ownership, it is almost futile to point out the very
lack of legal seriousness of the institution that was called social ownership.
As property with an undetermined title holder with the disappearance of
self- management (a bad but still legally regulated management model)
social ownership became an environment of decision making without a
clear base for managerial rights and responsibilities. Therefore, it is an
environment in which corruption necessarily breeds. Known are the cor-
ruption models of gray privatization for example by taking over the mar-
ket and clients of a social entrepreneur by its managers. This is property
without protection and a cause of export of corruption to other fields. 
It is not much different with state property, so we were probably the
only country in the world in which it was possible that the manager of the
customs service gives as presents confiscated automobiles not only to
members of his nomenclature, but also to people from his home town
with whom we grew up, to professors who taught his children, doctors
who have treated him. 
This situation also necessarily destroys private property. For illustrative
purposes we can use the regime of mutual property in our law where
shared parts of an (apartment) building are qualified as joint property, but
are placed on a regime which has nothing to do with it: the adaptation or
construction of an additional floor in a building which was fully private
mutual property decisions were made by the bodies of the municipality
until recently, and today by 51% of mutual owners under the condition
that municipal bodies issues needed licenses. That this is a cause for cor-
ruption attests almost regular legal action pertaining to realization of the
decision to change the use of joint parts of a building or to construct an
additional floor. The same holds true for the sale of building lots that is
forbidden and at the same time subject of taxation. Remedy for corrup-
tion is, obviously, in the consolidation of property and other classic legal
institutions.
Discretionary decision making 
A regulated legal state and the principle of the rule of law imply limita-
tion of all state bodies by law. Only as an exception it allows the imple-
mentation of the notion of expediency and discretionary decision. 
Not only must such exceptions be severely limited but also in such cases
procedural rules must be extremely restrictive with an obligation of pro-
viding a rationale and a possibility of an annulment of the discretionary
decision. On the contrary, one side is in such a weak position that the
doors to corruption are wide open. 
In our law this is most obviously seen in cases when the public mandate
along with a discretionary decision making right is granted to services that
are not formal state bodies. For example, corruption in health care has for
one of its causes the fact that the doctor makes discretionary decisions on
how a patient will use his right to health care: who and when will be sent to
the best specialist for an examination, who will be, and who will not be
hospitalized, who will use the right to rehabilitation in a spa. Therefore it
145Causes of Corruption
is not strange that the survey that is part of this research identifies medical
workers as one of the most corrupt groups.
Compound competence and conflict of competencies
Under compound competence we define a situation when several dif-
ferent state bodies are competent for proceeding in the same legal affair,
each one in one segment or domain. Such a case, for example, is the so
called compound administrative acts, those in forming of which several
bodies participate, when the document is complete only then they all issue
their acts which form the complete document.
Similarly, for the purpose of this analysis, when in one situation it is
necessary that several state bodies pass their documents, for example,
when the subject, needs to be issued several licenses or authorizations by
different bodies.
Even when the competency of these bodies is clearly and precisely deter-
mined, when it is known which body in which order does what, a citizen has
before him barriers which are hard to overcome. The situation is even more
difficult when documents of different bodies are mutually conditioned,
when the order of their passing is not precisely determined, when the one
who wishes to attain a certain right is forwarded by one body to another
organ. This is a zone when a solution is sought in special relations with
bodies that make decisions or in corruption. Everyone who has attempted
to secure all permits for constructing a building understands this situation
well, and the analyst asks the question if the entangled competence was
designed for the very reason of excreting pressure against the citizen. 
The situation can be even more complicated when there exists the so
called negative conflict of competences, when two or more bodies state
that they are not competent for giving an agreement, approval, or protec-
tion of a right, or when two or more bodies take competency passing
mutually contradictory acts. 
The solution is in simplifying the legal system. And in cases where coor-
dination is necessary of several competent state bodies the principle of one
window, well known abroad, should be introduced. The citizen commu-
nicates with one organ, which communicates with the rest. 
Control function and responsibility
As there is a hierarchy of legal origins, there exists, of course, a hierarchy
of bodies. At the same time, two-level decision-making is a constitutional
principle (article 22, point 2 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia.).
Therefore the higher bodies have in regard to the lower bodies a control
function, and in regard to the realizing of individual rights, an appellant
function. 
In numerous spheres the notion of duality and efficiency of control of
the decisions and work of the body of the first instance is in a large extent
damaged. First, the high level of centralization that is characterized by
reforms carried out here during the past decade made it so that there is
no significant differentiation between the bodies of different levels. The
regional bodies of first instance are most often named by the central
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organ, work according to their instructions, but also enjoy their protec-
tion. There is no statistical data, for example, on the number of accepted
appeals on tax issues, but even a superficial inspection shows that the
number is relatively small. 
Therefore, through the appellant process their control function is car-
ried out insufficiently, generally understood, as oversight by higher bodies
of the work of the lower bodies. 
Some additional institutional solutions weaken the control function. In
this way the rule that an appeal does not postpone the execution from
exception, as it was set in the Law on General Legal Procedure, has become
a widely used means of pressure against citizens. Therefore an appeal does
to postpone the execution in many tax affairs, in cases pertaining to con-
struction (for decisions on forbidding of construction or tearing down of
buildings), in customs affairs. On the other hand, the possibility to post-
pone the execution is widely used. 
In this way the first level bodies were granted a wide maneuvering space
to threaten by forced execution of the final decision at the first instance,
and to decide not to execute them. Since the contra-execution or the
restoration, if there is one (it was recently published that the Federal Cus-
toms Service owns several million German Marks for the reimbursement
of illegally confiscated objects for customs violations), cannot reimburse
the inflicted damage, this forms room for negotiations between the body
and the party that often lead to corruption. 
Lack of administrative control of the public administration and other
forms of control which follows form the principle of two-level decision
making, decrease the idea of responsible government services and state, and
the feeling of irresponsibility represents a golden bridge towards corruption. 
Penal legislation and corruption
Penal legislation, above all criminal, material, and administrative, can
be linked with corruption in two ways.
On one hand, all mentioned weaknesses of the legal system, which gen-
erate corruption, can also appear in this field. Three should be mentioned:
 In our criminal law one can notice the existence of the so-called spe-
cial criminal legislation, incriminations, sometimes very serious,
which are contained in laws that regulate a certain special matter, and
are not contained in the criminal law. For example, serious incrimi-
nations, with a high penal rate are to be found in the Law on Public
Peace and the Law on Possession and Carrying of Firearms. Some-
times we are dealing with forgotten incriminations, which are
rarely implemented, and there the process depends on the current
policy (judgment, will) of bodies of investigation and pursuit. There-
fore in practice one can rarely find persecution for the breach of
intellectual and industrial property, although we are talking about
common occurrences, whole industries, like for example publishing
of video and music pirate editions.
 Some are the so-called blanket norms, those where the content of the
incrimination in essence determines some other, non-criminal regu-
lations. Here too, it is possible to apply various prosecution policies.
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This is very characteristic for white-collar crime, or commercial
crime, covered for example by the offense of unethical business
dealing in commerce. The legal treatment of organizers of pyrami-
dal banks, for example, demonstrates the wide space of discretionary
decision-making.
 Also certain procedural norms, sometimes very important, allow dif-
ferent activities with which the public links the phenomenon of cor-
ruption. Most typical are the rules for deciding on detention (some
of which, after ten years of their use, the Constitutional Court of
Yugoslavia has ruled unconstitutional). Disturbing the public and
the possibility of influencing of a witness are flexible enough notions
that can cover any decision.
On the other hand, the phenomenon of corruption can be, influenced
by the number and character of indictments that deal with different kinds
of corruption, kind of punishment, and penal policy.
When talking about indictments, even though the draft of the changes
of the Criminal Law of Serbia which was prepared in April 2001 does con-
tain new acts (corruption in public procurement, corruption during pri-
vatization), the situation could be qualified as unsatisfactory. The penal
policy, having in mind the relatively small number of fully concluded pro-
ceedings, cannot be assessed. The problem obviously lies in investigating
and prosecuting.
CONCLUSION
Today corruption in Serbia is one of the largest and most difficult prob-
lems the country has inherited from Miloeviæ and his followers. Corruption
in Miloeviæs Serbia was not an accidental, and even less incidental phenom-
enon. Corruption was the very heart of that regime. It existed because the
ruler wanted it, and not because he was too weak to prevent it. 
From the institutional standpoint the basic cause of corruption in Ser-
bia was a particular institutional vacuum. Namely, institutions of the old
communist system were abandoned, and operational institutions of the
new, market system, or the institutions of political democracy were not
still formed. 
At the level of economic institutions, or of economic policy, even
thought the former regime wanted to form an impression of the existence
of great order in the society, in reality there was a lack of will to ease the
introduction of free entrepreneurship. The intent was, it seems, just the
opposite and it was reduced to keeping the number of new companies and
new economic forces constantly under direct control. Profitable business-
es were strictly reserved for the chosen political clientele. In those busi-
nesses combined entrepreneurship and common criminal activities were
present to a great extent. 
Shortly stated, state intervention, or the influence of the state in eco-
nomic dealings in Miloevics Serbia was exceptionally great  economic
freedoms were restricted. The known fact that every limitation of individ-
ual freedoms, and especially the economic freedom, simultaneously means
forming of conditions that encourage corruption has demonstrated its full
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effect in the case of Serbia. Global determinants of economic-systemic rela-
tions have generated conditions for development of corruption in Serbia.
Since the market economy did not function, or the end result was not
based on free market competition, certain social groups were inspired to
readjust the regulations (institutional framework) to their interests. This
could have been accomplished in two ways: by excluding them from the
existing rules or by readjusting of the rules to fit individual interests. 
Redistribution, which was imposed by the state as a management
model, could not be implemented transparently. This was done mostly far
away from public eyes, and it formed a strong incentive for corruption. In
other words, the positive incentives were formed and the demand grew
for corruptive behavior. The mentioned institutional framework formed
on the other side, sufficient incentive for politicians to secure positions
which posses certain economic authority, or those positions and functions
that in a relatively short period of time can be very lucratively exploited.
Since the state possessed the power of economic control it simply pulled
in politicians who were prone to corruption. In this way a respectable
supply of these services was secured. 
What finally warrants special attention is contained in the fact observed
in the implemented statistical research. It is interesting that citizens as a
basic causes of corruption in Serbia identify lawlessness and the lack of
rule of law (15 percent) and the crises of morality (17 percent), while the
economic system and meddling of the state in economic flows is given a
much smaller, almost negligible, importance. Likewise the proximity of
war and economic sanctions is not granted significant importance as caus-
es of corruption. This practically mean that citizens of Serbia in reality are
still not able to establish a correlation between characteristics of the eco-
nomic system and the existing level of corruption in Serbia, but consider it
some kind of derivative phenomenon. 
The basic political cause of corruption in Serbia, as was pointed out ear-
lier, is the very character of the former regime. Serbia was a cleptocratic
state in which institutions of the system, or their functioning, were adapt-
ed for the basic goal  maximizing of the personal wealth of the ruler. At
this point a very significant difference can be observed between the com-
munist and post communist dictators. While the communist leaders, con-
vinced in the immortality of their political project, were preoccupied with
the processes, or maximizing of current privileges, the post communist
dictator was obsessed by the maximizing of the stock of his personal
wealth. He was cynical enough to know that his political project was not
immortal (there was no project, except for the unscrupulous plunder), so
he had to secure himself for the rainy days. By irony of fate, now, when his
rainy days have arrived, seized riches are of no great aid, and it seems that
it will hold true for his family. 
For the legal system that exists in Serbia it can be said that it is compli-
cated, outdated, and at the same time over regulating and full of legal
voids, prohibitive, and unharmonized. In such a legal system, even if it was
implemented by the best of state bodies there necessarily exists legal
uncertainty. State bodies in this country, including the judiciary, however,
when talking about professional quality, and organization, and ethics, do
not deserve a passing grade. 
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Legal uncertainty, uncertainty of the outcome of a given legal proceed-
ings ant the possibility that law be differently implemented in same or
similar situations make citizens unprotected from the state. To attain a
right that belongs to him a citizen is often in a position of an appellant
whose appeal has an uncertain outcome. Then it is not strange that cor-
ruption appears as a process that will improve the attainment of rights.
Hereby, it is easier for corruption to be a way to accomplish that which is
not a legal right and to avoid a legal sanction. 
A legal system that deserves such qualifications generates therefore, the
phenomenon of corruption in all other fields, these in which the law, or a
decision or action by a certain state organ, is only one of the means for
acquiring of a goal. Corruption in education and health care, among other
things, is caused by the legally unclearly defined rights of the patients, lack
of responsibility of the medical staff, or a great deal of discretionary
authority (for example) during school and university registration and irre-
sponsibility of educators, with a feeling that the legal system is loose and
that sanctions can be avoided, influence the outspread of corruption in
this field.
Cure for corruption is in the radical and complete reform of the legal
system. The time has arrived!
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VI Effects of Corruption
KINDS OF CORRUPTION AND THEIR EFFECTS
The different kinds of corruption have different effects, as in regard to
type, also in regard to the intensity of effects. Before we commence with
the analysis of the effects of corruption in Serbia, we need to remember the
basic kinds, or aspects of corruption, already discussed in the introducto-
ry chapter of this study. 
According to the mechanism of corruption, or its economic conse-
quences, it is possible to identify several kinds (aspects) of corruption:
 Corruption which makes possible the implementing of rules (laws),
so called theft-less corruption;
 Corruption which makes possible the circumnavigating, or breaking
of rules (laws), so called corruption with theft;
 Corruption that leads to the change, or forming of new rules (laws).
The previously examined hypothetical case, or the example of
licenses for import of bananas, can be used for clarifying the listed
kinds of corruption, or the differences in motives, mechanisms, and
consequences, or the economic and social effects of different aspects
of corruption. We will continue to assume that the state policy of lim-
iting the import of bananas is based on licenses for their import. Also,
all assumptions that were used in the previous model still hold true
(see the introductory chapter). 
Corruption and implementation of rules 
If it is assumed, for example, that import licenses are issued to all inter-
ested companies that meet certain conditions, a corruption model can be
formulated that makes possible the implementation of law. Namely, gov-
ernment employees do their job inefficiently, and issuing of licenses is
running late, which endangers the business activity of those companies
that seek the named import licenses. Accordingly, a rational activity of
those companies is that they are ready to pay a certain amount of money
to be issued import licenses, or to speed up their issuing. In other words,
they are ready to, by way of corruption, pay for the issuing of a free license
for which, according to the rules, they have the full right. 
There are two possible reasons for the named behavior of govern-
ment employees. First, there is no incentive to work efficiently. Regard-
less of speed, or efficiency of their work, the salary remains the same,
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and therefore the optimization of behavior of government employees is
based on minimizing of effort (costs) for given income. Second, since they
are aware that companies are ready to pay a bribe for speeding up the issu-
ing of licenses, government employees are acting in such a way as to
increase the probability of being offered a bribe for expediting the process
of license issuing. The more they stall with issuing of licenses, the greater
the probability companies will offer a bribe. 
Even greater room for corruption of this kind is formed if the state
decides to limit the number of import licenses by issuing them in the order
that applications arrived (first come  first served). Then every import com-
pany will have an incentive to, by corrupting the government employee
issuing licenses, get on the list of importers, or to skip the line that is being
formed. 
Let us assume that the amount of corruption is 500 DEM per unit of
product (i.e. per ton of bananas). On picture 6.1. that, average, amount of
corruption is marked as the difference p* p0, and the total amount of cor-
ruption is marked by the area p0EAp*. Corruption in this case does not
lead to the change of the equilibrium quantity of the supply of bananas on
the market (Q)  this supply is determined by state intervention. Also,
there is no change in the price balance (p), the only thing that is increased
is the total cost to the company, or the increase of the cost of supply, and
the corresponding decrease of the economic profit (rent) which is seized
by the companies. The loss of the rent is fully compensated by the
increased income of the government employee, so there is only the redis-
tribution of income, or welfare. It is very important to notice that, in this
case, the allocative loss, or the loss of welfare due to unfavorable allocation
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of resources, is a consequence of state intervention on the free market, and
not of corruption. In other words, the named loss of welfare will be arrived
at regardless of the existence of corruption. Also, the change of the
amount of corruption does not influence the amount of the loss of wel-
fare. The change of the amount of corruption only influences the amount
of the rent seized by the companies  importers (Table 6.2.). Pursuant to
all that was said, we are dealing here with, regarding consequences on allo-
cation of resources, the least dangerous kind of corruption. 
A certain part of corruption registered in Serbia falls within this kind of
corruption. According to the survey results of private entrepreneurs, in
10 out of 17 offered cases (kinds) of corruption, we are dealing with cor-
ruption aimed at realizing of certain rights, or implementing of rules.
However, one should be careful when using this data, or when conclud-
ing that this is the most outspread kind of corruption in Serbia, and for
several reasons. First, for the one who is paying a bribe, the kind of cor-
ruption he is entering in is of no great consequence, so he is not interest-
ed in the typology of corruption  the private entrepreneur is interested
only to carry out the transaction successfully. Secondly, in a large number
of cases, private entrepreneurs said openly that they do not know what
kind of corruption it was, so one should be careful when dealing with
those who answered questions on the kind of corruption. Finally, psycho-
logically it is much easier for one who has paid a bribe to say that he paid
it to obtain his right. 
The named reservations in making a conclusion are indirectly support-
ed by results of the public opinion poll regarding corruption in Serbia.
Namely, only 20% of those polled believe that this kind of corruption is
the most outspread in Serbia, which contradicts the results of the survey of
private entrepreneurs. Additionally, only 9% of those polled believe that
this kind of corruption represents a social danger. Therefore, in a certain
way, or to a certain extent, there are similarities between theoretical find-
ings and the views of the local public opinion regarding the danger of this
kind of corruption. 
Therefore, in the case of corruption aimed at implementing of a rule, or
realizing of a certain right, we are dealing with the least dangerous form,
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Table 4.
Licenses for import of bananas  corruption without theft 
No state State intervention State 
intervention with no intervention
corruption with corruption
Equilibrium price 2.000 3.500 3.500
Equilibrium quantity 150 100 100
Total costs 300.000 200.000 200.000
Social welfare 337.500 225.000 225.000
Rent (total) 0 150.000 150.000
Rent of the company 0 150.000 149.999-1
Amount of corruption 0 0 1-149.999
or kind od corruption, and therefore with a kind of corruption with the
least negative effects. However, one should not have illusions that those
effects are small. They are greatest in the field of squandering of the state
and its efficiency, and especially regarding its credibility. If it is necessary
to for the realization of a certain right, guaranteed by the state, invest
money and time, then such a state is clearly not to be trusted. 
Corruption and circumnavigating of rules 
The next kind of corruption is the one that leads to circumnavigating,
or breaking of rules. Namely, every company that is importing bananas
has in interest in increasing the quantity of bananas that it is importing
(for every additionally imported banana, the profit is increased, as is the
rent it is taking). This means they have an incentive to, by corrupting of
government employees, increase the quantity of the allowed import of
bananas for their company, by which they increase the overall allowed
import quantity of bananas for the economy in general. Additionally,
companies not on the list for receiving licenses, have an economic interest
for import of bananas to be made possible for them. In other words, there
is a demand for additional import licenses, or supply for corruption that
will make possible the import of the additional quantity of bananas. If
new, illegal licenses are issued, rules are broken and the state is no more in
a position to effectively implement the rules, or laws, aimed, at least in
principle, at maximizing the welfare of its subjects.
Let us assume that, by way of corruption, importers were able to increase
the quantity of imported bananas for 25 tons. In the framework of this
model it was shown that, because of corruption, the equilibrium quantity
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of supply is increased (Q" > Q’), equilibrium price is decreasing (p"< p’),
the average profit of the importer is decreased (p" p0 < p"  p0), or the rent
he is seizing, and the welfare of the society is increasing (p"ED > p’CD) and
so is, of course, the welfare of government employees. It is interesting that
in this theoretical, or hypothetical case, corruption leads to improved allo-
cation of resources, or the increase of the overall social welfare, since by the
use of corruption the counter productive state regulation is being circum-
navigated. This only demonstrates how much totally unsuitable state inter-
vention of this type is, from the standpoint of social welfare. At a first
glance, corruption in this case is not all that bad (Table 6.2.). 
However, we should not celebrate too early. Negative effects of this kind
of corruption are long term. Namely, the state, by this kind of corruption,
is disabled in the implementing of its intervention in all cases, not only in
those cases in which such intervention is counter productive. Therefore,
the state is disabled in the implementing of any of its policies. More ever,
this kind of corruption also disables the state in the field of classic state
functions, which are not linked to intervention on the market of any sort,
like, for example, the execution of laws. Additionally there is a loss of con-
fidence in the state and its efficiency in, for example, protecting of private
property rights, which in the long run leads to pulling out, or the fleeing of
private capital, on one hand, or the decrease of the influx of private invest-
ments on the territory of such a state, on the other. This, which will be
demonstrated later, leads to a long- term decrease in the rate of economic
growth of such a country. 
According to the results of the survey of private entrepreneurs in Serbia,
they believe that a lesser part of corruption in which they take part is the
corruption by which laws are broken, or corruption that circumnavigates
the implementation of laws. Yet, they believe that the largest number of
cases of this kind of corruption is linked to the customs service and tax
administration, or the financial police. We have already mentioned that,
pertaining to this question; the results of the survey of private entrepre-
neurs should be taken with a certain dose of reservation. In contrast,
answers of those who participated in the public opinion poll demonstrate
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Table 6.2.
Licenses for import  corruption and circumnavigating of rules
No state State intervention State 
intervention with no intervention
corruption with corruption
Equilibrium price 2.000 3.500 2.750
Equilibrium quantity 150 100 125
Total costs 300.000 200.000 250.000
Social welfare 337.500 225.000 281.250
Rent 0 150.000 93.750
Rent of the company 0 150.000 93.749-1 
Amount of corruption 0 0 1-93.749
that the public believes that this kind of corruption, or corruption which
circumnavigates rules, is the most outspread kind in Serbia (46% of those
polled) and that it represents a very great social danger (31% of those
polled believe it is most dangerous). 
Corruption and the change of rules 
The two previous kinds of corruption are so -called administrative cor-
ruption, or such corruption which, based on biased decisions, disables the
full and unbiased implementation of state regulations. However, according
to its economic and social consequences, the most dangerous kind of corrup-
tion so-called political corruption. This is the kind of corruption that leads
to the change of rules, or the change or laws and bylaws in line with partial
(private) interests of corruptors. In other words, this type of corruption insti-
gates that the state intervention is formulated and implemented in line with
partial (private) interests of corruptors. Shortly, corruptors, most often the
financially strong of one society, take control of the state. In out hypothetical
case of banana import, the rational interest of each importer is that import be
even more limited, or that a new equilibrium on the market is established
which secures maximizing of the complete rent, of course under condition
that they continue to have a license for import of bananas. This means that
companies will have an incentive to by joint effort (collective action) influ-
ence the elected representatives of the populace, or the legislative authority,
so that by changing of the legislation, or rules, they limit the import of
bananas even more. Their goal is that import of bananas be limited to 75
tons, since for that quantity, in the framework of this model and its assump-
tions, there is maximizing of the rent, or of their economic profit. 
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Picture 6.3.
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The consequences of this kind of corruption is the further decrease of
the equilibrium of supply (Q" < Q’ < Q0), further increase of the equilibri-
um price (p" > p’> p0), and the increase, or maximizing of the rent
(p0EFp" > p0ACp’). Not only has the counterproductive state intervention
on the market already decreased the equilibrium scope of supply and
increased the equilibrium of the prices on the market, in regard to the
equilibrium on the free, unbound market, but this kind of corruption
leads to the strengthening of such a state intervention and intensifying of
its bad effects. With this kind of corruption we have a drastic worsening of
allocation of resources, or a significant decrease of social welfare. Namely,
corruption of this kind leads to further strengthening of counterproduc-
tive sate intervention. Corruptors want for their goals, to use the state, or
its power of coercion to force intervention on the market in order to max-
imize of their economic rent.
This kind of corruption is, according to its economic and social conse-
quences, surely the most dangerous. Namely, in this way, the state, or the
institutional framework for carrying out all economic activities, is shaped
according to special, private interests of those people who are in the aim of
promotion of their interests ready to bribe others, especially those who are
powerful, and who could be useful. In this way, the state is no longer a
public thing (Res Publica) and becomes a private playground of the
financial power brokers. Unlinked to our hypothetical example, such a
state becomes a real banana republic. 
What part of corruption in Serbia is part of this, most dangerous kind?
According to findings among the surveyed private entrepreneurs, a very
small portion of corruptionist activities in which they took part was
directed towards changing of laws, or bylaw regulations  almost never
above 10%. However, based on this finding one should not make concrete
conclusions that this kind of corruption is not outspread in Serbia. Name-
ly, the named survey includes small private entrepreneurs, who do not
have access to people who can influence the formulation and passing of
such laws, or bylaw regulations in a biased manner. This kind of corrup-
tion is reserved for the big businessmen, or those who are close to the
ruing circles (or are themselves part of those circles), and they can use
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Table 6.3.
Licenses for import  corruption which changes rules
No state State intervention State
intervention with no intervention
corruption with corruption
Equilibrium price 2.000 3.500 4.250
Equilibrium quantity 150 100 75
Total costs 300.000 200.000 150.000
Social welfare 337.500 300.000 253.125
Rent 0 150.000 168.750
Rent of the company 0 150.000 168.749-1 
Amount of corruption 0 0 1-168.749
their position to through corruption, or bribery, influence the formulating
and passing of laws and bylaw regulations, or regulations which are in
their interest. 
In contrast, the public opinion poll, or the survey of the perception of
corruption in Serbia, presents completely different results. Namely, 24%
of those polled believe that corruption aimed at changing laws and their
readjusting to private interests is the most outspread kind of corruption in
Serbia. Additionally, it is very encouraging that 44% of those polled
believe that this kind of corruption is most dangerous for the society.
Therefore, the consciousness about the great danger of this kind of cor-
ruption does exist in the public opinion of Serbia, although, obviously,
much remains to be done to increase the presence of this position. 
Therefore, it is certain that a large portion or registered corruption in
Serbia was just this kind of corruption, or corruption directed at changing
laws and other regulations. This kind of corruption in Miloevics regime
was reserved only for the selected ones  close friends of the ruler and per-
sons closest to him. Corruptors have been successful in formulating a legal
framework, or an economic system in Serbia, which was in accord with
their private interests. The very space for such changes of laws, or for exe-
cution of corruption was defined just as in any cleptocracy, by the ruler
himself. 
At the end of the examination of different kinds of corruption and their
effects we should point out the fact that the example, or the hypothetical
case of import licenses for bananas which we used during the examina-
tion, represents a typical case of counter productive state intervention.
Not only does it form fertile grounds for formation of corruption  the
state intervention of this kind, even if there was no corruption, is counter-
productive, because it decreases the social welfare. By removing of such
state intervention there is an increase of welfare of society in two basic
ways, by removing the possibility for corruption and by the very abolish-
ing of counterproductive state intervention. 
ECONOMIC CONCEQUENCES OF CORRUPTION
Economic consequences of corruption are numerous. They need to be
examined in detail. Namely, for a long time, most of all in the circles of
political scientists, like Huntington, a thesis is discussed that corruption
can be economically beneficial. Supposedly, if the public administration,
or bureaucracy, is too centralized and rigid, then it is better that it should
be unfair, then fair. Namely, then corruption will become a means for
oiling of the wheels of business, in other words, corruption under those
conditions makes the very existence of economic betterment possible. 
Such a thesis can be seductive  at least at first. The only problem is that
those who support it are in for a big disappointment, but it is very hard to
convince them ex ante, before they feel the consequences of their conge-
niality towards corruption. For this reason it is necessary to systematically
study the economic consequences of corruption, both in principal, and
those specific ones which are felt by Serbia. Those consequences can be
rendered to eventual followers of Huntingtons thesis in Serbia. 
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Allocative economic efficiency 
The previously stated theoretical models demonstrate some of possible
consequences of different types of corruption regarding allocative efficiency,
or the short- term change of social welfare. The hypothetical case that we
considered has demonstrated that the consequences of corruption or the
short- term can change of welfare can be different. The most serious conse-
quences regarding society undoubtedly have the kind of corruption that
changes the laws, or the situational framework, and leaves it as long- term,
almost lasting consequences on society. The conclusion of the analysis of
this hypothetical case is largely that all situations in which state intervention
exists, or import limitation, lead to the decrease of welfare, and that the free
functioning of the market leads to the maximization of social welfare. 
For this reason it is very significant to answer the following question.
Why does a benevolent state even introduce an import limitation? One
possible motive is the protection of domestic manufacturers, or an incen-
tive for the domestic manufacturing of the named good. In the case of
bananas and a large number of countries, like Serbia, there is no domestic
production of bananas, and this argument cannot stand. Protecting the
balance of payment position of the country, by decreasing of imports, can
be the next motive for such an intervention. This, however, can also be
accomplished by introducing high customs tariffs, which would, in addi-
tion to the decrease of import, secure certain income for the state budget.
Still, many countries, like ours (up to May 2001, when by new foreign
trade regulations the licenses for the import of almost any commodity
were lifted), keep introducing limitations of this sort. There are two possi-
ble rational explanations. First, a benevolent state does not trust its cus-
toms service, or her government employees, but thinks that, because of
ineffective customs protection, there will be an increase of import, or that
there will be no increase of budget influx. Second, a cleptocratic state
wants the maximizing of its own income, or the income of those who are
part of the plundering group, and the licenses are, in both named cases, a
better mechanism than customs. 
In the examined hypothetical case, deregulation, or abolition of state
intervention is the only convincing, or efficient strategy in fighting corrup-
tion. Deregulation removes the possibility of generation and flourishing of
corruption and necessarily increases the social welfare. It is a paradox, but
corruption has in certain cases of the mentioned state intervention had a
positive short term effect on social welfare, or it increased the short term
efficiency of allocation of resources, since it partially or even in full pre-
vented the implementation of counterproductive state intervention. 
Although, at the first glance, there are but a few cases of this sort of state
intervention, a detailed analysis of such a an intervention for many coun-
tries, and even of those most developed, not only in the economic, but also
in the institutional sense, demonstrates an almost unbelievable cases of
counterproductive state intervention. Some of them are shortly described
in the introduction of this study. 
However, the listed examples should never be generalized. There still exist
those forms of state intervention, like economic regulation of natural
monopolies, which, at least in principle, increase social welfare, and therefore
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are not to be abolished. Therefore, deregulation in those cases is not
socially justified. In those cases in particular, effects of corruption on the
efficiency of allocation of resources, or the welfare of the society, are
extremely unfavorable. Corruption adjacent to economic regulation of a
natural monopoly opens up space for monopolistic behavior of a private
entrepreneur, which causes exceptionally unfavorable consequences for
social welfare. 
Transaction costs of corruption 
The prior examination of consequences of corruption to allocative effi-
ciency, or to the short term changes of welfare during the existence of cor-
ruption, were based on an assumption that transactional costs of corrup-
tion do not exist, or that they equal to or are close to zero. Transactional
costs are those costs that have to be met for a given transaction (like cor-
ruption) to take place. If the transaction costs of corruption equal zero,
corruption represents only the transfer of welfare, or the redistribution of
the existing welfare that, by itself, does not change the overall welfare of
the society in a short run. 
The existence of transactional costs means that in corruption, or in its
execution, real resources need to be invested, which have their opportuni-
ty costs. In other words, all of those resources, if there was no corruption,
could be invested in other activities and in those that, in contrast to cor-
ruption, generate new value, or increase social welfare. Precisely those
opportunity costs for allocating of those resources represent the transac-
tion costs of corruption. Corruption is not free in this case also, there is
no free lunch. Therefore, the key question in examining the effects of cor-
ruption is what are its real transaction costs. 
Transactional costs of corruption are made up of a very large number of
costs and a significant number of these costs are rather high. This is natu-
ral, since corruption is by its nature an illegal, or hidden activity. This fact
forms the significant increase of transactional costs in two ways. 
First, since it is an illegal activity, for its implementation the legal insti-
tutions of the system in any one country do not have to be used. Namely,
corruption represents a specific contract by which both sides are obligated
to certain activities  the one corrupted, that for example, he will issue an
appropriate import license, and the corruptor that he will pay an appro-
priate amount. If there is a violation of the contract, or if any one side does
not carry out its obligation, there is no possibility of court protection of
the contractual, or affected side. The one corrupted has no incentive to
report the corruptor to the court authorities because, for example, he did
not pay him the full amount of his compensation  he, of course, does not
want to inform the authorities of the named transaction, since it is illegal,
and he a participant. Therefore, the implementation of the contract is up
to the signatories, and there exists no possibility of the institutionalized
oversight of its implementation. In other words, it is necessary to establish
an alternative manner of monitoring of implementing of a contract in cor-
ruption, and for that significant resources are needed. 
Second, as in the case of any other illegal activity, it is necessary to invest
resources so that this activity remains undiscovered. Since corruption is a
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criminal act, punishable by law in a large number of countries, it is pru-
dent, from the standpoint of participants in corruption, to develop very
good protection for conducting of this activity, which also seeks addition-
al resources. Those corrupted have to plan well the transaction itself,
removal of proof, to invisibly keep and spend money, to resolve all the list-
ed and many more problems, and all of this demands engagement of real
resources. 
Let us examine certain (surely not all) transactional costs of corruption.
First, government employees have to be found who are ready to be cor-
rupted, or the finding of the right people in the public administration,
which demands time, additional engagement of ones own people and
very careful presentation of information, so that risk would be minimized
in an attempt to corrupt government employees. Then one has to formu-
late an informal contract on corruption, or precisely define rights and
obligations of participants in corruption, and manner of the implement-
ing of the contract. In that implementation, the mechanism that verifies
the meeting of obligations (especially by the one who is corrupted), or the
manner of realizing of rights from the corruptionist contract is included.
Finally, one needs to define control mechanisms for the implementation
of that contract and allocate the resources that will serve that purpose. 
All of the mentioned makes for high transactional costs of corruption,
or high opportunity costs of resources that are used for implementing cor-
ruption. For example, as stated by Tanzi it is assessed that managers of
companies in countries with a high levels of corruption use around 20% of
their work time for negotiating of favors of corrupt government employ-
ees. This means that one fifth of work resources of this kind is allocated for
the covering of allocative costs of corruption. To this surely has to be
added the, for now unknown, part of work time which government
employees spend in negotiating corruption, instead of carrying out of
their real duty, implementing of state policy, or regulations. 
Results of the survey of private entrepreneurs in Serbia have shown that
around one third (34%) of those polled do not think that transactional
costs exist which are covered by them, in the sense that not even one part
of their work time is spent on implementing corruption (although it takes
place), and around one in five (21%) state that they spend less then 1% of
their work time. However, around one quarter (24%) of those polled cal-
culate that up to 25% of their work time is used for dealing with corrup-
tion or its implementation, and almost 5% of those polled state that for
dealing with corruption they use up more then 25% of their work time.
These results demonstrate several important distinctions of transaction
costs of corruption in Serbia. First, the working time that private entrepre-
neurs spend in implementing corruption varies significantly, but can gen-
erally be assessed as rather large. Second, the variations can possibly be
explained by the fact that some private entrepreneurs are attempting to in
every way avoid corruption, or paying of bribes. Such entrepreneurs spend
a significant amount of time searching for a way to avoid paying of bribes,
and that represents significant costs that corruption imposes on the pri-
vate entrepreneurs. If an individual entrepreneur will spend his work time
searching for a way to avoid paying of a bribe depends, above all, on the
amount of that bribe, so it can be assumed that the amount of the bribe
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differs from one entrepreneur to the other, most likely depending on the
business activity he is engaged in. 
Results of the survey of private entrepreneurs shows that their total
expense for corruption varies between 1 and 10% of their overall income.
It is likely that the variations of that participation leads to a variation of
time spent on dealing with corruption, or, especially, dealing with ways to
avoid paying corruption. Of course, the larger the amount of a bribe to be
paid, the larger the incentive to private entrepreneurs to invest effort
(their work time) to find a way to avoid that payment. Regardless of
motives of private entrepreneurs, it is certain that their work time that is
not spent in manufacturing activities, or activities which are generating
new value, possibly represents the most significant transactional cost of
corruption, and survey results show that this cost in Serbia is rather high. 
When examining the size of transactions costs of corruption, or the
effects of those costs on social welfare, it is necessary to differentiate
between centralized and decentralized corruption. Centralized corruption
is, theoretically, a more suitable solution from the standpoint of amounts
of transactional costs. Namely, in a case of full centralization, there is only
one contract on corruption, or only one transaction, and therefore the
overall transactional costs are lowest. To, in line with our example, acquire
an import license for bananas, only one contract on corruption is needed
with the authorized government employee or, possibly, politician, for
example, a minister  the rest is routine. Decentralized corruption, or the
increasing of its dispersion, increases the number of needed contracts on
corruption, or the number of transactions, and therefore unavoidably
increases the overall transaction costs. By extreme dispersion, of by decen-
tralization of corruption (everyone seeks his part of the cake), we arrive at
an enormous increase in overall transaction costs of corruption, which
means that a large part of resources of one society will be allocated in
unproductive activities, or activities directed at the redistribution of wel-
fare, and not generating of new value. Centralized corruption represents
in a specific way a good thing in a bad situation. First, it generates smaller
transaction costs. Second, it is relatively easier to fight centralized corrup-
tion. Of course a precondition for this is strong political will. The problem
is that in conditions of centralized corruption this will, for understandable
reasons, can often be lacking. 
The most appropriate measurement (approximation) of the degree of
dispersion of corruption in a society is the number of places a bribe needs
to be paid for acquiring the same service. The results of the survey of pri-
vate entrepreneurs in Serbia demonstrate that almost 65% of those sur-
veyed were forced to pay two or more times. However, of the listed 65%
responses, the frequency of double, or multiple payments, varies signifi-
cantly, so that around 30% named that frequency as always, usually, or
often. In contrast, according to results of the public opinion survey, expe-
riences of the citizens of are somewhat different. From those who had
experience with corruption, 63% have made the same corruptionist pay-
ment in only one place, 26% in two places, and 15% in three or more
places. Therefore, it is as if there exist two different levels of dispersion, or
centralization of corruption in Serbia. While the corruption facing the pri-
vate entrepreneurs is rather dispersed, corruption facing the citizens of
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Serbia is rather centralized. Without additional research it is not possible
to offer a convincing explanation for these, at first glance, contradictory
results. However, it is very significant to point out to the fact that the dis-
persion of corruption in the case of private entrepreneurs is an indirect
confirmation of the high transaction costs of corruption, or the high par-
ticipation of work time that private entrepreneurs spend in dealing with
corruption. 
An additional question arises if this type of market structure of corrup-
tion is in accordance with our basic hypothesis that Serbia used to be ruled
by a cleptocracy, which, by definition, means centralized corruption? In
other words, can previously stated results be interpreted as an empirical
base for rejecting the hypothesis? The answer is a clear  no, not according
to any one factor. Namely, cleptocracy means the centralization of corrup-
tion in the sense of its planning and general implementation, but the con-
crete execution of corruption in the framework of cleptocracy does not
have to be unavoidably centralized. This, above all, depends on a large
number of factors, and one of these factors is the number of people on the
supply side of corruption (or government employees) that are included in
cleptocratic corruption. It seems that in Serbia as part of cleptocracy, there
was a division of two market structures, or industrial organizations of cor-
ruption. One is the one pertaining to corruption services for the economy,
or for entrepreneurs that is relatively dispersed, and the other is the one
pertaining to corruption services for citizens and which is relatively cen-
tralized. Based on this it follows that transaction costs of corruption are
larger in the case of corruption for private entrepreneurs. This, however,
has an influence on citizens, or consumers, since the private entrepreneurs
certainly build into the price of their product a very high portion of trans-
action costs, and in this way transfer them to the citizens. 
Transaction costs of corruption depend also on the concrete costs for
implementing of this kind of contract, and those costs depend on the
probability that the corruption contract will be successfully implemented.
One can indirectly arrive at that possibility based on the data on the rela-
tive number of concluded and implemented corruption contracts. The
results of the survey of private entrepreneurs show that they were, rarely
or never in only 5% of cases left without the agreed on and paid service.
This happened in 12% of cases, while all others received their paid corrup-
tionist service (always, usually, and often). In other words, there is a very
high probability that the paid service will be received. This holds true to an
even larger extent for corruption services pertaining to citizens. According
to results of our public opinion, 90% of citizens of Serbia that were in a
position to pay a bribe received the service they sought from the corrupt
government employee, or that service for which they paid for by a bribe.
At first, it seems that transaction costs of implementing of an corruption
contract are relatively small, since the probability of its implementing is
rather high. However, this can also be misleading. Namely, it is fully possi-
ble that this high probability is only a result of high transactional costs, or
large resources that are invested in the process of implementing of the cor-
ruption contract. 
Regardless of the mentioned controversy, all of the listed results
demonstrate that in Serbia transaction costs are rather high and that they
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make up a very high part of overall costs that are generated by corruption.
Those transaction costs have a highly unfavorable consequence on the
allocation of resources and, accordingly, on the change of the social wel-
fare. Transaction costs of corruption represent, in the short run, probably
the greatest evil caused by corruption. 
Long-term effects of corruption on welfare 
According to the mentioned characteristics, or the size of transaction
costs, corruption is very similar to organized crime, because both activities
are illegal (relation of corruption and organized crime will be discussed
later). For this reason neither can use the legal institutions of the system,
and have to conceal their activities. One common characteristic of these
activities is exceptionally important. Both of these activities deal with the
redistribution of welfare, and not its creating. No additional value, or new
welfare is generated by these activities. For these reasons both of these
activities are destructive for every society. 
In examining the phenomenon of organized crime, Fiorentini and
Peltzman point to the fact that in every society there are two kinds of
activities: manufacturing, which generate, or increase the overall welfare
of the society and redistribution (like organized crime and corruption),
which only redistribute the existing welfare. The key question for the
future of every society is: how are the available resources allocated
between the two named groups of activities? If the largest part of
resources is allocated in manufacturing activities, new value will be
formed increasing the welfare of the society. Such a society has a future. If
the greatest part of resources is allocated in the redistribution activities,
no new value will be formed, or there will be no new welfare. There will
be only one dirty pond with crocodiles in it. The water level in the pond
will be ever lower, and crocodiles will become ever more aggressive, spoils
will be increasingly fewer, and at the end the pond will go dry. There will
be no more pond, no more crocodiles, nor other inhabitants of the pond.
Societies that have fallen deep into corruption and organized crime have
no future  they will implode. 
How will the resources, or in what proportion, be allocated between the
two listed activities depends on a large number of factors. However, the key
factor is the institutional framework, or the extent to which that framework
influences the productivity of resources in these activities. Namely, in this
way the institutional framework forms incentives for economic subjects to
allocate their resources in one of these activities. Reasons for the high eco-
nomic, or manufacturing efficiency of certain societies are to be sought in
the institutional framework that stimulated the allocation of resources in
manufacturing activities and their efficient use in that regard. The low eco-
nomic efficiency of other societies should not only be explained by insuffi-
cient resources they have at their disposal, but also by the institutional
framework which does not stimulate allocation of resources in manufac-
turing, but in redistribution. The most dangerous factors that those who
have already invested their resources in redistributive activities, or have
specialized in those activities, like organized crime or corruption, want to
influence further changes of the institutional framework in their favor, so
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that they can increase the productivity of their already invested resources
even more. This leads to further moving of resources from productive into
non-productive activities  a certain road to a demise of society. Serbia had
in the late 1990s already taken to that road. 
This initiates the discussion of the long-range effects of corruption. Key
questions connected to the long-range effects of corruption are: how to
attract new resources and secure their efficient allocation? In other words,
how to secure sustainable economic growth and long-term increase of
social welfare, or long term economic welfare of the country?
Empirical research has without a doubt shown that countries in which a
higher level of corruption was registered have lower rates of economic
growth. There are a few reasons for these consequences of corruption or,
several mechanisms for the working out of the mentioned relationship.
The first mechanism has been already examined, and deals with the alter-
native allocation of resources to manufacturing and redistributive activi-
ties. The situation regarding this dilemma in Serbia can be seen from the
aspiration of the youth concerning their professional careers. One has to
hope that political changes in the second half of 2000 will lead to the
change of the social system of values which was inherited from Miloeviæs
Serbia and according to which criminals were respected citizens, and
turbo-folk singers with no musical talent were respected citizens also,
almost considered as artists. 
The second mechanism pertains to direct foreign investments. Namely,
because of the lack of capital in many countries, the basic factor of their
economic growth is represented by direct foreign investments. The global-
ization process has already lead to establishment of strong ties between
direct foreign investments and the rate of growth for a large number of
countries, for almost all countries except those most developed. If there is
a high level of corruption in a certain country, foreign investors hesitate in
realizing their investments, or there is a decrease of the possibility for real-
ization of those investments. At that, the amount to be paid for corruption
in the realizing of those investments, although it increases the costs, is not
of decisive importance. Far more important is the fact that a high level of
corruption, or its outspread, increases the uncertainty, or risk the investor
is faced with, not only during the investment itself, but also during the
complete economic lifecycle of the project he is investing in. The increased
risk increases risk premiums, which increases the price of the capital paid
by the investor. Therefore, a higher expected profit rate is needed for the
project he is investing in. If, because of corruption in a certain country, the
price of capital goes up, it is possible that the expected profit rate is not
sufficient to cover that price. Since foreign direct investors minimize the
differences between the expected rate of return (profit rate) and the price
of capital which they pay, they will chose a countries with a low risk of
investment (low price of capital), so that countries with the high level of
corruption remain outside of the flows of foreign direct investments,
which brings down the rate of their economic growth. Moreover, since the
large and high quality investors have an exceptional aversion towards risk,
in the highly corrupt countries speculative capital will appear, or investors
of dubious reputation, or quality. This additionally brings down the rate
of economic growth in highly corrupted countries. 
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Besides direct foreign investments, corruption influences the securing
of funds on the international capital market, or influences the acquisition
of credits on this market. Access to the international capital market is ben-
eficial for all countries in which supply of capital is scarce. In that way the
local, rather high interest rate (consequence of the scarcity of capital) is
decreased, which means more investments, or a higher rate of economic
growth. However, a high level of corruption increases the risk of investing
capital in a given country, which leads to the increase of the risk premium
payment of which is demanded by the creditor. This unavoidably leads to
the raise of the equilibrium interest rate for which capital can be borrowed
on the international market. The increase of the equilibrium interest rate
unavoidably decreases the scope of investments, and in this way decreases
the rate of economic growth of subject country. 
To what extent did the observed corruption in Serbia in the past decade
influence the economic growth of the country, or the long- term change of
the social welfare? This question can be divided into two: one about the
influence of corruption on direct foreign investments, and the other on the
appearing of Serbia on the international market of capital. As far as direct
foreign investments are concerned, they did not come to Serbia in the past
ten years for a number of reasons. Some of them are formal (ban on invest-
ment as part of the politically motivated sanctions against the country),
some of them essential (exceptionally high investment risk, especially the
so called noncommercial, or political risk). Thus, inherent political insta-
bility, followed by wars, changes of borders, and other extraordinary events
have formed such risk for foreign direct investments that there was not a
high enough profit rate which could compensate such risk. In such condi-
tions, corruption simply was not relevant for investors. In other words,
they decided not to invest their capital long before examining the risk per-
taining to corruption. It is ironic, but the only significant foreign direct
investment in Serbia during 1990s, the investment of Italian STET and
Greek OTE, was maybe made possible with the aid of corruption. 
As far as the presence on the international market of capital is con-
cerned, Serbia, or FR Yugoslavia is a highly indebted country, so in the
past ten years it did not have access to the international market of capital.
It still does not have access at this moment, until it regulates its existing
obligations to international creditors. Only when our existing obligations
towards foreign creditors are regulated, our country will be able to be
present on that market. Only then, based on the premiums for risk it will
be paying, it will receive the real information on the effects of local cor-
ruption on the risk premium which we have to pay, or on the full interest
rate, and therefore on the rate of economic growth of our country. This is
still ahead in the future. 
Finally, we conclude the examination of the long-term economic effects
of corruption by examining the link between corruption and organized
crime. Although there are significant differences among certain defini-
tions of organized crime, it is clear that organized crime is based on the
strong link between crime and the state, or in the taking over of certain
state functions (above all, the implementing of laws) by organized crime.
Corruption represents the basic mechanism for this transfer, or taking
over of these functions. One is dealing with, above all, with the corruption
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of the police, or the judiciary authority of the state. Organized crime is
later present as the new state, or a state within a state, which has the
monopoly on the use of force, or implementing of its laws in a certain por-
tion of society. In normal circumstances, without corruption there is no
organized crime.
Accordingly, the interest of organized crime in Serbia, as in any other
country, is for corruption to be increased and to through such an
increased corruption take over ever more state functions, so to increase its
power and social influence. The growth of corruption in society leads to
the forming of preconditions for the growth of the role of organized
crime. This undermines the basic role of the state, or the basic task of the
state, and that is the implementing of laws. The complete society becomes
an unorganized framework in which no one has an incentive to produc-
tively allocate his resources. Society becomes the already mentioned pond
with crocodiles. If a turnaround does not happen, such a society is des-
tined for obliteration  the pond will unavoidably dry out. 
SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CORRUPTION
Poverty, to a larger or lesser degree, is almost a general determinant of
todays Serbia and larger part of South East Europe. The fall of the stan-
dard of living in the majority of these countries was drastic, and caused,
above all, by dramatic political events in the last decade of the past centu-
ry, which have, with the customary transition recession, lead to a drastic
fall of the national product, which caused a great decrease of real wages.
Abrupt poverty caused a number of problems, starting with personal and
family, to the frustration of complete social groups. Many members of
yesterdays, communist nomenclatures and public services, which used to
belong to the middle class, have quickly grown poor and fallen on the hier-
archical scale of position, power, and material standards. A consequence
of this fall was the decrease of their prestige. The fall of the standard of liv-
ing, combined with the increased insecurity and uncertainty of their posi-
tions, destroyed their former system of values. For many individuals and
families things were turned up side down They have accepted with diffi-
culty the described new circumstances, especially if one has in mind that
their former (before transition) standard of living was not based on their
work, but exclusively on the position which they had in the hierarchical
structure of the nomenclature. 
At the same time in Serbia, after fifty years of restriction, based on com-
munist ideology, there is development of the private sector. Regardless of a
number of unfavorable circumstances, the newly formed private sector
began, step by step, to accumulate significant amounts of financial
resources. This is supported by the fact that the participation of the private
sector in the national product of Serbia is almost 40%. The development of
the private sector leads to the increase of the material position of its mem-
bers. Because of the transfer of power from the social into the private sec-
tor there is a transfer of members of the nomenclature into the class of pri-
vate businessmen. In spite of the fact that those same members of the com-
munist nomenclature were for fifty years the most ardent and ideological
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opponents of private property and of the market. The described process
causes social division. And thus is formed, on one hand, a small class of the
rich, most often members of yesterdays communist nomenclature, and on
the other hand, great masses of the impoverished populace. This is an addi-
tional reason for destruction of the prior value system.
How acute is the problem of poverty in Serbia is best illustrated by the
results of our survey. As the three most important problems facing Ser-
bian society, from ten offered, those surveyed name poverty, crime, and
political instability. If we add the answers of the first and second rank1,
then poverty as the greatest problem is perceived by 48,1%, crime by
35,0% and political instability by 31,0% of those polled. At that those
less educated perceive poverty somewhat more and, those more educat-
ed political instability. From this it is more then clear that poverty, after
a ten-year period of economic regression, is one of the key problems of
Serbian society. 
As the key problem that pertains to them personally those polled also
name poverty. Namely, as the first problem it is named by almost one half
(48,0%) of citizens, and as the second problems by almost one in five
(18,1%). On the second place as their personal problem is unemployment:
first rank 9,1% and second rank 14,1%. As the third problem those polled
list the bad economic situation: first rank 8,5% and second rank 9,7%. In
conclusion, according to the beliefs of citizens, poverty dominates as the
problem of the majority of citizens of Serbia, and the next two, from ten
offered alternatives, are those which directly or indirectly cause poverty:
unemployment and a poor economy. 
The relationship between corruption and poverty is doubtlessly very
complicated and multi-dimensional. Some of those relations are mutual,
some are of lesser, and some of greater intensity. Very often is the phe-
nomenon of poverty is mentioned as one of the key causes of corruption.
In is interesting that the public opinion poll in Serbia shows that a large
part of the populace perceives poverty as the key factor of corruption in
Serbia. However, for us it is much more interesting to examine (at this
juncture) the consequences that corruption in Serbia has on poverty. 
In examining economic consequences of corruption, or consequences
on the allocation of resources (for the short term change of welfare) it was
seen that corruption generates significant transactional costs, which to a
great extent are transferred to the consumers, of citizens of one country.
Simply, the prices of many commodities are higher, since the manufactur-
ers, or importers and vendors to the greatest extent transfer onto the end
user, or consumer the amount that they have paid for corruption. There-
fore, there is a decrease in the real buying power of the population, since,
because of corruption, the prices of commodities are rising. The price
increase is, of course, the same for all consumers. However, this leads to
the increase of economic inequality, or social differences. The same
increase of prices of one item from the consumer basket leads to different
relative decrease of the buying power of those rich and those poor, and in
that way it leads to the increase of economic inequalities. Therefore, cor-
ruption of this kind leads also to the factual redistribution of income from
1 In the survey it was foreseen to rank, from ten offered, two according to importance.
the poor towards the rich, or to the increase of the economic inequalities
in a society. In other words, the poor will become even poorer. 
In the long run, it was shown that corruption decreases the rate of eco-
nomic growth of a country, or decreases the long- term growth of social
welfare. In that way it decreases the possibility that by the growth of
national product there will be an alleviating of the problem of poverty,
regardless of the given distribution of income, or welfare. The smaller the
cake that is being divided, the smaller its pieces, regardless of how it is
divided. 
It is of great importance that corruption restrains, or disables state
intervention in the redistribution of income, or state aid to the poorest
groups. For example, because of the decrease of fiscal revenues caused by
corruption, the state is forced to decrease budgetary expenditures, most
often, those items slated for the poorest parts of the population. This can
be illustrated by the example that the previous (socialist) authorities in
Serbia were two years late in the payments of child support. If the fiscal
expenditures are not decreased, then they are covered by a general tax 
inflation, which affects the poorest groups in society the most. In this way
a redistribution is carried out again from the poor towards the rich, or
there is an increase of economic inequality. 
Finally, with the increase of poverty there is an increase of social anomy.
Simultaneously, poverty and social anomy directly influence the increase
of the level of accessibility to corruption. This means that poverty directly
influences the expansion of corruption among public servants. Thus we
reach the spellbound spiral in which one factor has an influence on the
other: poverty on corruption, anomy on corruption, and corruption on
poverty and anomy. Every subsequent circle of the spiral is greater. 
CONCLUSION
The consequences of corruption, or its economic and social effects, are
exceptionally serious for any society. The gravity of consequences of cor-
ruption in any one society will depend on a larger number of factors. One
is, of course, the outspread of corruption  the more corruption, the worse
it is. Both of our empirical surveys (public opinion poll and the survey of
private entrepreneurs) have directly indicated that corruption in Serbia is
very outspread. One should have no illusions concerning this issue. We
should not even compare it with other countries  certain results from our
survey for Serbia are really to be very concerned about. 
Next, consequences of corruption depend to a great extent on the type
of corruption that dominates in a given country. At that the most danger-
ous corruption is the one that makes possible the passing and implement-
ing of laws and other regulations according to partial (private) interests of
corruptors. The survey has shown that this type of corruption in Serbia is
more then significantly represented. Cleptocracy in which we used to live
has made it possible for politically and economically powerful business
people of the new kind to influence the legal framework, or the economic
system, and to accommodate it to their needs  maximizing of rent and
personal wealth. 
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Transactional costs of corruption directly decrease social welfare. The
greater those transactional costs, the smaller social welfare. Our research
has shown that in Serbia significant transactional costs exist, which is
above all shown in the large amount of work time that private entrepre-
neurs spend dealing with corruption. All the resources used in the imple-
menting of corruption cannot be used anywhere else  for generating new
value and increasing of welfare. 
It was shown also that corruption has a negative influence on poverty,
or that one of its consequences is that the poor become even poorer, or
that economic inequalities in a society are increased. 
Long-term consequences of corruption are the worst for a society. At
certain points in time societies are at turning points. Serbia at this time can
choose between a decisive turnaround towards a productive society,
which generates new value, or it can remain on the same path on which
the country was lead by the previous regime the path of corruption and
organized crime.
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VII The Anti-Corruption Strategy
Corruption in Serbia is very widely spread and it represents a great
social evil. Its roots are deep, and its claws have a hold on practically every
field of society. 
The great task of reconstructing Serbia, made possible by the political
changes accomplished in September of 2000, assumes a radical break with
the past, with the ways of functioning of the political, economic, and social
life, with a change of behavior of individuals and their organizations. And
above all else, the change of the state. 
One of the important elements of reconstruction is the battle
against corruption. We knew about it, have talked about it, and now
is the time to fight it, knowing that in that fight there are no short
cuts, not easy solutions. But, this battle is worth the effort, because
corruption does not represent a threat only to human freedom and
rights and democratic institutions, but also to economic progress and
the decrease of poverty. 
The battle against corruption must not be a one-time affair or a cam-
paign, but constant effort, focused on maintaining the accomplished
results and attaining of new ones. It is part of one larger strategy  the
strategy of creating of efficient and honest government. 
The new government of Serbia has several times stated its intent to
severely and seriously deal with corruption, which the Prime Minister, in
his inaugural speech, named as one of the priorities of this government
and the first results are: several people were arrested and charged with cor-
ruption, or the misuse of public office; a comission was formed to investi-
gate misuses in economy and financial transactions, its role is to investi-
gate the corruption of the previous regime; prepared and forwarded to the
Serbian Assembly are drafts of the Resolution on Struggle Against Corrup-
tion and the Tax on Windfall Gain Act; in the draft of the new Penal Code
one segment pertains to sanctioning of corruption, and the like. Still, these
are only first steps on a long road.
Serbia needs an all encompassing anti-corruption strategy, based on the
dedication of the political leadership of the country to fight corruption,
reform of institutions with a goal of prevention, passing of the anti-cor-
ruption legislation, implementing of laws, and a partnership between the
state and the civil society. The most rapid road to failure is the lack of
energy of the political leadership of the country, excess influence of the
inherited bureaucratic structures, slow and uncoordinated reforms, focus
on small corruption (while ignoring the large), and the founding of the
anti-corruption battle on activities of political leaders, in place of institu-
tions which will last longer.
171
BASIC STRATEGIES
Principles 
Stamping out corruption in Serbia should not deal with external mani-
festations and symptoms of the disease, but must be based on the knowl-
edge of its basic causes. The causes of corruption in Serbia are institution-
al, or they result from state institutions, as noted at length in previous
chapters. When a state official or servant:
 has wide freedom of decision making,
 is not held accountable by the public,
 has no motive to work fairly, 
corruption is unavoidable. 
To the institutional causes of corruption one can also add social cir-
cumstances, although not as a cause, but as a factor which makes corrup-
tion easier, or the battle against it harder. In the past ten years, among cit-
izens of Serbia a certain atmosphere of tolerance towards corruption was
formed: it is, often, considered a necessary evil, the only way to get a cer-
tain job done, it is not even condemned strongly enough. Such perception
of corruption was influenced by poverty, wars, personal loyalty to political
leaders in political parties, low legitimacy of authorities (because they were
repressive, inefficient, and did not deliver public goods). Additionally, the
previous regime largely succeeded in representing its corruption as some-
thing unavoidable and it tried to convince the citizens of Serbia that there
is no other way to do things at times of war and sanctions. More generally,
the political process was rotten, and the rule of law was practically banned;
laws were implemented selectively, according to wishes of the authorities.
When the highest authorities break their own laws, then the citizens do
not feel obligated to abide by them.
With the fall of the previous regime the possibility is most likely
annulled for an organized, centralized corruption at the highest level, like
the one that was present in the previous period. With the development of
democracy and winning of freedom, it is less than likely that anyone will
be in a position to operate a centralized organization whose basic task will
be defending his own political power and attaining of personal wealth by
misuse of office, or corruption whose important goal is attaining of loyal
supporters for the purpose of remaining in power. In the future the game
will most likely be the standard, decentralized corruption, although not
only at the lower levels (with employees), but also with possible high cor-
ruption, at high state positions. It is not likely that the patron-client sys-
tem will be developed, in which one advances by loyalty to those who are
superior, at the expense of legality.
In the institutional sense, the three basic directions in the battle against
corruption are:
 reducing the role of the state, by decreasing its discretionary power,
which reduces the scope of its activity which can be contaminated by
corruption; this reduction of the role of the state can be carried out
either by deregulation (liberalization), or by introducing automatic
rules; deregulation means lifting of regulations from a certain activi-
ty and leaving to the private decision makers the right to freely decide
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about that activity, and a good example is the recent banning of
licenses and other administrative limitations in foreign trade and the
liberalization of trade in the sense that everyone can freely import
and export goods and services, of course along with the payment of
customs tariffs; in state affairs where deregulation is not possible, it is
needed to establish, to the greatest extent, automatism of decisions
through prescribing of conditions which need to be met when apply-
ing, so that meeting of a criteria is the base for the making of a deci-
sion, and not the free will or assessment of opportunity by a govern-
ment employee;
 accountability means an obligation of government bodies and
employees to inform and report on their work to citizens, and the
right of citizens to take action against those officials whose behavior
they do not find satisfactory; the most important guarantee for the
responsibility of state officials and government in full is the right of
citizens to change the authorities by elections, punishing them for
bad behavior and misuses, and corruption in general; for citizens to
be able to judge the work of state officials it is necessary to provide
transparency, or public oversight of the work of officials trough, for
example, open sessions of the assembly and the government for the
media, mandatory publishing of reports on work of government
bodies, and the like; an especially important role should be the
assembly supervision of the work of executive organs;
 incentive structure of people who execute state functions represents
an important element of corruption, because it is the basis of the cost-
benefit calculation by an individual; on one hand, the possibility that
by taking a bribe one can secure a pleasant life is surely a strong incen-
tive towards corruption, but an appropriate policy can influence the
costs of corruption for an individual and destimulate bad behavior;
examples of such policies are the increase of previously miserable
salaries of government employees, regular career advancement, a
combination of strong supervision and effective punishment, devel-
opment of ethic norms and the feeling of public service, personal
example by management and the like; the goal of these measures is
that the combination little risk, large gain for the government
employee be changed into great risk, little gain; a special signifi-
cance has the regulating of the conflicts of interests (situations in
which an official has a significant amount of personal interest linked
to official businesses that he can influence for personal gains); since in
Serbia there is no sufficient understanding of the depth of this prob-
lem, a more detailed legislative regulation is needed.
In addition to the institutional changes, which we will discuss more,
the anti-corruption battle must make an effort to change the position of
the public towards corruption, or to influence that it be changed from
mildly negative towards very negative. The basic erroneous attitude of
many citizens is that corruption represents a simple and ordinary redis-
tribution of income between the citizens (or companies) and a govern-
ment employee, and that there are no negative economic and social
effects; in other words, proceeds believe that for society it is irrelevant
who will have the money in question, which is totally wrong. Therefore it
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is necessary to constantly point out the negative social, economic, and
political effects of corruption, or the price, which Serbia pays for this phe-
nomenon. The increase of the consciousness about these, social costs of
corruption, or their exceptionally negative effects for the society, should
lead to the change of the environment in which corruption takes place, to
growing of hostility towards corruption and to public demand for
reforms so that it can be prevented. The understanding of corruption and
its negative consequences can be influenced in several ways: by media
campaigns, investigative journalism, civic society organizations, semi-
nars, lectures, and other ways.
The most important element of the anti-corruption battle is political
will, or the desire of authorities to really fight corruption. That political
will should be and has to be influenced by the public, by applying constant
pressure on authorities and political parties. Namely, if there is no politi-
cal will, or not to the sufficient extent, then the fight against corruption
cannot accomplish sufficient results, but will be scaled down to a few
attractive court processes and external manifestations and declarations,
like a few fiery and empty political speeches, and will be without real
results. One should not follow the example of Kenya, at the moment when
the International Monetary Fund held back a loan because of significant
corruption: the state prosecutor issued a statement literally saying that the
Government has this morning established an anti-corruption unit to
oversee the work of the anti-corruption committee, which follows the
action of the anti-corruption working group, which was previously estab-
lished to investigate the working of the governments ad hoc committee,
formed earlier this year to investigate the problem of corruption of high
style among corrupt government officials (1997). Corruption in this way
cannot be wiped out.
Serbia does not need to be told by the international community, or
international financial institutions what needs to be done with the problem
of corruption  we should know this by ourselves and do so because the
battle against corruption is one of the key national interests of Serbia. In
other words, we need to fight corruption for ourselves and because of our
interests, and not to meet the demands of the international community. 
Politics and the struggle against corruption 
In Serbia the sphere of politics was the most significant generator of
corruption in the previous period, and at that not only through restrictive
legislation and lack of interest toward good operations of government,
but, above all, through a centralized system of corruption (cleptocracy)
aimed towards both acquiring of personal wealth by members of the
nomenclature, and towards manufacturing of loyalty of individuals and
lower levels of authorities through their inclusion in a broad system of
corruption.
The previous regime was irresponsible, both towards its electorate, and
towards the law. It usually won elections by electoral fraud and media
manipulation, while it misused laws or simply broke them. It controlled
the legislative, executive, and judicial authority, and made impossible the
oversight through the division of power.
The downfall of the previous regime expanded the field of political free-
dom and opened a road towards democracy. Both will be protected the
best by good institutions and responsible government, and not by trust in
the good intentions of the new generation of politicians.
There are two basic methods, which increase the responsibility of gov-
ernment bodies and officials and influence their behavior: the first is polit-
ical competition, and the second supervision by the public. 
Political competition influences the everyday work of the officials
through the pressure brought by the approaching elections and the need
of the ruling party (or coalition) to go before the voters with a convincing
balance sheet. When elections are free, then the government answers to
the voting public and loses elections if its guilt is great and obvious. The
voters then punish the government for failures and bad management,
including corruption, which becomes an issue in the election campaign.
In all elections in Serbia from 1990 to the present corruption did not
represent an important issue, which was natural having in mind the polit-
ical situation in the country and the region. However, this should not
remain so. With the calming of political passions, importance will be
gained by the day-to-day issues, among which corruption takes a signif-
icant place. Citizens will have ever less understanding for weaknesses of
the state organs and individuals in them.
Since political competition increases the level of responsibility of politi-
cians, for Serbia it is important to construct a stable political order based
on few large parties, supported by wide public support. A large number of
small parties make the political system fragmented and unstable, which
decreases the legitimacy of political institutions and leads to increased rad-
icalism of political conditions. A smaller number of larger parties always
aim at the average, moderate voter and for this reason are focused on the
center of the political spectrum. Unfortunately, Serbia is at present mov-
ing away from the ideal. Small, sometimes marginal parties are growing
stronger now, using, and even misusing their participation in the victori-
ous DOS and are winning over citizens by offering positions in the newly
won authority in exchange for the joining of the party. This is corruption
in action. Serbia, therefore, needs a more mature political scene and
enlargement of parties  either by their unification, or by holding of com-
petitive elections.
An especially important aspect of the functioning of political parties and
party activities, but also of politicians individually, is their financing and
covering of costs of election campaigns. Experiences of developed countries
clearly demonstrate that corruption, to a large extent, is linked with financ-
ing of election campaigns, and not only to direct receiving of bribes by
politicians. In Serbia corruption was also linked to parties, both in financ-
ing of election campaigns, and with personal interests of party members.
Besides the parties of the former regime, certain democratic parties from
DOS have, more or less, been a part of the circle of corruption.
By appropriate legislation and intensified oversight of the financing of
parties it is necessary to secure the following:
 transparency and legality of funding, in such a way that the legal fund-
ing can be followed through valid documents and be made public,
while prosecuting any informal funding without paper traces (like
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cash donations and the like); in Serbia, there were many harsh words
said during the political struggle, but financing of parties did not rep-
resent a political issue during the previous decade, as if a (silent)
agreement was reached between parties on not attacking each other;
 state funding of parties to a certain extent, since the party activities, in
spite of all shortcomings, are still things of common interest, and
because competition brings solutions which are less bad; state financ-
ing reduces the need for private sources of financing, which can be
based on dubious motives; the existing Serbian legislation is obvious-
ly not a good one, and it is necessary to carry out the old intent of
DOS and pass a new one;
 limiting the level of expenditures is an additional possibility; by doing
so it would be attempted to make politics inexpensive, which would,
again, lead to a decrease of corruption in politics; on the other hand,
if this limitation becomes a regulation, it would be in conflict with
political freedoms and the right of every person to by the use of his
funds backs the ideas he supports; it is possible to additionally
expand the free propaganda time for relevant political parties avail-
able on the state TV network, which would decrease the need to col-
lect financial funds;
 limiting the right to granting donations; granting of donations by state
and private companies should be made illegal, as it was done in some
countries; this would prevent the most direct linkage of parties and
private interests; it is possible to forbid the financing of parties from
abroad, because this too can be a way to circumnavigate the rules;
 ban the use of the state for party purposes; parties in power should not
use state money and property (cars, offices, ect.) for party purposes.
Transparency and public control of the work of officials represents
both an element or democracy, and its supplement. Under the previous
regime there was almost no public control over the activity of the regime,
and all-important decisions were made in secret and in a very small circle
of people. The rest was propaganda. 
Public control over the work of politicians and government employees
was shown to be in many countries an exceptionally important tool not
only in fighting corruption, but also for attaining good governance in gen-
eral. Transparency of public affairs can be increased in numerous ways:
opening up of the sessions of assemblies, the government, executive coun-
cils, and courts for the public; publishing the voting records of representa-
tives and delegates, publishing of annual reports of state bodies and court
rulings, etc. In this way, with the help of the media, the pressure is
increased on the officials and their potential corruptionist activity is made
more difficult. Of course, the penal policy remains as the last resort.
Special importance is affixed to regulating conflicts of interests, or situ-
ations in which an official possesses such (substantial) personal interests
linked with the official activities that he can, or it seems that he can, influ-
ence his personal gains by carrying out those official activities. In Serbia
the sufficient understanding of the depth of this problem does not exist,
not in the public, nor among the members of the political elite  either
former, or present. Many do not understand the lack of ethics in exerting
influence from a public office onto a beneficial outcome of a personal
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business, nor do they link it to the idea of corruption. Numerous members
of the previous government in Serbia have kept their positions of directors
of companies, and have directly used pubic affairs for private gains.1
There are several legal ways to limit conflict of interests. In Serbia, how-
ever, there is a ban for ministers and other high state officials to hold other
public offices,2 but this regulation is not enough. It is necessary, first, to
expand it and make it more precise and, second, to resolve the legal prob-
lems of sanctioning, which exist now, and primarily in the domain of legal
legitimacy for initiating of proceedings. Then, laws need to be passed on
the obligation of officials to register their wealth on entering of a public
office, which would make possible the control of their wealth at the begin-
ning and the end of public service and destimulate corruption.3 Also, it is
necessary to legally regulate the obligation to register gifts received by the
officials, and to limit their value, so that corruption could be separated
from signs of attention. The passing of such a law in the parliament is not
enough: it is necessary to secure its implementation, which was not done
up to now.
Ethics and fighting corruption 
The low level of trust of citizens in the authorities and state officials rep-
resents a great challenge for the new democratic regime in Serbia, even
more because from the ethical behavior of government employees depends
the quality of the democratic institutions and economic development.
When they act wrongly, the state institutions become inefficient, and the
trust of citizens and economic actors in state institutions decreases.
Independent activity of government employees in Serbia has increased
with the political changes. The recent strong control by political leader-
ship of the country over the work of all subordinate bodies and individu-
als, based on party membership and loyalty to the leader, is now replaced
with a decentralized approach and much larger autonomy of state bodies
and employees. This result was not attained as part of a plan, or of a dif-
ferent approach, but as a result of democratization, the character of polit-
ical authorities (coalition of eighteen parties), the youth of democratic
institutions, and lack of experience of the new authorities in managing the
state. Government employees are faced with new and different goals and
conflicts of interest because of the reform of public administration, devo-
lution of responsibility, larger administrative discretion, changed relation-
ships between the public and the private sectors, and increased focus on
the market. Additionally, the rapid changes of the surroundings, including
the change of the fundamental values and institutions, add to the uncer-
tainty about the future behavior of state employees.
With political changes the character of corruption is Serbia is chang-
ing. While under Miloeviæ the large, centralized corruption dominated
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1 For example, Simpo company has increased the prices of its products several times pre-
cisely before the general limitation of prices. The director of Simpo was Vice President
of the Government of Serbia and  has used inside information.
2 Law on Public Administration.
3 Several ministers from DOS governments have publicly, at the time of taking office, listed
their material possessions, but it was not done precisely enough, nor did everyone do so.
in favor of the political nomenclature (cleptocracy), in the future there
will probably prevail the ordinary, smaller bureaucratic corruption.
Therefore more significance will be given to the battle against this kind
of corruption.
Ethic standards are one of the basic tests of the arbitrary misuse of dis-
cretionary power. Without an ethical barometer it is hard not only to
measure the level of corruption, but also to wage a battle against it. Ethic
standards place barriers to the motivational system of an individual, or
they suggest and determine what is good, and what is not. If a government
employee is not abiding by the ethic standard and basic values of the
administration then this represents breaking of the rules and a sign that
corruption is possible, and even probable.
In addition to agreeing to the goals and the need for building of good
ethic standards, in the contemporary world two somewhat different
approaches are used in implementing of ethic standards: the first is based
on the strict following of rules with prescribed administrative procedures,
control mechanisms, and detailed rules of what a government employee
should do, how to do it, and what he must not do; the second approach is
based on principles and goals and on professionalism, and is strengthened
by incentives and the encouraging of good behavior.
Serbia needs both approaches. The present public administration has
learned to obey orders, but without the application of procedures based
on laws and professionalism, supplemented by incentives. For this reason
it is necessary to establish written rules of conduct for the administration,
which should be strictly followed, while breaking of rules would be pun-
ished. On the other hand, it is necessary to strengthen consciousness
regarding the principals and goals of public administration, introduce
appropriate incentives and spread among the government employees the
sentiment of serving of the people and the state. 
Modern ethic principles in the working of public administration con-
tain the recommendations of the OECD to governments of member coun-
tries and other governments:
 ethic standards must be clear, so that employees can understand and
implement them; for this reason, it is necessary to formulate and
publish basic ethic principles and standards,
 ethic standards must be contained in laws, because the laws establish
the basic, minimal mandatory standards of behavior of a government
employee; ethic standards thus represent a framework for investiga-
tion, disciplinary action, and punishment,
 government employees should exactly know their rights and obligations;
to be able to react in a right way when exposed to wrong actions, they
must be aware of all the prescribed procedures and of the special
chain of responsibility, as of their rights to protection from their
superiors,
 political leaders are responsible for keeping of high ethical standards,
especially by giving a personal example in carrying out of their duty,
 higher civil servants are also responsible for maintaining of ethic stan-
dards, by way of their leadership role in the administration, by which
they are in a position to present a model of ethical behavior for lower
employees and citizens,
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 work conditions should encourage good behavior; it is needed to develop
encouraging conditions for ethical behavior, as are positive condi-
tions for advancement, personal development, reimbursement, train-
ing and similar.
The ethical approach to the problem of corruption, as to other prob-
lems, cannot be sufficient by itself, not only in Serbia but elsewhere.
However, disregarding it cannot be productive either. It is certain that
only a combination of different methods in fighting corruption can give
good results, and the ethical approach has its significant place in that
combination. 
DEREGULATION OF ECONOMIC LIFE 
Introduction 
It is very hard to propose a correct (in other words realistic and practi-
cally usable) answer to the question in how it is possible for a society to
successfully fight mass corruption. We can see that we are dealing with a
very serious problem by the fact that corruption represents a serious and
constant problem in all societies, also in those, which are democratic in
their structure and with an efficient and stable market economy. Corrup-
tion, therefore, also functions in those countries, which have all the rele-
vant, and century old institutions. 
We can differentiate, along with simplifying, two possible approaches,
or two global strategies for fighting corruption. One of the solutions for
the problem of corruption, which is often proposed, is additional
bureaucratization. It boils down to institutionally organized strengthen-
ing of the process of oversight and control of the work of government
employees. This approach in reality does not represent anything else
than an attempt to put out the fire, but the activity is not aimed
against the very causes of the fire. Inclination toward this strategic
approach in searching for a solution for the problem of corruption could
be deduced from the position of the majority of citizens of Serbia
towards the causes of corruption. They, as we saw in survey results,
believe that lawlessness and the lack of the rule of law are the most sig-
nificant causes of corruption. The second strategic approach originates
at the position that one should act against the very causes of corruption,
or that it is necessary to establish institutions of a free market economy.
Such a strategy means among other things a high level of deregulation
and liberalization of economic life. 
It is interesting that the majority of citizens are in reality skeptical towards
the possibility that corruption can be fully wiped out. Thus 40.5 percent of
those polled think that corruption in Serbia will always exist, although simul-
taneously they believe that its level can be somewhat decreased. Only 4.9 per-
cent of those polled are fully optimistic, or believe that corruption can be
fully abolished. Our position is that a strategy of acting against the causes of
corruption would be acceptable, or that it would give better results for Serbia
then additional bureaucratization. We are in particular inclined to this posi-
tion by results of the survey conducted with private entrepreneurs.
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Powerness of bureaucracy
Is it realistic to expect that additional bureaucracy, or increased over-
sight and control can resolve the existing problem of massive corruption
in Serbia? It is possible to list several open issues that bring such an
approach seriously under question. Above all, one should have in mind
the problem which arises with every constructivism: human actions have
both the intended, but also the unintended effects, therefore actions of the
bureaucracy, even those well intentional, are not free from unwanted and
unexpected negative consequences. This is not the only problem that aris-
es in the implementation of this strategy. If one attempted to solve the
problem of corruption in Serbia by only adding control and punishment,
then the problem would only be transferred from the existing, to a higher
hierarchical level. This would demand further enlargement of the control
chain. The process of enlargement of the control chain would in reality
establish a need for new bureaucrats who would have the task to control
the already existing controllers. Then soon the need will arise for control-
ling them. The circle goes on. Bureaucracy would in this way systematical-
ly be encouraged and enlarged.
All that we said is nothing new and represents an already identified
problem in implementing of this strategy in developed countries,
although they have very developed systems of internal control of govern-
ment employees. The implementation of such a strategy would be made
especially difficult having in mind the existing institutional, and before
all the legal-political, framework in Serbia. Let us repeat that 67,1 per-
cent of citizens believe that the judiciary system is unreliable, and 58,1
percent believe it is unable to execute its own decisions. Both citizens
and private entrepreneurs gave the same assessment. This strategy would
accomplish only that corruption would be positioned on higher levels,
which would become even less accessible to public control. Bureaucracy
of social and especially economic relationships, as was seen earlier, in
reality represents the basic cause of the problem of mass corruption in
Serbia and therefore it cannot be an efficient solution and the strategy in
a struggle against it. 
Deregulation and liberalization 
Corruption, therefore, having in minds methods of its development, its
skilful and hard to catch disguising and growth, cannot be efficiently
dealt with by administrative measures. The list of efficient measures for
preventing the development and spreading of corruption should be based
on removing its very causes. Economically speaking, it is necessary for the
incentives for corruption to be removed. This solution is in line with the
thinking of the liberal doctrine and assumes the deregulation and liberal-
ization of the market in the real sense of the word. The mentioned activi-
ties more precisely mean the opening of room for private initiative,
decrease of state interventionism, and of different kinds of arbitration in
economic life. To the smallest possible level should be brought down all of
those incentives, which lead to the appearance of the actors ready to cor-
rupt (demand), and also those who are ready to be corrupted (supply).
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This means the removal of the economic-systemic preconditions for the
appearance of actors of corruption. 
Every loss of economic freedom generates, as we have shown at length,
preconditions for generating, continuing, and expanding of mechanisms
of corruption with all negative effects that follow. This simultaneously
means that only by institutional (legal, political, economic) arrangements
that protect and expand the economic and political freedom, which is
based on it, is it possible to develop necessary preconditions for decreasing
and stamping out of corruption. 
Having in mind the present state of society in Serbia, it is essential to
simultaneously establish elements of a free and market economy and ele-
ments of a democratic society. In this way, measures for fighting corrup-
tion in Serbia simultaneously represent the measures for the necessary
social and economic reforms. When we limit our attention only to the
economic system, the change actually means that it is necessary to create
conditions that will result in an advent of competitive economic order.
This means opening of the room for free private initiative, with trans-
parent, defined, institutionally protected, and strictly respected rules of
market activity. 
To eliminate causes leading to corruption in Serbia it is necessary to
revitalize or, more precisely, again formulate the standard assumptions for
a market economy: stable intuitional framework, private property, free-
dom of agreement, and individual entrepreneurship. Deregulation of eco-
nomic life does not mean anarchy, as is interpreted by certain individuals
or political groups either maliciously or unknowingly. Spontaneous mar-
ket competition in Serbia should take into account the existence of a
strong and inviolable system of market rules. This means that it is neces-
sary to establish institutions, which support the market economy and
which grant the full economic freedom to its active participants. 
A significant measure which is necessary to carry out the reform of the
economic system, and which is significant for removing of causes of cor-
ruption, represents the liberalization of prices. This is unavoidable for sev-
eral reasons. Above all so that it could finally be made clear in Serbia
which manufacturer is able to bear the pressure of competition, and which
is not. Liberalization of prices should end the existing confusion on the
market regarding the level of success of certain companies and industries,
and make it possible for them to identify those production programs that
represent a real comparative advantage. Such a state  in which efficiency
is measured only by the success on the open market  at the same time,
will decrease the incentive for lobbying in any sphere of economic activity.
The demand for services of corruption will be decreased. 
On the other hand, economic policy should also follow this process.
This means, first and foremost, creating conditions where the government
restrains itself from active participation in the economic processes. It is
especially important to ban its power to redistribute profits from some
participants to others. It is necessary to make it institutionally impossible
to conduct discriminatory economic policy. Government employees in
case of the deregulation of economy will not have the power to influence
economic processes, and therefore will not be objectively able to offer
services of corruption. All together these measures should, although not in
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a short time, encourage the formation of a different business ethics that
would not have crime as its base.
Deregulation of economic activity would cause, therefore, the decrease
of economic power of the political elite. It would be reasonable that
processes of deregulation be followed by both political and economic
decentralization, which also means the strengthening of the local govern-
ment. We will revisit this part of the anti-corruption strategy in another
part of this study.
Individual recommendations
Every institutional limitation of freedom almost as a rule leads to cor-
ruption. This effect especially holds true for limiting economic freedom.
One should not neglect the fact that without the existence of economic
freedom, the political freedom by itself (expressed in a high level of
democratization of a society) is not able to prevent corruption. 
For the existing statist manner of managing the economy in Serbia,
which is the basic reason for mass corruption, to be replaced by a compet-
itive economic order, it is necessary to carry out significant institutional
changes, which are reflected through the necessity of a rapid change of cer-
tain significant economic-systemic laws. They should promote and pro-
tect economic freedom.
1. To arrive at the deregulation of the economy in Serbia, it is necessary,
above all, to privatize the social and state capital, and assets. Without pri-
vatization, which would encompass a rapid, compulsory, and massive pri-
vatization, it will not be possible to establish a new institutional infrastruc-
ture. Without the new institutions it is not possible to encourage and
maintain efficient and free entrepreneurship. Only private property can in
the given conditions initiate the true market mechanism in Serbia and
thus overcome the destructive and deeply rooted economic statism, which
we have identified as one of the most significant institutional causes of
corruption. It was demonstrated, also, that private property in the past
represented a very strong barrier against corruption. 
The new Law on Privatization represents a step in the right direction,
because as the basic methods of privatization it foresees the sale of social and
state capital and property by competitive techniques  tenders and auctions.
This should exclude the possibility of corruption, because, in general, com-
petition of interested investors disables the seller (state and her employees)
from discretionary decision-making and from taking bribes. 
However, even competitive techniques are not always resistant to cor-
ruption. They are not when the bidding is not based on one criterion, for
example price, so that the winner can be easily and exactly determined.
During privatization the price is usually the most important criterion, but
others are also used, like the readiness of the buyer to invest in the compa-
ny, or to retain a certain number of employees. When there are several cri-
teria, then the singularity of the solution to the question of the winner is
lost and the decision is often based on an individual feeling of the one or
those who make the decision on the importance of individual criteria. Or
it is based on a bribe.
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The privatization strategy of the Government of Serbia is based on sale
by tender of the larger and best companies, and the criteria for choosing
the best proposal is the price, scope of investment in the company, and
preservation of employment. Therefore the possibility for corruption is
introduced. Economic logic states that it is best to rely on only one criteri-
on  the price  but the social and political circumstances and believes
induce the inclusion of the other two mentioned criteria. 
The only cure against corruption during the tender sale could be the
transparency of the decision making process, but it is interesting that the
Law on Privatization does not determine who makes the decision on the
chosen bidder  the managing body of the company or the Agency for Pri-
vatization  but leaves this issue to other regulations, which is not good.
2. Parallel with the change of the privatization law it is necessary to ini-
tiate the change of the existing legislation governing the creation of new
companies. It needs to be simplified, from the formal and legal aspect.
This means significantly shortening of the procedure and, therefore, the
complete bureaucratic procedure to register a new company. The process
should be faster, more efficient, and unbiased. Particularly numerous
licenses of a technical nature should be banned, like those pertaining to
sanitary, power and other issues. The positive effect from such a change
could be many-sided. This would, above all, decrease the possibility for
the misuse of office by government employees who participate in the
existing complicated bureaucratic chain. On the other hand, such legal
simplification of the procedure for opening of new companies would lead
to formation of a different market environment. In this way conditions
would be developed for decreasing of the existing level of highly concen-
trated market structure in Serbia, or it would develop a much more com-
petitive market structure then in the past. This would lead to elimination
of a significant part of the existing causes of corruption in Serbia since
there would be left ever less room for administrative regulation.
3. All dealings pertaining to public procurement should be made much
more transparent. This means that they have to be accessible to the control
of the public opinion, as of appropriate institutions which should follow
their legality. On the other hand, the processes of public procurement
should not be limited only to local companies, or it would be advisable
that they also include interested foreign companies. In such a situation
competition would be strengthened, which would lead to arrangements
under most favorable conditions. This, or course, does not mean that this
is enough to fully eliminate corruption in these activities (which is illus-
trated well by the collective resignation of the members of the European
Commission over corruption), but it would in the mentioned way be sig-
nificantly decreased.
4. The mentioned changes that influence the formation of room for
new entrepreneurs should be followed by changes of the Law on Labor
and Employment. The present state of highly formalized level of protec-
tion of workers and the nonexistence of the free competition between
workers in one company, as between the unemployed and those employed
is unsustainable. It is necessary to go towards the establishing a labor mar-
ket in its real sense, or establishing of mechanisms for allocation of labor
according to knowledge and abilities of workers, or processes where
knowledge and abilities will be the only criterion for selection. In such
conditions when the criterion of market efficiency is the only relevant one,
there is no free space to acquire by corruption a quality work position. The
affirmation of the hard labor market and rigorous insisting on respect
for laws would lead to the decreasing of the gray market of labor and
therefore to a lesser amount of incentives for corruption. 
5. Changes are necessary in taxation. The tax system was, as we have
already seen, to a large extent directly responsible for the encouragement
of mass corruption in Serbia. Above all, it is excessively complicated and
inappropriate for unambiguous implementation. It is necessary, therefore,
to significantly simplify it, and make it transparent to decrease the need
for its additional interpretation and in line with that decrease the possi-
bilities for its misuse. It would be desirable that discretionary rights of the
state in this domain be fully eliminated. In other words, it is necessary to
decrease to the lowest possible level the space for, present massive, evasion
of taxes by privileged companies and individuals. The change of the struc-
ture of the tax tariff, especially the decrease of the taxation of salaries,
would lead to the decrease of the gray market and its quicker inclusion
in the formal market. 
6. Also the field of foreign trade should be regulated differently then in
the past. Deregulation of this sector means liberalization of the domestic
market, or the need for banning of foreign trade barriers. Liberalization
means banning of the quantitive import-export limitations and lowering of
the level of customs protection. This means among other things banning of
the system of export licenses, as of all other protectionist measures of eco-
nomic policy. It is necessary that the system of foreign trade policy much
like the tax system be as transparent and as simple as possible, and to con-
tain as little discretionary authority as possible. In this field legislative regu-
lations used to be an especially great incentive for corruption in Serbia. It is
no accident that citizens saw the customs service as the activity with much
corruption (4,47), and 31,7 percent of those polled named the customs
service as the institution where corruption is present the most. The survey
of private entrepreneurs has shown that import and export licenses are at
the very top of the causes of corruption. They are ranked on the second and
third place. Deregulation and liberalization of the market would ban these
corruptionist activities almost over night. During the past months signifi-
cant steps were taken towards the reform, or liberalization of foreign trade,
but there is much room for further changes.
Establishing of these few listed measures of deregulation in Serbia will
not be simple at all, since massive corruption in the previous decade caused
a serious social problem. It has, on one hand, induced processes which have
resulted in social inertia, and, on the other hand, it has formed financially
powerful and influential lobbies which are preventing, or are opposing, any
kind of deregulation and liberalization. These lobbies, which are not hard
to identify, will most certainly be the cause of the greatest resistance to
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deregulation and liberalization of economic activity, because they will
attempt to retain the previous privileged position. 
The above mentioned problem at the same time represents a great test
which will verify the power and determination of the new authorities in
Serbia to carry out radical economic reforms and to justify the high expec-
tations of voters (as much as 60 percent of citizens expect from the new
authorities a significantly lower level of corruption) which have voted for
them. Also there is a high level of confidence that private entrepreneurs
have expressed towards the new authorities. It is their turn now to justify
this trust. 
REFORM OF THE JUDICIARY SYSTEM 
Introduction 
There are a number of arguments for the assumption that key causes of
the phenomenon of corruption in the judiciary are exogenous, that its
massive scope is a result of overall social and economic crises, erosion of
public morality, flaws of the legal system, and crises of institutions. From
this follows the assumption that the battle against corruption in the judici-
ary cannot be won only by making changes in those exogenous factors that
make corruption possible and encourage it. Still, the institutions reform in
the judiciary represent a significant precondition for eliminating or
decreasing of corruption.
The text which follows, and which will be focused on the reform of the
judiciary much more then on other factors or subjects, will outline the
direction of the wanted reforms, with concrete suggestions, based on con-
crete facts, ranging from the position of the judiciary institutions to the
human factor.
The basic premise is the one contained in the current constitution (arti-
cle 96 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia) and international docu-
ments4  independent judiciary  that, however, does not mean it is
uncontrolled and irresponsible.
Relationship of the judiciary and other authorities in fighting the cor-
ruption in the judiciary
The judiciary is best defended from corruption by its independence.
There are two dimensions of that independence: independence of the court
as an institution and the independence of the judge as a person. The inde-
pendence of the court, as an institution, is reflected in its independence
concerning bodies of the legislative and executive branches of government
and other organs, organizations, and individuals. The independence of
judges, as individuals, is represented in their freedom to pass unbiased
decisions, based on personal judgment of facts and personal understanding
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of the law, without limitations, influences, inducement, incentives, pres-
sures, and interventions, direct or indirect, exerted by anyone for whatever
reason. Various influences always aspire to reach the court, and if they do
reach it or not depends exclusively on the judge. For a judge there must be
no authority besides law and justice. Judges must not be directed by rulers
or leaders, army or police, party or mafia, relatives or friends, best men or
acquaintances, etc. By no one, apart from their conscience. While routine is
enough for doing many other state job, for the successful carrying out of
the judiciary authority one needs an almost a God-like power of reason,
because a judge decides on life and death, freedom and lack of freedom,
ownership and property, damage and compensation, truth and lies, law
and lack of law, justice and lack of justice, use and misuse of law, hence
about the most significant and most subtitle goods and interests of people
and their communities. For this reason a judge must become worthy of the
office he executes. In this way he will gain the trust of the people in whose
name he passes decisions. Trust is gained: by strengthening of respect, hon-
orable life, unbiased rulings, personal integrity, dignity, and bravery. And
by the codex of the judiciary which, whose canons instruct: be independ-
ent, be just, be professional, be free, be brave, be appropriate, be incorrupt-
ible, be committed, be apolitical, and be true to the code.
The judiciary must become free from politics, which has to a largest
extent corrupted it, after first infecting it with class prejudice. The judici-
ary must not belong to a class, as it did in the party state, so it can become
just, as it has to be in a democratic state. The road from a class court to a
just court transforms a class judge, a lackey of the party state, into a just
judge, an apostle of the rule of law. A just judge does not search for the will
of the ruling class, but grants everyone that which belongs to him in the
same proceedings with the same things, in unequal proceedings with
unequal things in accord with their inequality in proceeding towards
another as towards himself. A just judge is able to resist all pressure and
influence. For this reason he must be of strong character.
In the Yugoslav and Serbian law the principle of the division of power is
proclaimed: courts are autonomous and independent. The principle,
however, was not fully operational, and a number practical deviations
bring to question the independence of judges and courts from other
branches of government in a way where it is possible to defend a hypothe-
sis that they are necessarily subject to influences of representatives of the
legislative and executive power, political elite, in a way and scope that one
can talk about corruption. This is manifested:
 in the manner of election of judges and heads of courts, in which the
decisive role is played by the legislative authority, the assembly and
its working bodies, with an indirect influence of the executive
authority (ministries); 
 in the manner of financing, since the courts and judges are financed
from the (general) budget, which at the proposal of the executive
branch is passed by the parliament, and the funds are managed by the
minister. From the budget and its status depends the financial posi-
tion of courts as institutions and of judges. The material dependence
is even larges because this financing includes also the privileged
financing, for example (surely not in the last place of importance) the
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granting of apartments and credits for purchasing apartments. The
author of this text wrote twenty years ago that any redistribution of
social and state-owned apartments (which today also means to pur-
chase them under privileged conditions) is unjust, regardless of the
planned and implemented criteria; simply, during the competi-
tion, one gets all, the rest get nothing. 
This material dependence of the judiciary and judges also has a number
of more subtle forms, in which a significant role is played, by distributing
and directing the funds between the executive authority and the judges, by
court administrations, for example through (quasi)specializations of
judges by participating in congress tourism, acquisition of equipment and
renovating of offices, and the like.
It is logical that all of this results in accessibility of judges to the influ-
ence of the executive branch, or political factors that form it, to an extent
which can be marked as corruption.
Institutionally this state can be changed by introducing of a separate
court (judiciary) budget, with court autonomy in planning and the realiz-
ing of its use. It is possible that one part of this budget can be secured from
court taxes.
The material status of judges in any case must be significantly
improved, independently and faster from the general increase of the stan-
dard of living in Serbia (Yugoslavia). Very low salaries are not, of course,
an excuse for corruption, but are doubtlessly a condition which is favor-
able, especially when they are on the brink or below the existential mini-
mum and when the income of judges (to whom law forbids alternative
additional sources of income) is in the total amount lower then guaran-
teed for other categories. 
Election of judges and heads of courts 
This very significant issue was brought up in the previous section and
pertains to the initial election into the title of a judge, the permanent sta-
tus of judges, and conditions and procedures for removal from office, as
also to the advancement of judges, or election to the higher and the high-
est courts. It also has a special dimension, the issue of transition, the
change of the existing situation, both when talking about the existing judi-
cial human resources, and when dealing with the institutional organizing
of this field.
1. The existing judicial personnel, at least according to the majority of
appraisals, is not satisfactory. The appraisal can be defended by logical
analysis.
First, if there is any sense in discussing the need for changing of the
manner of recruitment of judges, the premise is that the present manner is
not satisfactory. If it is not good, then it could not have provided quality
judges and presidents of courts.
Second, if appraisal stands that corruption in the judiciary is extensive 
which is true, judging by the survey results given in this study, and by
results of several earlier surveys (this appraisal have among other things
given the judges themselves in a survey organized by the association of
187The Anti-Corruption Strategy
judges in 1998)  then a question can be put forward is it not the elemen-
tary condition for fighting corruption the change of the judicial personnel,
in a way and in scope which overcomes the regular changes.
Finally, it is known that the judiciary in the past ten years has signifi-
cantly changed itself, that the office of judge was vacated by a large num-
ber of judges, that new judges were recruited, that the political criteria
played a great part in this, that economists without judicial experience and
needed knowledge were elected to the highest judicial offices, according to
political and similar merits; the fact that the present president of the Con-
stitutional Court of Serbia is an economist and was previously a social-
political worker is paradigmatic (of course this generates susceptibility to
all forms of corruption). 
If previous assumptions hold, then a question can be put forward is it not
necessary to examine the judicial personnel, remove from the judiciary
those who have shown themselves to be lacking quality, those who have
misused the office of the judge. This is a question, which was raised in many
countries in transition, and somewhere (The Czech Republic, for example)
it received a positive answer: a general re-election of judges was carried out.
In our law this idea has a constitutional barrier; the constitution pro-
claims the permanence of judges, a judge can lose his office only for precise-
ly named reasons (article 101 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia). The
thesis that the change for this reason and the effort for the dismissal of
judges who have, according to the constitutional and legal condition,
unskillfully and unscrupulously performed their function of a judge does
not seem encouraging: in the procedure for the dismissal the decisive role,
according to the Law on Courts, have the judges themselves (general session
of the Constitutional Court of Serbia), so it is probable that they will not
vote for their own dismissal. The constitutional reform does not seem like a
very attractive idea, not only because the Constitution of Serbia is hard to
change; in a society like ours, the permanence of judges represents a (rela-
tively recently established) heritage which is dangerous to sacrifice.
For this reason there appears a practical idea: as part of the judicial
reform, which is necessary anyway, abolish the existing courts, and there-
fore their judges, and establish new ones. This circumnavigating of the
constitutional solution, not too elegant, could be practical, if the (re)elec-
tion of judges is carried out in line with all election principles that have to
be contained for the reformed judiciary.
2. The manner of the election of judges, as was said previously, is char-
acterized by a formal domination of the central legislative authority, with
a hidden influence by the executive authority, and through them the
unallowed influence of political criteria. There are several ideas to reform
this: (1) direct election of judges, elections to be carried out by citizens
like elections for other representatives of authorities; objections are that
this is not in accord with continental law tradition to which we belong,
that there is no logical link with the permanence of judges for which it is
taken that represents the bases of their independence and, finally and
most important, the expert, professional criteria in direct elections will
unavoidably be in the second plane or at least endangered; (2) decentral-
ization, in the framework of the generally existing system, so that judges
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would be elected by representative organs of the territorial unit (local
government, provinces, or republics) which the court covers; objections
are that the influence of political power, in a smaller surroundings, would
be even greater; (3) election of judges by an independent professional
body, for which it is said that it is against the constitution which grants
the national Assembly the authority to elect judges, and (4) form an inde-
pendent expert body which will have a decisive role (as the only one
authorized to propose candidates) in the election process, while the for-
mal election would be left to the national Assembly.
For the author of this text the last possibility seems most attractive.
First, it is in line with the general tendency that certain traditionally state
functions are granted to independent bodies (for example, regulating
body for telecommunications, media). Representatively organized and
autonomous, this body would, if it has sufficient institutional capacities
and guarantees, support and develop the highest professional and moral
standards (of course, if by other elements: social respect, financial stan-
dard, the vocation of a judge becomes attractive for best candidates). Ideas
exist on members of this body: it would be made up of distinguished and
experienced judges, law professors, lawyers, and possibly distinguished
representative from other fields of the legal profession.
Still, it is also necessary to point out the weaknesses of this proposal.
First, the idea about an independent body is not coherent; a certain insti-
tution has to name this body and regarding this institution the body is not
fully independent. (This flaw could be decreased by diversifying of the sys-
tem of proposing members, and by separating it from decisions on the
appointment of judges. For example, candidates for the body would be
named individually by the association of judges, or the organization which
encompasses judges, the law school, the lawyers organizations, associa-
tion of legal professionals). 
Such a body would have a strong mandate (members would be hard to
dismiss), without the possibility of reelection, as one of the guarantees for
full independence. The Assembly, which finally decides on the proposal,
could move only in the bounds of the proposal formed by this body.
Organization of the judiciary and the court control of the judiciary 
Traditional organization of the judiciary in Serbia (with a domination
of courts of general competence with only one kind of specialized courts,
commercial), with the rules of competence and some rules of procedure,
demonstrates certain weaknesses which can be qualified as an appropriate
milieu for the generating of corruption as a phenomenon, and not in indi-
vidual cases.
As a bad consequence of the existing organization, which can support
the generation of corruption, are noted:
 non existence of specialized courts or at least of institutionalized spe-
cializations of judges, which causes the insufficient efficiency of
courts, excessive role of court experts on whom the outcome of a case
depends  and all of this is space for the appearance of corruption;
 excessively easy and inexpensive access to the court (low court taxes,
non existence of mandatory professional representation or defense
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except in certain cases), which leads to numerous low-cost lawsuits
which block the court, cause inefficiency, and again form an environ-
ment for corruption;
 wide open doors for revision and other extraordinary legal remedies,
which means that the Supreme Court practically lost the role of cas-
sation, and that courts are de facto three-level, but it also makes that
the court process, until it reaches the final decision, lasts too long
(Serbia would hardly stand up to the control of the European Court
for Human Rights in the implementation of article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights), etc.
For the reform position it is worthy to focus on the last point. A clear
division of appellant and cassation role of the highest court would
increase its authority. Simultaneously, one could expect the formation of
the unified judiciary practice in the narrow sense of that idea. One of the
positive consequences would be that incorrect court decisions (as a con-
sequence of corruption) would be more visible, and therefore also made
more difficult. The social and judicial reaction to such cases would be
more probable, which would lead to stamping out of corruption in the
judiciary. 
The judiciary is also defended from corruption by establishing of a legal
order in which courts will act in a more organized manner and more effi-
ciently. And they will act in this way if the bottleneck of the original juris-
diction becomes passable; if specialized courts take their part from the
general arsenal of competence; if the appellant courts take over the com-
plete second-level jurisdiction; if the administrative court takes over the
solving of administrative cases from the Supreme Court and the regional
courts; if the Supreme Court finally becomes a cassation court. All of this
is expected from the announced Law on Courts and Judges. 
A reconstructed judiciary will strengthen the immune capability of
judges to stand up to temptations of corruption.
Lawyers
Lawyers in our country are traditionally organized as an autonomous
and independent activity, organized in a bar, and in that sense no reason is
visible for significant institutional changes. Still, certain issues demand
attention.
Traditionally, the bar was in this country open for admittance, with a sys-
tem of registration, if traditional conditions were met. A tendency toward
limiting admittance were caused most likely by (anti)market reasons: a great
number of legal professionals became lawyers, many for reasons of econom-
ic nature (leaving the badly paid government services, demise of commer-
cial companies which had developed legal departments, ect.), even for lack
of political suitability for other legal professions. Of course one can think
about professional standards in setting conditions for inclusion in the reg-
istry of lawyers, about the manner in which the bar exam is organized, but
those are questions of taste and lesser importance; one can see no reasons
for establishing significant barriers in this form of legal activity, regardless of
the sad statement that sometimes legal representation is refuge for those
who cannot find another job in the legal profession. Closing of the bars for
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new members for reasons of competition (there is not enough work for so
many lawyers) is not acceptable; this is a question that needs to be regulat-
ed by the market of legal services.
Nevertheless, two issues initiated by the public deserve attention.
The first is the question of the possibility of former judges becoming
lawyers. It is pointed out that there is an excessively large possibility of
unfair competition here, and of special status which such lawyers have in
courts where they used to work. This, essentially, implies the possibility of
various kinds of corruption. For this reason a ban is proposed on the
inclusion of former judges in the register of lawyers, for a certain number
of years (3 to 5), on the territory covered by the court in which they used
to work. This at the first glance acceptable idea has flaws. First, the work of
lawyers in this country is not linked with the territory of one court so this
limitation would be easy to evade, or it would be necessary to establish a
more serious system of limitation, control, and exceptions. Second, if
enforced in full, it would be a serious barrier for crossing over of judges
into this profession, since in this country the territorial mobility is tradi-
tionally small, and was made even more difficult for economic reasons.
Third, a strict limitation could be undermined from the standpoint of
constitutionality, the availability of professions to all under equal condi-
tions (article 35 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia).
The general trend is more often in the opposite direction, a desire for a
transfer from a lawyer to a judge, as a result of professional advancement.
The second question is the one of the control worthiness for the pro-
fession of a lawyer. It could be shortly defined as: for the inclusion in the
register of lawyers is it possible and desirable to introduce certain elimi-
natory conditions, pertaining to the person of the candidate, or to his
previous life as a guarantee that in this profession, as a profession of spe-
cial trust, will not be entered by those who are ethically controversial and
have inclinations towards breaking of legal and moral norms, and even
towards corruption.
A general positive answer opens up a number of other issues, for example: 
 is the unworthiness for the profession of a lawyer to be foreseen by a
general flexible clause, with leaving of discretionary assessment to the
bodies which determine it or by decisively listing the reasons, for
example by linking them to a certain committed criminal offence; the
first method carries a danger of arbitrariness, and the second, besides
that it is necessarily too narrow for the goal it has in mind, opens up
the question of rehabilitation of the perpetrator of a criminal offence,
clearing of the penal register, etc.
 does the rule and its implementation have to be part of autonomous
rights and decision making of the bar, or on the other hand a legal
rule, with court control of the decision. The choice among the alter-
natives has not only formal consequences, but in a new way opens up
the issue of the autonomy of the bar.
It is interesting to link the two previous problems: can one who was dis-
missed enter the profession of a lawyer from the office of a judge for
unskillful and unscrupulous performance? If he was a bad judge  to the
extent he had to be dismissed  what are the guarantees he will be a proper
lawyer? A positive answer could, however, lead to an even more restrictive
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implementation of the conditions for dismissal of judges: we would be
dealing, practically, with professional elimination.
We are dealing, obviously, with a complex reform issue, which demands
subtle measuring of arguments. Yet, this option deserves full attention. 
Public Attorney
The public Attorney is an independent state body that prosecutes the
perpetrators of criminal and other acts punishable by law and uses legal
means for protection of the constitutionality and legality. (article 103
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia).
In the reform of this delicate organ the appropriateness could possibly
be examined of the two of its jurisdictions: prosecution of punishable acts
and protection of legality and constitutionality by uses of extraordinary
legal means (request for the protection of legality) in the public interest,
and at the request of the interested parties in the proceedings.
When one determines the points which connect the two jurisdictions,
the question will remain is it appropriate that the same organ is, on one
hand, specialized, and, on the other hand, able to deal with illegality in all
branches of law and all types of proceedings.
Attorneys will probably be partially relieved from carrying out of the
second function when the ombudsman is introduced to our legal system.
In designing of its jurisdiction, as in the reform of the position and juris-
diction of the state (public) prosecutors there should be found the real
role for the attorneys in the general protection of legality.
When discussing the basic jurisdiction of the attorney, few issues war-
rant attention:
 Deciding, in certain circumstances, on initiating criminal proceed-
ings according to the principle of opportunity, by discretionary judg-
ment. In the best case, we are dealing with rules that must be an
exception, clearly stated.
 Establishing of centralized and hierarchical organization of attor-
neys (by itself not unacceptable) by mandatory instructions. Having
in mind the need for the equalizing of the interpretation and for
identical implementing of the law, mandatory instructions are a
dangerous instrument, which can always have a tendency to grow
into a parallel and uncontrolled source of law, which weakens legal-
ity, allows different measures and generates a milieu for the influ-
ence of corruption.
 Precisely defining the complicated relationship, before initiating of
a bill of indictment, in the triangle investigative judge, attorney,
police. Although the attorney is under obligation to initiate activities
of criminal prosecution as soon as he learns of the criminal act, or
perpetrator, the attorney often explains the lack of action by the
non-existence of criminal charges by the police. Also, the attorneys
explain the lack of criminal prosecution by the lack of corporation
by the police, by the fact that the police does not initiate investiga-
tive acts that the attorney has demanded. Therefore one should
think about the introduction of a criminal police force that would
be more directly linked to the attorney, like the one that exists in
some countries. In this way the negative conflicts of jurisdictions of
attorney and police could be avoided behind which may stand a
willful exemption from criminal prosecution (corruption). This can
be true for the relationship between the attorney and the investiga-
tive judge. After making of a decision on initiating of an investiga-
tion, the investigative judge is the one who heads the procedure, and
the attorney based on that investigative procedure should decide on
initiating of an indictment and its content. Thin indictments and
requalification during the main proceedings in favor of the accused
are justified by the lack of coordination between the attorney and
the investigative judge. This creates a room of discretionary deci-
sion-making and manipulation: a clear ground for corruption. 
The reform of the attorney‘s office is necessary and it must be
approached in a very careful and balanced manner.
Court administration, court experts and other participants in pro-
ceedings 
Expertise, professionalism and modernization are important features
for the necesarry reforms of the court administration, which would signif-
icantly influence the decrease of the possibility for corruption. Since this
chapter deals with the reform of the judiciary system, we will mention
only certain needed changes which also have a legal dimension, beginning
with cases of discovered corruption in practice, with all reservations
regarding the number of cases, and of the modes of operation.
 Reform of rules on process activities performed by court clerks, so as
to decrease the possibility of discretionary decision making and evad-
ing of the law. For example: reform of the rules on delivery of docu-
ments, on official records and archives, including modern means of
official record keeping (computerization, ect.).
 Simplifying of technical rules of the executive procedures and greater
responsibility of executive staff.
 Precise authority of the court management regarding court adminis-
tration.
The institution of court experts, as one of the sore points of our judici-
ary, can hardly be changed by institutional means. The problem is con-
tained in the professional and ethical standards and it is possible that cer-
tain advancement would be attained through professional organizing of
certain professions (medical associations, organizations of bookkeeping
professionals, and similar), under a condition that the organizations have
functioning professional and ethical control mechanisms. Possibly those
professional organizations should be granted the right to participate in
forming of lists of permanent court experts. 
Conclusion 
If the hypothesis is correct that the key causes of corruption in the judi-
ciary are exogenous, that they originate, on one side, from zones which
enter the judiciary, interests which are achieved by means of the judici-
ary, and , on the other side, that the legal origins are linked to the overall
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shortcomings of the legal system, the reform of the judiciary system is only
one of the elements of the anti-corruption strategy in general and in the
judiciary.
From the analysis it follows that such a strategy has to be based on the
following:
 cleansing of the existing judicial cadre, or the legal and constitu-
tional removal of those who have misused judiciary functions of
whose professional education and experience are not a guarantee for
successful execution of this function,
 strengthening of the independence of the judiciary form other
branches of the government, by various institutional measures,
including financial independence,
 change of the legal system of election of judges and other holders of
judicial functions, also with the aim of strengthening of its inde-
pendence,
 more efficient and transparent organization of the system of courts,
technical modernization of courts,
 strengthening of professionalism and responsibility of other partici-
pants in court proceedings.
REFORM OF THE FISCAL SYSTEM
Collecting of income and state expenditures represent the basic element
of demonstrating the power of the state, but also an important or basic
cause of corruption in many countries. Over the centuries many methods
for defending of the state from corruption were developed, and especially
on the side of collecting duties, like bookkeeping and audit methods, but
the success is not great, especially on the side of public expenditures.
Evasion of taxes, customs duty, and other duties is high in Serbia. It
would be hard to say that this would be possible without the responsi-
bility of the tax and customs administration, or employees of those
services, or that this guilt is solely reflected in inferior work and bad
organization. 
The greatest source of corruption in Serbia is, at least up till now, is the
customs service. A fully non-transparent and uncontrolled system was
formed, under the direction of only one man, director of the customs
service. The privileged could do anything, from the import of forbidden
commodities, to not paying customs duties. The rest could not, when a
good deal was in question, import even those things that represented legal
import. Also small corruption grew rapidly.5 Even the honest customs
officers were hurt.6
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5 The following joke is popular: one customs officer asked another:  what should we give
our colleague for his birthday? A Mercedes?  No, answers the other, its not enough. 
A house?  No, its not enough.  Should we let him work by himself for one day?  No,
its too much.
6 One anecdote known to the author: a young customs officer gave to his superior, whom
he trusted, a list of license plates of trucks (probably with cigarettes) which crossed the
customs line without any papers and without control; he did not attempt to do any-
thing more, because he knew that it was smuggling supported by the heads of the cus-
toms service and the state; soon he was arrested for a couple of days, just as a lesson.
In the field of collection of taxes and other duties corruption has been
present. It is less developed in the process of determining of taxes, and
more in collection and control of collection. Large businessmen linked
with the previous regime did not pay taxes, nor did the financial police
control them. Because of their interest even the annual income tax for cit-
izens was not introduced. They represented a taboo. Also for smaller play-
ers, it was possible to avoid paying of taxes, either by decreasing the calcu-
lation, or by simply not paying (this remained unsanctioned, and by the
paying of a bribe. 
Also the expenditure side of the fiscal system was subject to corruption.
However, in Serbia during the past decade there was no significant state
investment or purchasing of most valuable equipment, and therefore the
chance for the greater corruption was connected with public procure-
ment. In the future things will change, along with economic growth and
the increase of state expenditures. However, the smaller corruption during
smaller state procurement is a daily occurrence, and especially popular
and well known on the local level.
Public revenues 
Every successful anti-corruption strategy in the tax sector, as in any
other, must originate from motives and possibilities of corruptionist
behavior. For motivation, it is necessary to develop a feeling of a mission
and camaraderie among government employees, but this is not enough. It
is good to introduce both positive and negative stimuli. 
Among positive incentives, the most important is the mechanism of
determining of salaries based on performances of every individual tax col-
lector and financial policeman. This mechanism of compensation already
exists in Serbia, but it is not used often enough; either the bonus is distrib-
uted equally, or the boss distributes it based on personal likes and dislikes.
It is necessary that the process of stimulation be made transparent and
public, so that unfair distribution would be stamped out and good work
be rewarded. When determining the amount of stimulation it is necessary
to strike a good balance: on one hand it has to be encouraging enough, but
on the other hand it must not represent an excess burden for the budget
and must not encourage the employees too much so they would not,
because of being over zealous, make the citizens worse off.
Punishing for corruption represents negative stimulation. Punishment
should be made public, so it would act as a deterrent for other potential
perpetrators. Punishment as the only remedy for corruption cannot give
positive overall results, because it will bring not only the decrease of cor-
ruption, but also of work enthusiasm; and therefore it should be com-
bined with positive incentives.
Influencing the motivation of the employees in the Public Income
Administration and the Financial Police is not sufficient for stamping
out corruption, and it needs to be supplemented by a system of measures,
which will decrease the possibility of discretionary decision making by
these officials. 
Simplification of tax laws and procedures is most likely the best way for
limiting the possibilities for corruption. The present fiscal system in Serbia is
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very complicated and it includes more then two hundred different taxes and
duties, with numerous exceptions and exemptions, which decreases the
transparency of the system and grants a wide maneuvering room for discre-
tionary decision making, and thus for corruption. The change of numerous
tax laws in March 2001 represents a first step in a good direction (especially
in the sense of widening of the tax base), but not enough in the direction of
decreasing of the number of tax forms and more significant simplification
of procedures and removal of discretionary decision-making.
It is also necessary to strengthen internal control, so that it would not
happen, for example, that a taxpayer gains a profit because of the inactivi-
ty of the administration or because of the lack of control of business deal-
ings, and because a bribed inspector has failed to follow the prescribed
procedure. It would be useful to form special anti-corruption units in the
Public Income Administration and the Financial Police, whose task would
be to fight corruption. 
Control of the collection of state revenues, and the handling of budget
funds, should not be subject only of internal control (from appropriate
organs or ministries), but also of external control. The fiscal system of Ser-
bia lacks an institution, which exists in many countries, and is an oversight
and an expert body, which would be independent of the authorities and
linked to the Serbian assembly, similar to the General Accounting Office
in the US. It would have several functions, and one of them should be
expert and analytical oversight of activities of the tax administration and
controls, including the anti-corruption component.
It would be useful to accept the Fiscal Transparency Code of the
International Monetary Fund, by which numerous information about
the fiscal system would be made public and, first of all, accessible to the
assembly, whose one of the basic functions is the supervision of the
executive power.
Public procurement
Public procurement was always a field sensitive to corruption. In the
more recent history of Serbia the first corruption scandal, almost century
and a half ago, was linked to military procurement, the army minister, and
his relatives the merchants. Reasons for the attractiveness of public pro-
curement for illegal activity is easy to see: on one hand, they usually repre-
sent a significant part of public expenditures and of the social product of a
country, and the value of individual contracts is often very high, and, on
the other hand, the potential bribe for the one who makes the decision on
procurement can several times exceed his life time earnings. Temptations
are great, and the risk is, in too many cases, too small.
The largest corruption potential is to be found in large construction
projects  highways, dams, waterworks, airports, government buildings, etc.
 not only because investments are large, but also because they are complex
undertakings, suitable for varying of the quantity of material and quality of
provided services. This is followed by purchases of large equipment, like air-
planes, military technical equipment, buses and trucks, construction equip-
ment and generators, and the like. However, smaller acquisitions of office
expandable supplies, uniforms, fuel, and the like are also interesting.
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The largest procurements do not have to represent the largest problem,
because they are easiest to control, if there is a will to do so. It is most dif-
ficult to secure fairness of smaller procurements, which are larger in num-
ber and cause less interest.
It is usually believed that corruption takes place in the final phase of
negotiating a deal, or that the two sides reach agreement on corruption
directly before making of a business deal, when all offers are known. How-
ever, the agreement is often reached much earlier, in the early phases, at
the time when the government employee formulates the request for the
purchase (and when specifications are adapted for a certain party) or
when the list of qualified suppliers is made (and when a certain party is
included, and another is not). Of course, corruption is also an agreement
of potential suppliers on a joint strategy, which secures a higher price then
would be reached under competitive conditions. Corruption also exists
after entering into the contract, because the service provider or supplier is
attempting to break even for the costs he had incurred by giving bribes
or to make additional income, which can result in an insufficient level of
quality of services or extent of supply of some goods.
A good system of public procurement secures a sufficient level of goods
or services needed by the state for meeting its functions supplied at a
favorable price, on time and of good quality. It is effective and economical.
Conditions for the acquisition should be widely publicized, and the con-
tract should be granted to the one who satisfies all the requested standards
and demands and who offers the best offer. Rules of procurement should
be clear and fair, the procedure of procurement transparent, and results
predictable. 
Most favorable results, both from the standpoint of economic efficien-
cy, and the minimizing of corruption, are attained through competitive
bidding of a larger number of bidders, under an assumption that they are
qualified, or that they passed the test of capability, and dependability. The
basic elements of such a competitive method are:
 public notice of the competition, with a call for participation,
 documents that should clearly state the kind of procurement,
describe the competitive process, contain conditions of the contract
and list the criteria for electing the winner,
 offers are forwarded in closed envelopes, which are opened at a pre-
viously known time and place, in the presence of representatives of
bidders,
 an unbiased evaluation of bids is carried out by a competent person,
without influences of bidders or other parties,
 contract is granted to the bidder, which meets all the conditions and
has the best bid according to the previously published criteria.
Competitive procurement limits the power of government employees
and in this way protects the state from corruption. Such procurement
removes to the greatest possible extent discretionary decision making
about the selection of the bidder and commodity, because it is based on
the process of competition and establishing of clear procedures and crite-
ria for selection.
The above-mentioned demands are best achieve by an open tender. Only
in a certain class of procurement it is not possible or it is not advantageous
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to use the full tender system. Instead either the limited tender or another
technique of procurement is used.
Many multilateral and financial organizations develop and offer com-
petitive methods of public procurement. The World Trade Organization
encourages countries to use its rules, while the international development
banks (World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, ect) use (and condition) loans, which they give with following of
those rules. Their goal is the most efficient use of loans, including the fight
against corruption. 
Since FRY became a member of the European Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (EBRD) and since it already begun receiving credits from
this institution, we will examine its rules, and note that they apply to both the
projects fully financed by EBRD, and also projects it finances only partially.
Simultaneously, this will be a good example of rules for public procurement.
EBRD asks from its clients that during public procurement they use an
open, competitive tender. Only in special cases contracts can be made on
the basis of a selective tender or on individual offers. 
An open tender is a procedure that means 1) that all interested bidders
be previously appropriately informed about demands of the future con-
tract and 2) all bidders have an equal chance to submit an application and
to win the competition. In this way the widest competition is secured, with
positive effects on economy and efficiency.
The Bank does not even allow discrimination of participants in regards
to the country of origin. All companies have a right to participate in ten-
ders, regardless if they originate from Bank member countries or from
other countries. The only condition for participation is the ability of the
company to carry out the contract.
The EBRD reserves the right, in case of corruption, to reject the propos-
al of the project, discontinue payment of the installments of the credit if the
recipient does not undertake prompt action and disqualifies from future
tenders the companies that participated in corruption. At the same time,
the Bank includes in its contracts a standard clause by which it reserves the
right to send auditors to companies which were granted contracts for pub-
lic procurement, which will examine their invoices and books.
Open tenders are mandatory for negotiating goods and services valued
above 300 thousand Euros and for constructions valued above 5 million
Euros. To discourage the tactic by which large procurements are divided
into smaller ones, so to avoid open tenders, EBRD states in its rules: no
demand for procurement must be divided with an intent to decrease the
value of the contract under the limit so that this rules be avoided. For
procurement below these values the Bank encourages clients to contin-
ue to use open tenders, but they can use other procedures based on com-
petition and transparency. 
Standard procedure of competitive procurement include the following
five steps: 1) informing those interested of the possibility to forward bids,
2) pre-qualification, when needed, 3) a call for bids and provision of ten-
der documentation, 4) submission of bids, their assessment, and choosing
the most favorable bidder, and 5) administration of the contract.
Informing about the future tender is aimed at offering a chance to
interested parties to prepare well for the tender itself (agreement with
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subcontractors, securing bank guarantees, ect.). The goal of the pre-quali-
fication is securing of, especially in large and complex projects, bidders
which are really capable to carry out the contract, and taking in account
their experience, personnel and technical capabilities, and financial ability.
A selective tender, where state bodies previously conduct a selection of
bidders and invite only them to offer bids, is possible in specific circum-
stances: when the product is highly specialized and very complex, when
the list of possible suppliers is limited and when the acquisition is urgent.
It is possible to put forward a bid by only one supplier, but only when
dealing with additional procurement of a same commodity or service,
when the product is exclusive and for standardization with the existing
equipment.
The EBRD allows tenders for domestic manufacturers when dealing
with a small value of procurement, when domestic prices are lower from
international and when it is clear that foreign companies have no interest
to participate in the tender. These tenders are carried out according to
rules of open tender.
For goods of standard specification and small value, it is possible to use
the method of common purchase on the market, which means acquiring
of three bids with specified prices.
The procedure od public procurement that EBRD demands from its
clients if based on the Agreement on Public Procurements, accepted by the
World Trade Organization (WTO), where the formal acceptance of this
agreement is not a condition for joining the WTO. Also, the World Bank
prescribes similar procedures for projects it finances in full or partially.
Accepting of these or similar rules for organizing public procurement
decreases room for discretionary decisions by state organs and their
employees, and therefore the possibility of corruption, but does not ban it
in full. There is always certain room for agreements and bribes, because
the rules cannot foresee every situation, nor can discretionary decision-
making be fully excluded. Best results are achieved by a coordinated effort
aimed at corruption. Everyone must be aware that breaking of rules of
public procurement represents a violation, which will be discovered and
punished; there is a need for effective monitoring of the process of pro-
curement from another body, made up from independent professionals;
there is also a need for a subsequent audits of the process of procurement;
an independent judiciary system is necessary, which will not be corrupted
and which will unbiasly assess eventual breaking of rules and pass punish-
ment for the perpetrator; also decent salaries for government employees
are needed, which will reward honesty and decrease the need for the prac-
tice of corruption.
Certain changes in the system of public procurements in Serbia took
place during the past six months. Individual authorities are implementing
competitive techniques of procurement at their own initiative, the best
possible way they know. Usually bids are collected, which is a significant
step forwards compared to the previous period, but is in no way enough,
because it is the least transparent and least competitive method. There-
fore, it is necessary to pass a law on public procurement, which would pre-
scribe mandatory tender procurement and transparent procedures for all
valuable acquisitions.
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PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION REFORM 
Public administration must serve the citizens and the people, and not
its own interests or interests of the ruling individuals and parties. For this
reason it must support democratic values and principles established by the
constitution, adhere to the highest ethical standards, provide services in an
unbiased and just manner, efficiently use the available funds, encourage
the participation of citizens in decision making, be subject to supervision,
make its work transparent by providing correct and timely information,
be professional and based on law, and have career advancement based on
accomplishments and abilities. 
Public administration must be to the highest degree depoliticized. The
highest echelons of public administration will always be made up of the
representatives of parties in power, but the rest, lower level officials, and
ordinary employees, should be politically independent professionals. They
should secure the continuity of the public administration, so it would not
be undermined during every future change of government, and should
collect and expand professional knowledge so they could do their job in
the best way and advise politicians (ministers). Politicizing of the public
administration opens the door for breaking of procedures and laws, and
therefore to corruption.
Public administration must implement its discretionary power in a pos-
itive manner, which means to attain only those goals for which it is
authorized, to be unbiased and to use only those factors which are relevant
in a certain case, to respect the principle of equality before the law, to
make decisions promptly and to respect general principles, but to have
understanding for special situations.
When deciding on a certain case, public administration must adhere to
valid procedure: to inform parties on the manner of decision making
regarding the demand; to hear out the party and take under consideration
its statement and fact it has brought forward; to make public the reasons
why a certain decision was made; to inform the party on the appeal proce-
dure against the decision. In general, the procedure of activities of the
administration must be written in the law, and not arbitrary or left to the
will of ministries or other state bodies.
An audit is necessary and in line with that precise implementation and
adhering to the law on general administrative procedure and special
administrative laws, especially in the field of taxes, customs, and internal
affairs. The process includes internal administrative procedures, demand-
ing that all procedures be saved in written or electronic form. Rules on
informing on corruption (whistle blowing) are also needed, to encourage
government employees to discover and turn in, in specific circumstances,
the violations of their superiors. 
A successful state anti-corruption policy of the government is made up
of a combination of instruments and activities that are mutually consistent
and correspond to circumstances in the administrative surrounding. All
methods of prevention and control mechanisms should be organized in the
framework of the current, economic, political, legal, organizational, and
operative structures. In answering the current needs, these mechanisms
should be planned and applied for future needs of a modern, society of
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European orientation with efficient state mechanisms. Due to this it is
necessary to have a well organized internal control of the administration
and external supervision. Also there is a need for adequate leadership and
management, based on international experience and standards. The legal
framework is in the center of all anti-corruption strategies. Laws, especial-
ly the criminal law and the public administration law, define the basic
standard of behavior and work of government employees. For this reason,
detailed review of these documents is necessary to harmonize the system.
Laws, rules, and regulations are implemented by the method of investiga-
tion and criminal prosecution. The review of the policy of implementation
of laws is also necessary. The process of turning in and finding out, inves-
tigation, prosecution and punishing of bad behavior and corruption
should be based on strict adherence to legal rules, which are in accord to
determined European standards. Internal procedure is necessary to deter-
mine the facts, and not to take the place of the law.
The draft of the new criminal law introduces a number of new articles
pertaining to corruption, misuse or pilfering of public funds from the
budget, public procurement, privatization, corruption in the judiciary and
public administration, corruption connected to lawyers practice, the sys-
tem of medical protection, education, public information and mass
media, and forging results in sport competitions. A group of articles of the
law (articles 256-265) represents the current situation in the country, and
not an adequate systemic answer to problems connected to corruption,
bribery, and various opportunistic activities in public services. Unfortu-
nately, draft criminal law leaves much unfinished. It seems a bit dracon-
ian, unbalanced, so it needs further elaboration and perpetuating. Legal
instruments for stamping out corruption would have to be more encom-
passing, more systematic, mutually more strongly connected, directly reg-
ulating other problems also, like the conflict of interests and the like.
Therefore, if the criminal law secures the protection in a way that is envi-
sioned now, then a new law on corruption and conflict of interests is nec-
essary. The new law would mark specific and incriminating procedures for
the complete public service, but especially for higher government officials,
public figures and managers of public services, when they act in the frame-
work of the conflict of interests and other kinds of corruptionist behavior. 
A new law on the performance of government employees, based on the
experiences of other countries, should be passed. Besides passing of this
law on performance, which would provide ethic guidelines for all govern-
ment employees, the government should undertake measures for securing
of synergy between a concept of public administration based on obedience
and prescribed procedures and the concept based on ethic management
and integrity. Therefore, to stamp out corruption, the government should
focus not only on the strict respect for the letter of the law, but also on
promoting of the law on performance, which provides the ethical bases for
all state services.
It is necessary to understand the linkage between a) a strict, centralized
public administration based on laws and obedience and 2) a public service
based on process and integrity. On the other hand, the ethical framework,
based on the hard to catch aspirations and encouragements in a devel-
oped, result-based model of public administration, represents the heart of
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a modern public service. The state imperium is not a base for change  we
must accept ethics, and not only secure the functioning of law.
Impartiality, professionalism, and integrity are basic values of all mod-
ern public administrations. This signifies equal access to public services,
the protection of minorities, and equality before the law. Old values of the
public administration (legality, discipline, and loyalty to work) should
also be added to the new values (efficiency, transparency, and awareness
for rights of citizens), which depict social demands, changes in expecta-
tions of the population, and changes of methods and techniques of public
management. 
Ethic law or law on performance. Taking into account the conditions in
the country, a regulation on the behavior of government employees is nec-
essary. It could be passed as a government decree. Forming of an ethic infra-
structure demands constant effort in training, establishing of standards, and
management of social institutions in an ethically focused administrative
surrounding. A positive influence on the relationship between civil society
and public services will rapidly be seen. Citizens trust public institutions and
their founders when they see that the public services are used for the com-
mon good. In our situation, certain innovations would be necessary to con-
struct an all-encompassing ethical framework. The decentralized organiza-
tion of our society in the past century, could provide certain ideas, which
represent tradition and are constructed in our memory.
Integrity, public administration without corruption and daily work of
government employees based on ethics are essential for constructing of a
modern, decentralized system which will create a personal identity for the
lower levels of public institutions and strengthen the trust of citizens in
those institutions.
Strong and unbending political determination of the present govern-
ment is of vital importance. It should be made official and pursued by
appropriate activities. Reform of the administration cannot be imple-
mented without organized activities for stamping out corruption. 
In our greatly secretive surrounding, strong support should be given to
transparency. Several key measures are necessary:
 all activities by government employees should be based on rules and
reasons for making a decision, except in certain strictly limited cases
when a discretionary right is allowed, for reasons of protection.
Authority and scope for the use of discretionary right should be
brought to a minimum, because it could provide fertile ground for
corruption;
 it is necessary to make possible administrative correction of the
majority of decisions, which could be accomplished by adequate
decentralization;
 determine standards for administrative time limits;
 obtain a legal and organizational procedure, which secures access by
media to the activities and results of the work of the administration. 
An all-encompassing anti-corruption strategy followed by an action
plan should be developed, with the participation of the central (state) bod-
ies. They are the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of External Affairs,
Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Finance, Ministry for Foreign Economic
Relations, and the Federal Customs Service. The process of implementa-
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tion should include good communication, training, and mastering of the
anti-corruption strategy.
An adequate training plan with specialized programs for government
employees on all levels and in all sectors is an important element of the
reform of public administration, as is the strategy for fighting corruption.
Employment of new employees should be regulated to accomplish
equality. Yet, it should be selective in certain sectors. The process of orien-
tation for a new job of these beginners should include the basic mandato-
ry training in ethics, law on good behaviour, and anti-corruption. A com-
prehensive training program and an adequate educational program
should be constructed for government bodies and agencies susceptible to
corruption. Specialized and intensive training is necessary for organs
included in activities of fighting against corruption, as are the police, judi-
ciary, and defense force.
The selection based on clean criminal records would precede employ-
ment in certain government agencies. Then a comprehensive training
should be secured for especially sensitive services like: tax administration,
customs service, public procurement, public investments, and services for
cooperation and trade with foreign companies in the state owned or con-
trolled companies.
Liability mechanisms should be regulated by law and fully transparent.
Corruption should be easy to identify. The legal framework for accounta-
bility is necessary, so that it could represent a framework for the activity of
all public services, determine the results of the anti-corruption effort, and
secure the implementation of the appropriate legal proceedings. 
A Parliamentary anti-corruption committee should be formed, and it
should be authorized to appoint ad hoc working groups for battling cor-
ruption in certain sectors. The committee would undertake its activities
either independently or in support to activities of other executive bodies.
Combining of procedures is necessary having in mind the general sur-
rounding of public services. The anti-corruption strategy on the state level
should also include the potentials of certain non-government organiza-
tions (NGOs) and trade unions. Cooperation of the government, NGOs,
and unions would secure strong joint action, attaining of quality, learning
from comparative experiences of other countries, and would accelerate
the implementation of measures for fighting corruption.
The new law should also require that all higher-level government
employees register their material status, income, real estate, and business
capital.
The need exists for development of a thorough detailed and compre-
hensive administrative and oversight procedure, which would identify
responsible personnel to discover substandard behavior, and initiate pre-
ventive and penal procedures.
Reform of public administration should be implemented on the bases
of experience of other countries with developed system for fighting cor-
ruption. Therefore, all the active and passive forms of corruption should
be declared criminal offences. Additionally, all other forms of corruption,
like direct and indirect corruption and in some cases attempted corrup-
tion, should also be declared criminal offences. The new law should secure
appropriate regulations.
203The Anti-Corruption Strategy
The results of the work of internal control auditors inside ministries,
sections, and other organizations should be available to the public. The
procedures, which make possible this process, should be included in and
protected by law.
Independent and detailed examination of activities of the public
administration on all levels must be institutionalized in several ways. In
addition to the parliamentary commission, it is necessary to have external,
independent checking of accounts, to be carried out by a best audit agency
and the ombudsman. The jurisdictions of both institutions have to be
expanded to the complete public administration. At least once a year
results of an independent audit and ombudsman should be published.
A full analysis should be undertaken of the failures, criminal trends, and
unethical behavior of the previous regime. An anti-corruption program
should be launched after the completion of this analysis. This program should
be suitable for rapid action and be merciless: if all main types of corruption are
not identified, causes and results studied, and sanctions determined and
implemented, then the anti-corruption strategy cannot be successful.
It is necessary to determine a central institution to coordinate the
implementation of measures connected with corruption, based on a har-
monized legal framework, and provide guidelines, on the national level,
and for the development of a policy of prevention in all bodies and organ-
izations of public administration. 
It is also necessary to include all of the relevant non government and
other organizations of civil society in preparations of the appropriate poli-
cies and building of public consensus on prevention of corruption and the
strategy of repressive action on the central and local level, and if needed
also on the level of individual organizations. 
There is a need for establishing a Public Administration Institute. Edu-
cation, which increases knowledge and develops skills in public adminis-
tration, is the basic element of the strategy of the reform of public admin-
istration. New skills should be developed to achieve essential changes and
changes of behavior. The anti-corruption strategy needs a careful, coordi-
nated, centralized, standardized, and specialized system for the immedi-
ate, effective formation of skills and knowledge. This would greatly
strengthen the government in its activities in implementation of the anti-
corruption strategy. Additionally this would aid ministries and other
agencies in envisioning and implementing a new policy of fighting against
corruption. The Institute would develop an educational plan for the com-
plete public sector, including in it elements of the anti-corruption training
program, based on similar programs of other countries. The Public
Administration Institute would also be in a position to develop various
specific, educational programs, based on international experiences and
adapted to the needs of certain institutions. 
In the police of Serbia it is necessary to cleanse the MUP workforce by
separating from service those policeman who have engaged in crime and
corruption. Their place is no longer in an institution whose task is fighting
crime and corruption. The courts are the place for those for whom cor-
ruption can be proven. This would give a strong and convincing signal to
others that corruption does not pay, or that the leadership of the police
force has seriously decided to stamp out corruption.
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It is necessary to additionally develop the system of internal, discipli-
nary control, which in the past, if it was used, could have given better
results. In the long run, it would be more advantageous to transform the
existing system of internal control into a special organizational unit inside
of MUP (police within the police), which would exclusively deal with
discovering illegal activities of members of MUP.
In this domain a great barrier to discovering and stamping out corrup-
tion represents the so called code of silence, or professional solidarity and
the unwritten rule that a colleague is not to be turned in for a disciplinary
violation or criminal act, and that testimony is not to be given against him.
For fighting corruption in the police force it is necessary to activate the
existing mechanisms of external control and establish certain new forms
of civil control, like the ombudsman. Serbia should introduce this institu-
tion and within its framework one ombudsman should be responsible
exclusively for the police.
One of the means for fighting against corruption is the so-called codex
of police ethics passed by the UN, and then by a number of countries
(Canada, France, England and Wales, Slovenia, ect).
It is necessary to improve methods and program contents of institu-
tions for education of policemen. Even Archibald Raise pointed out that
educating a policeman should be more careful than with others, because
their responsibility is greater, their profession is difficult, delicate, and
often dangerous, so a policeman cannot be be created quickly.
Of the utmost importance for preventing and stamping out corruption
in the police force is the existence of political will to do so. Without it,
even if specific action is initiated, real success cannot be expected. The bat-
tle against corruption can be won only if the leaders and government have
the will to undertake political risk to make a break with the past and to
build institutions through which a modern economy with a free market
can be developed.
The joining of Yugoslavia in the international anti-corruption pro-
grams will surely benefit the stamping out of corruption, which is in great
part present in organized crime, both transnational and national. Corrup-
tion stimulates organized crime and represents its second phase.
In health care a number of measures need to be implemented similar to
those in other fields of public administration and domains of the society,
but also a number of measures specific for health care.
In addition to escalating punitive measures, to decrease the level of cor-
ruption in health care it is necessary to reform the system of health insur-
ance and health protection, so as to change the character of this discipline
towards competition. For health care to function in an unobstructed way,
it is necessary to decrease the role of the state and encourage competition.
The role of the state would be brought down to regulating of this domain
and monitoring of implementation of legal regulations. The state would
determine the rules of the game by passing a law on health insurance and
health protection. The job of the state is to be an unbiased arbitrator who
will demand that all actors follow the rules, and not favor certain partici-
pants, as it does today. For competition in the health care market however
it is necessary for the health insurance funds to be independent financial
institutions, in which their assemblies will name executive councils, make
205The Anti-Corruption Strategy
decisions on the amount of the insurance premiums and levels of benefits
in respect of the chosen insurance plan. It is also necessary to establish
competition between state medical institutions, as well as between the pri-
vate and state medical sectors. Also, by changing the way of paying a med-
ical staff, those employed in medical institutions would be encouraged
towards competition. In this way conditions are formed so that medical
staff be motivated for higher quality, and therefore economically more
profitable work. Their salaries would not be fixed, but would depend on
real expertise and quality of work.
A medical practiotioner is the one who has to provide support to the
patient, to heal in accord with the medical doctrine, to demonstrate real
care for the process of medical attention. A patient has to trust the doctor.
This establishes in full an ethical relation between a doctor and a patient.
Not everyone can answer the demands that arise from practicing medi-
cine. For this reason it is necessary, as one of the basic criteria in the selec-
tion of medical students, to establish the psychological ability, or the
strength of moral character, the readiness to be deprived of many things,
and dedication to work. 
Passing of ethic codes should confirm what a medical worker must do,
and what he must not do under any conditions, without previously select-
ing those who practice medicine will not give positive results in a fight not
only against corruption, but also against unskilled medical practice. 
INDEPENDENT ANTI-CORRUPTION INSTITUTIONS
In addition to the state bodies which regularely, in accordance with
their functions deal with corruption, like police and the judiciary, it is nec-
essary to establish new bodies, which will in a specialized way deal with
this problem. The reason for establishing new bodies is to be found in the
lack of sufficient readiness of the regular ones to successfully deal with
corruption, which is the result of either 1) their lack of ability and training
for a conflict with ever more sophisticated corruption or 2) their partici-
pation in corruption. The second reason is dominant in Serbia, although
the first one has significant influence, too. In such a situation it is good to
form new bodies, with clean records and equipped with specialized knowl-
edge and abilities.
Agency
Many countries have, in recent years, formed anti-corruption agencies or
commissions, seeking new ways to stand up to corruption. Success was par-
tial, and failures occurred when agencies (commissions) were badly organ-
ized and/or when the reasons for their formation were mostly promotional. 
The basic question during the establishment of an anti-corruption
agency is how to secure its independence from politics, or from political
factors, which can be part of the circle of corruption. Full independence is,
of course, not possible, because someone has to establish it, prescribe the
rules of operation, finance, and control its work. For the success of the
agency it is good if it is linked to an influential individual (president or
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prime minister) who is dedicated to fighting corruption, but, at the same
time, this is also a danger because someone else can take his post, someone
less agile, or someone corruptible. Then the agency can be used as a tool
against political opponents or even, as a mean for coercion and corrup-
tion. Therefore, the anti-corruption agency should be linked to the
Assembly of Serbia, and its activity subject to oversight of higher courts. A
positive circumstance for the establishing of such an agency in Serbia
today is the fact that no party has the control of the assembly, so no one is
in a position to name an obedient party worker to head the agency, which
would automatically lead to its discreditation.
The next important issue is the authority of the agency. It can be educa-
tional-preventive and/or investigative. It is the best if it has both, accord-
ing to the Hong Kong model. The investigative function means the right
to have access to documentation and a right to question witnesses.
For the agency to be successful in its work, it is necessary to secure
strong political support, or independence so it can investigate activities
in the highest levels of power, sufficient resources, and the necessary
process rights.
Similar units should be established in those branches of public adminis-
tration, which are prone to corruption or are already corroded by corrup-
tion. Their independence would be less from the independence of the
main agency, but it is still possible, if there is good will by the appropriate
minister and the corresponding influence of the main agency, that they
play a positive role in resisting corruption in the public administration.
Main Control 
The executive branch of government, which is usually under the
strongest corruptionist pressure, and has the greatest potential to engage
in corruption, needs external oversight. The assembly has the authority,
but the representatives are usually not competent enough for this task and
the executive branch, on the basis of its better access to information and
greater knowledge, could mislead the assembly. For this reason the assem-
bly needs a body that will permanently deal with state income and expen-
ditures and carry out their audit. The state budget is an overly important
thing in every country for its spending to be left to the honesty of the gov-
ernment and its employees. Due to this in many countries such a body was
formed, independent of the government and with a primary function to
supervise the spending of budget funds, not only of the central, but also of
local authorities, and state companies. 
This body could be called the Main Control, according to an old Ser-
bian institution formed almost a century and a half ago. The election of
the Main Controller, as the head of the Main Control, would take place at
the assembly, which would decide on funds needed for the functioning of
the Main Control. In addition to controlling of spending of budget and
other state funds, it could also be the budget court, a very useful expert-
analytical organ of the state, and the like.
To safeguard the independence and secure the efficiency of the Main
Control, it should have a legal base in the constitution and laws, and poss-
es functional, organizational, and financial independence, have process
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rights and sufficient resources to audit all state accounts, and to freely
make known its findings to the assembly and the public and use interna-
tional standards for audit.
Ombudsman
The new government of Serbia has indicated the introduction of the
institution of ombudsman for several reasons, but its role in fighting cor-
ruption can be significant.
The ombudsman is a protector of the people, he is contacted by citizens
with a complaint on the work of the state administration or other institu-
tions when they are not working like they should, when regular ways in
attaining of a certain right or obstructing or violating of a right and justice
were shown to be slow or impassible. The ombudsman investigates deci-
sions, which are against the law, other rules and regulations, and not in
line with customary procedure; decisions that are biased, unjust or dis-
criminating; not passing of needed decisions, delays, lack of attention,
incompetence and inefficiency in the work of the administration. It has
the access to government documents, so it can investigate the complaints.
The ombudsman does not undertake typical investigative or prosecution
activities, but attempts to examine the mistakes of the administration so
that they can be corrected.
The ombudsman must be fully independent, especially from the official
authorities, so that it could be successful and that citizens would trust it. The
trust of citizens is the basic condition for the success of the ombudsman.
ACTION PLAN 
A successful struggle against corruption demands a comprehensive
approach, consistency, and permanence of action and strength in imple-
mentation, based on previously determined responsibilities and rules.
Basic elements of an anti-corruption program are:
1. Resolve: the basic precondition for fighting corruption is the resolve
of political leadership of the country and all of subordinated bodies
and their clear determination to fight corruption, based on the
awareness of negative influences of corruption on the efficiency and
integrity of the work of the public administration, and therefore on
economic, social, and political life;
2. Responsibility of the Assembly of Serbia: the Assembly of Serbia, as
an expression of the public will and sovereignty, represents the basic
barrier to corruption and the most important factor in the fight for
good management and against corruption; its two key functions are
the legislative and supervision of the work of the executive branch;
3. Responsibility of the Government: the operational fight against cor-
ruption is the responsibility of the Government of the Republic of
Serbia, and the federal government in the domain of its authority,
and they have to designate the fight against corruption as one of their
priorities, to conduct it permanently both through the state institu-
tions, and also by proposing institutional reforms; 
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4. Break with the past: that the government investigates all important,
known and unknown corruption affairs from the previous period, so
that perpetrators would be punished and thus give a strong signal to
all potential violators;
5. Transparency: make the work of all state organs and individuals
maximally transparent and public, by way of the presence of media
on sessions, publication of reports on the work of state bodies and
the like;
6. Accountability: secure the accountability and responsibility of
everyone in the public administration, from the government and
other state bodies, through parties and political leaders up to every
public employee;
7. Decreasing of discretionary decision making: execute maximum
deregulation of rules, wherever possible, so to decrease the discre-
tionary rights of the public administration and reduce the potential
field of corruption;
8. Legal regulation: pass anti-corruption legislation and supplement
the criminal legislation, so that corruptionist activity and attempted
and prepared corruption are precisely sanctioned;
9. Public procurement: pass a law on public procurement, based on
competitive methods (tenders, auctions, ect.), which would pertain
to all institutions financed from the budget and state funds, and for
state companies;
10. Independent central body of control: establish the Main Control, an
independent body linked exclusively to the Assembly of Serbia,
which would supervise and audit the financial transactions of all
budgets and public companies, and conduct other related tasks;
investigating and punishment would be independent from the Gov-
ernment and subject to public inspection;
11. Anti-corruption agency: at the Assembly of Serbia form a specialized
anti-corruption organ, which will lead and coordinate the fight
against corruption;
12. Other anti-corruption bodies: in certain branches of the public
administration to form a special anti-corruption bodies, in the
police, customs, tax administration, health care, etc.,
13. Reform of administration: reform the public administration, based
on new laws on public administration and on administrative proce-
dure; 
14. Change the personnel: replace one part of government employees,
especially in sensitive services (customs, police, judiciary, adminis-
tration, ect.),
15. Reform the judiciary: reform the judiciary towards greater inde-
pendence from the executive branch and political parties and leaders,
16. Reform the police: strengthen internal control, special training, eth-
ical standards,
17. International law: join the Convention Against Bribery of the OECD
from 1997;
18. International cooperation: secure the cooperation of state and other
institutions and organizations of the civil society with international
partners during the struggle against corruption,
209The Anti-Corruption Strategy
19. Education: long term and short term activities of training of special-
ized services, government employees and citizens about the causes,
harmful effects, and methods for fighting corruption; introduction
of certain contents in educational programs in schools;
20. Ethic standards: developing of ethical standards of good behavior
and incorporating them in the legislation,
21. Independent media: independent media play an important role in
forming of anti-corruptionist pressure on government officials and
represents the best actor for developing the awareness about the
kinds, scope, and harmful effects of corruption; it is possible to
organize media campaigns, specialized programs, documentary
series about the phenomenon of corruption in the society; reports on
activities of competent organs, finding of investigations, etc.
22. Promotion activities and field campaigns: for the promotion of the
fight against corruption (posters in critical institutions, badges with
appropriate messages, flyers and other propaganda material; the
anti-corruption week, and the like;
23. Research activity: promotion of continued research and expert
activities on the problem of corruption, symposiums, meetings, pub-
lications, and the like; a special role for empirical determining of
progress in fighting corruption by periodic public opinion polls. 
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